Introduction
After Fiji’s December 2022 election, marking the first genuine transfer of power since the 2006 coup, optimism regarding civil liberties surged (Fraenkel, 2024). The coalition government vowed to scrap “gag decrees”, in other words, decrees that restrict public expression. In Fiji’s case, the term refers to decrees like the Media Industry Development Decree (2010), which heavily censored journalists. Yet two years on, the Public Order Act continues to restrict peaceful assemblies, and the 2013 Constitution’s near-unbreakable amendment rules frustrate reform. Currently, Fiji exists in a transitional state – democracy has been restored in structure, but its function remains constrained by the same authoritarian tools designed to suppress dissent.
New Leaders Bearing the Same old Chains
At first glance, Fiji’s civic climate has brightened since the change of government. The coalition that ousted Frank Bainimarama’s FijiFirst regime moved quickly to roll back key authoritarian-era policies. Within months, a draconian media law criticised for “severely hampering freedom of the press” was repealed, and politically motivated travel blacklists for critics were lifted (US Department of State, 2024, p. 1; CIVICUS Monitor, 2025). A revamped Fiji Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Commission signalled the new administration’s commitment to accountability (CIVICUS Monitor, 2025).
However, the Public Order Act, amended in 2014, remains intact and in force. This law grants authorities sweeping powers to restrict assemblies and use whatever force is deemed necessary in the name of public order (US Department of State, 2024, p. 3). Under the previous government, such powers had been used liberally to disperse demonstrations and detain opposition voices, entrenching what one scholar calls a “democratic deficit” in which formal elections masked the reality of curtailed rights (Ramesh, 2023, p. 32).
In practice, police and officials continue to act as gatekeepers of public space. Permits for marches are arbitrarily delayed or denied; gatherings that touch on sensitive issues are corralled out of sight. In late 2024, for instance, a coalition of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) marking International Human Rights Day found their march tightly restricted, as the permit was granted only at the eleventh hour, and the number of participants was capped until a minister intervened (CIVICUS Monitor, 2025).
Protesters carrying banners referencing West Papua or Palestine were singled out by authorities. Even peaceful vigils in solidarity with Palestine, organised by women’s rights groups as part of a global campaign, have been relocated indoors after police prohibited public gatherings on the issue (CIVICUS Monitor, 2025).=
Constitution Unyielded
Fiji’s supreme law has been described as rigid and contentious, making the Constitution effectively “unamendable” (Kirkby & Martyn, 2025). The 2013 Constitution, conceived by the military regime after it scrapped an earlier participatory drafting process, was designed to fortify the power structure of the post-coup order (Saati, 2020). On the one hand, it enshrined some progressive ideals such as a common Fijian identity and equal citizenry, nodding to democratic norms (Regan, Kirkby, & Kant, 2024, p. 165). On the other hand, the document is “distinctly illiberal” in crucial aspects, concentrating extraordinary authority in the hands of the Prime Minister and Attorney-General while sidelining traditional checks and balances (Regan et al., 2024, p. 165).
It created an executive system that marginalises opposition voices, reinforcing what observers describe as a “winner-takes-all government structure” (Regan et al., 2024, p. 165). More alarming to civil libertarians, the Constitution grants sweeping immunity to the military and government officials regarding all actions related to the 2006 coup and subsequent decrees, effectively institutionalising impunity within the national constitution (US Department of State, 2024, pp. 3–4).
Any change to the Constitution requires a three-quarters supermajority in Parliament, as well as the approval of three-quarters of all registered voters in a national referendum. With voter turnout in recent elections consistently below 75 percent, meeting this constitutional threshold has proven virtually unattainable (Kirkby & Martyn, 2025). In March 2025, Rabuka’s administration attempted to remove the referendum requirement and lower the parliamentary supermajority needed to amend the Constitution (CIVICUS Monitor, 2025). However, despite holding a majority, the government fell one vote short: 40 out of 55 MPs supported the change, just shy of the 75 percent (41 votes) mandated for passage (Kirkby & Martyn, 2025).
Potential for Reformation
Recognising that legal reforms could stall in Parliament or the courts, the government has redirected efforts toward transitional justice and policy shifts that do not require constitutional amendment. In December 2024, Fiji’s legislature unanimously passed a Truth and Reconciliation Act aimed at unpacking the traumas of its coup-prone recent history (CIVICUS Monitor, 2025). The initiative established a commission to investigate past political violence and human rights abuses, signalling a willingness to acknowledge wrongdoing, though explicitly avoiding any commitment to criminal accountability. Notably, the commission’s mandate steers significantly clear of criminal accountability. Its chairperson emphasised that the process would focus on “closure and healing” rather than prosecutions (CIVICUS Monitor, 2025).
Additionally, Fiji’s leaders have promised to review statutes like the Public Order Act and sedition provisions of the Crimes Act, which have been used to “target the media and opposition politicians” (Amnesty International, 2024, p. 7). International observers have amplified these calls. During Fiji’s Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human Rights Council in early 2025, peer governments urged the country to “safeguard the right to freedom of expression, assembly, and association” by scrapping or amending these laws (CIVICUS Monitor, 2025). The Fijian delegation accepted some recommendations and noted others, but on the ground, tangible change has largely stalled. By mid-2025, no legislative amendments had been tabled to roll back the Public Order Act’s draconian powers, and prosecutions under earlier restrictions were only being dropped belatedly.
The true measure of Fiji’s transition will not be just the laws amended or commissions convened, but the lived experience of ordinary people: Can communities march against unjust development projects without fear of police crackdowns? Can journalists expose corruption without risking sedition charges? Can opposition politicians speak openly and critically without facing midnight raids or travel bans?
Conclusion
Fiji’s democratic gains remain provisional. The Public Order Act still curbs marches, and the 2013 Constitution’s high bar to amendment keeps old power intact. Until those rules change, media freedom, union rallies, and community protests depend on the goodwill of those who hold office. Fiji officials signalled a willingness to acknowledge past abuses, though without committing to criminal accountability. Otherwise, the hope sparked in 2022 will fade, and rights that should be routine will remain permissions that can be withdrawn. Fiji can still set a regional benchmark, but only if it removes these barriers now.
Bibliography
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