Introduction
Crimes Against Humanity (CAH) encompass acts such as murder, torture, and imprisonment that are part of a widespread or systematic attack on civilians pursuant to a state or organisational policy. Historically tied to state action, as seen in Nazi Germany and Khmer Rouge atrocities, its scope has been debated, notably with the International Crimes Tribunal (ICC) for the former Yugoslavia’s Kunarac ruling extending liability to non-state actors, a shift contested for diluting the state policy nexus.
The people of Bangladesh witnessed severe state repression by the former government led by Sheikh Hasina. Initially, the student protest was regarding the quota reform, as the former government allocated an unjust percentage of the quota reserved for the descendants of freedom fighters. However, this student protest turned into a nationwide protest against the government from July to August 2024. During the time of the protest, the former government deployed lethal force, arbitrary detentions, and torture, which resulted in over 1,400 deaths and widespread abuses.
Historical Background of CAH
The term “Crimes Against Humanity” was first introduced in the First World War to address the atrocities of the Ottoman Empire against the Armenians. To elaborate, a tripartite declaration was issued by the French, British, and Russian governments in response to the crimes conducted by
The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarać, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković [2002] (Appeals Chamber) IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A.
M Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 1.
the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, through this declaration, the criminal conducts were labelled as offences against humanity and civilisation. Notably, Turkey was responsible for the systematic elimination of an estimated 200,000 to 800,000 Armenians during World War I. The declaration underscored Turkey’s accountability for transgressions against universally recognised norms. Consequently, in 1919, an Inter-Allied Commission was formed, which consisted of representatives from the Allied countries except for the United States and Japan. The Inter-Allied Commission invoked the “laws of humanity” as articulated in the preamble to the 1907 Hague Convention, advocating for the prosecution of Turkish officials implicated in the massacre. However, the trials did not take place because Turkey was granted amnesty as per the Treaty of Lausanne.
The formal adjudication of CAH commenced with the Nuremberg trials. Following the Second World War, the conflict resulted in approximately 60 million deaths, predominantly civilians, including the extermination of six million Jews and 20 million Slavs. Unlike the post-World War I period, which saw no prosecutorial follow-through, the victorious Allied powers established the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo (IMTFE) after World War II. These bodies enshrined CAH within Articles 6(c) and 5(c) of their respective charters, marking a pivotal shift toward accountability for such offences.
The modern legal construct of CAH traces its genesis to Article 6(c) of the London Charter, which defines such crimes as CAH. As per the London Charter, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, or other inhumane acts inflicted upon any civilian population, whether preceding or coinciding with armed conflict, or persecutions based on political, racial, or religious grounds in execution of any offence within the tribunal’s purview, regardless of compliance with the domestic law of the situs of commission, are CAH.
Article 6(c) constitutes the seminal blueprint for the statutory frameworks of subsequent international adjudicative entities, including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the International Criminal Court (ICC), and hybrid tribunals such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), the Special Panels of the Dili District Court (also known as the East Timor Tribunal) for Timor-Leste, and the Serbian War Crimes Tribunal (for Kosovo). Embedded within this formulation, CAH, was conceptualised as inherently tethered to state action, a paradigm that remained intact until jurisprudential innovations introduced by the ICTY altered its scope.
In the Kunarac case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber determined that the evolving nature of armed conflicts and the enhanced capacities of non-state actors had reached a juncture where CAH no longer exclusively constitutes a state-centric crime but may also be perpetrated by nonstate
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (adopted 18 October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910) 205 CTS 277.
M Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 2.
Charter of the International Military Tribunal (adopted 8 August 1945) 82 UNTS 279, art 6(c); Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (adopted 19 January 1946, amended 26 April 1946) TIAS 1589, art 5(c).
Charter of the International Military Tribunal (adopted 8 August 1945) 82 UNTS 279, art 6(c).
M Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 6-7.
entities. While the escalating deleterious conduct of non-state actors in contemporary armed conflicts undeniably poses a pressing challenge warranting redress, the Kunarac Appeals Judgement is jurisprudentially flawed. It effectuated a paradigm shift in the legal scope of CAH on tenuous grounds, selectively invoking precedents while conspicuously disregarding Article 7(2) of the Rome Statute and the attendant scholarly commentaries that affirm the necessity of a state policy nexus. Given the emergence of novel factual scenarios involving CAH-type offences committed by non-state actors, there exists an imperative to address their accountability. However, this must be accomplished transparently by extending the state policy paradigm to encompass non-state actors exhibiting state-like attributes, rather than relying upon an eclectic and incomplete interpretation of historical judicial pronouncements.
Legal Elements of CAH: Characterisation as an International Crime
It is a settled principle of international law that an offence must possess a distinctive feature elevating it from a domestic crime to one cognisable under international jurisdiction. This distinguishing “international element” manifests in characteristics safeguarding significant global interests: (a) conduct impairing a vital international concern; (b) acts so egregious as to offend universally shared values; (c) offences spanning multiple states through perpetrator or victim nationality or transnational means; or (d) conduct affecting an internationally protected interest, necessitating global criminalisation due to its reliance on “state policy” for execution. Analysis of 267 multilateral treaties reveals that the 25 recognised categories of international crimes embody one or more of these elements: (1) international: threats to global peace or acts shocking the collective conscience; (2) transnational: conduct impacting multiple states’ safety or economies, or involving cross-border actors; or (3) state policy: acts requiring international cooperation for prevention, contingent on state orchestration.
CAH, as a category, historically hinges on this state policy nexus, per Article 6(c) of the London Charter, which lists acts like murder and persecution tied to war or state-driven persecution. Subsequent formulations in the ICTY, Article 4, ICTR, Article 3, and Rome Statute, Article 7, derive from this matrix, though general elements like actus reus and mens rea are inferred from “general principles of law” across major legal systems. Unlike domestic analogs, CAH’s international character stems from state policy, evidenced in Nazi Germany’s meticulous execution or the Khmer Rouge’s systematic atrocities from 1975 to 1988.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3, art 7(2).
Claus Kress, ‘On the Outer Limits of Crimes against Humanity: The Concept of Organization within the Policy Requirement: Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law
855; The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarać, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković [2002] (Appeals Chamber) IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A [93].
M Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 8-9.
M Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 20.
The 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind uniquely extends CAH to non-state actors, defining it as systematic or large-scale acts, i.e., murder, extermination, torture directed by a government, organisation, or group. However, the ICTY’s Kunarac ruling controversially decoupled CAH from state policy, asserting non-state actors’ capacity to commit such crimes amid evolving conflict dynamics. This shift, criticised for selectively ignoring Article 7(2) of the Rome Statute and supporting commentaries, risks diluting CAH’s international essence. Rather than cherry-picking precedents, accountability for non-state actors should extend state policy to entities with state-like attributes.
The Rome Statute’s Article 7(2) introduces “state or organisational policy”, traditionally encompassing state-affiliated bodies, e.g., military units, not independent non-state groups. ICC Pre-Trial Chambers, as in Katanga and Bemba, interpret this flexibly, requiring organised, patterned attacks potentially by non-state entities with territorial control or capacity for widespread/systematic acts, even absent formal policy. This interpretation by ICC suggests a trajectory toward including non-state actors within CAH, provided they exhibit quasi-state traits.
Historically, CAH’s state policy element involves: (1) targeting identifiable civilian groups; (2) acts criminal under domestic law; (3) execution by state agents or with official acquiescence; (4) significant, systematic victimisation; and (5) initially, a war nexus (since relaxed under customary law). State policy may emanate from high-level decisions or lower-tier conduct tolerated by superiors, leveraging state resources. Cases like Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, and Fujimori’s Peru exemplify this, though modern mass killings raise questions about requisite policy scope, formulation level, and state involvement. Thus, customary law now omits the war nexus, retaining state or organisational policy that distinguishes CAH from mere widespread abuses. In the absence of a war nexus, “widespread or systematic” becomes contextually variable, yet implies an underlying policy. Extending CAH to non-state actors demands they mirror state-like structures, preserving its international character rather than redefining it through judicial overreach, as in Kunarac.
From Quota to Crisis: A Legal Analysis of State Repression and Human Rights Violations
On June 5th, 2024 the High Court Division of Bangladesh’s Supreme Court reinstated a quota system reserving 30 percent of public sector positions for descendants of 1970s independence fighters, overturning a 2018 governmental abolition of the same as unconstitutional following widespread student protests. This judicial decision reignited dissent that was perceived as
M Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 24; Guénaël Mettraux, ‘Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and for Rwanda’ (2002) 43 Harvard International Law Journal 237, 244, 271–283.
The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga [2014] (Trial Judgement) ICC-01/04-01/07 A.
The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba [2018] (Judgment) ICC-01/05-01/13.
M Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 28.
M Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 21.
M Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 19-28.
discriminatory and favored politically connected families tied to the Awami League, exacerbating grievances over merit-based access to employment. Students, including some Awami League affiliates, decried the system’s bias, with one protester lamenting exclusion due to his non-political rural origins. The protests, initially sparked by the quota issue, evolved into a broader societal uprising against systemic corruption, political patronage, and violations of economic, social, and cultural rights. A protester’s song poignantly captured these sentiments, highlighting the disparity between the privileged and the honest amidst pervasive corruption.
The former Awami League government, led by Sheikh Hasina, responded with escalating repression, transitioning from intimidation to lethal, militarised force, resulting in grave human rights violations. This response reflected deeper structural issues, i.e., binary politics, entrenched corruption, and economic disparities. Historically, Bangladesh’s political landscape has been dominated by patronage-driven leaders who weaponize state mechanisms against rivals. The Awami League’s abolition of the caretaker government system post-2008, coupled with flawed elections in 2014, 2018, and January 2024 marred by irregularities, violence, and opposition suppression, consolidated its control over political, judicial, and security apparatuses. This dominance fuelled clientelism and cronyism, prioritising large-scale industries and infrastructure over equitable development. Despite reported GDP growth, income inequality surged between 2010 and 2022. The unemployment rate was 40 percent among the young men and 60 percent for young women, intensifying discontent over limited public sector access.
Economic pressures, including food and energy inflation since 2022, compounded by austerity measures tied to IMF loans, further eroded living standards. Corruption permeated public procurement and key sectors, with oligarchs linked to the Awami League syphoning funds abroad, threatening macroeconomic stability. A recent survey shows that low-level extortion by bureaucrats and security forces, affecting 74.4 percent of citizens, deepened public frustration. The government’s initial response involved delegitimising protests, with Sheikh Hasina denouncing students as infiltrated by opposition forces and, on July 14th, 2024 provocatively labelling them “razakars”, a term evoking collaboration with Pakistan during the 1971 war. This rhetoric incited Chhatra League supporters to attack protesters, often with police complicity, from July 14th to 16th, 2024 while security forces employed less-lethal and lethal weapons, killing at least six on July 16th alone.
From July 16th, the government militarised its approach, deploying paramilitary units like the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB), and Armed Police Battalions, alongside regular police, using military-grade firearms. By July 17th, coordinated operations under a “Core Committee” chaired by the Home Affairs Minister oversaw widespread suppression, culminating in a July 19th curfew and Army deployment of 27,000 soldiers. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights estimates 1,400 protest-related deaths between July 15th and August 5th, 2024 predominantly from firearms wielded by state
United Nations Human Rights Office, ‘OHCHR Fact-Finding Report: Human Rights Violations and Abuses related to the Protests of July and August 2024 in Bangladesh’ (Report, 12 February 2025) 3.
United Nations Human Rights Office, ‘OHCHR Fact-Finding Report: Human Rights Violations and Abuses related to the Protests of July and August 2024 in Bangladesh’ (Report, 12 February 2025) 4.
United Nations Human Rights Office, ‘OHCHR Fact-Finding Report: Human Rights Violations and Abuses related to the Protests of July and August 2024 in Bangladesh’ (Report, 12 February 2025) 4-5.
forces, with forensic evidence indicating 78 percent of examined deaths (130 cases) resulted from military rifles and shotguns. The Ministry of Health recorded 841 deaths and 12,272 injuries, though the data is incomplete due to underreporting and intimidation of medical staff.
The government systematically violated international human rights law, engaging in extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, and obstruction of medical care. Security forces, including RAB and BGB, fired indiscriminately at peaceful protesters, violating the principles of necessity and proportionality under international standards. Army personnel, though less directly implicated, supported operations and occasionally used lethal force, as in one documented killing on August 5th. Chhatra League and Awami League supporters, incited by senior officials, conducted coordinated attacks with police, using blunt weapons and firearms, often with impunity. Over 11,702 arrests, predominantly arbitrary, targeted students, opposition figures, and bystanders, with detainees subjected to torture, i.e., beatings, electric shocks, and coerced confessions in facilities like Detective Branch headquarters.
Medical care obstruction exacerbated casualties, with police and intelligence agencies blocking ambulances, raiding hospitals, and pressuring staff to falsify records, as in the case of Shykh Aashhabul Yamin, who was killed on July 18th after being denied aid. Internet shutdowns from July 18th–23rd and August 4th–5th, ordered via NTMC and BTRC without legal basis, stifled expression and assembly rights, concealing violations. Women faced gender-based violence such as physical assaults and rape threats aimed at deterring participation, while children suffered killings, maiming, and torture, with 12–13 percent of deaths being minors.
From July 15th to August 5th, 2024 the former Awami League government, led by Sheikh Hasina, and its affiliates executed a deliberate strategy to retain power by violently suppressing protests perceived as an opposition-driven threat. Hasina’s early hardline signals, including deploying the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) and labelling protesters “razakars”, set the stage for systematic violations. Senior officials, including Obaidul Quader and ministers, incited Chhatra League supporters to attack peaceful student assemblies, escalating into a militarised response involving police, Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB), and Ansar/VDP. These forces employed lethal force, arbitrary arrests, and torture, with the army providing operational support despite internal resistance.
The OHCHR finds reasonable grounds to suspect crimes against humanity under Article seven of the Rome Statute for murder, torture, and imprisonment stemming from a widespread and systematic attack on civilians pursuant to a state policy to crush dissent. Murder is evidenced by security forces and Awami League affiliates intentionally killing defenceless protesters at point-blank range or firing lethal ammunition into crowds, targeting vital areas without any
United Nations Human Rights Office, ‘OHCHR Fact-Finding Report: Human Rights Violations and Abuses related to the Protests of July and August 2024 in Bangladesh’ (Report, 12 February 2025) 8, 10.
United Nations Human Rights Office, ‘OHCHR Fact-Finding Report: Human Rights Violations and Abuses related to the Protests of July and August 2024 in Bangladesh’ (Report, 12 February 2025) 43-44.
United Nations Human Rights Office, ‘OHCHR Fact-Finding Report: Human Rights Violations and Abuses related to the Protests of July and August 2024 in Bangladesh’ (Report, 12 February 2025) 40-41.
United Nations Human Rights Office, ‘OHCHR Fact-Finding Report: Human Rights Violations and Abuses related to the Protests of July and August 2024 in Bangladesh’ (Report, 12 February 2025) 10, 14.
United Nations Human Rights Office, ‘OHCHR Fact-Finding Report: Human Rights Violations and Abuses related to the Protests of July and August 2024 in Bangladesh’ (Report, 12 February 2025) 6-7, 18-38.
imminent threat justifying such force. Torture occurred through severe beatings, electroshocks, and limb shootings in custody or at protest sites, inflicting extreme suffering to punish and intimidate. Imprisonment involved thousands of arbitrary detentions or warrantless arrests, incommunicado confinement, and delayed judicial access, violating international law. Detainees, including children, were subjected to inhumane conditions and ill-treatment.
This attack’s widespread nature is demonstrated by its large-scale execution across Bangladesh, involving coordinated operations with helicopters, armoured vehicles, and tens of thousands of personnel. Its systematic character is reflected in consistent patterns mirroring prior suppressions, orchestrated by the “Core Committee” under the Home Affairs Minister and Hasina’s direct orders, including directives to kill and conceal bodies. Intelligence agencies (DGFI, NSI, NTMC) and police units facilitated mass arrests, medical obstruction, and internet shutdowns to conceal violations, aligning with a policy to sustain power. Perpetrators’ awareness of this attack’s scope, bolstered by past protest suppression experience, underscores intent. These findings, established on a reasonable ground basis, warrant further investigation into these international crimes.
Conclusion
The July-August 2024 Bangladesh protests, initially ignited by a discriminatory quota reinstatement, unravelled into a profound challenge to the Awami League’s authoritarian grip, met with a brutal state response. The OHCHR’s findings of 1,400 deaths, predominantly from military-grade firearms, alongside mass arrests, torture, and medical obstruction, reveal a coordinated campaign of repression. These acts, executed by security forces and Awami League affiliates under Hasina’s directives and the “Core Committee’s” oversight, exhibit the widespread and systematic character required for CAH under Article Seven of the Rome Statute. Murder, evidenced by targeted killings, torture, through custodial abuses, and imprisonment, via arbitrary detentions, aligns with a state policy to crush dissent, bolstered by historical suppression patterns and intent inferred from leadership orders. While traditionally state-centric, the Rome Statute’s “organisational policy” and evolving jurisprudence suggest applicability, though Bangladesh’s case unequivocally involves state orchestration. These reasonable grounds necessitate further investigation into CAH, affirming the violations’ gravity as offences against universally shared values, demanding global accountability.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Laws, Treaties, Conventions
Charter of the International Military Tribunal (adopted 8 August 1945) 82 UNTS 279, art. 6(c).
United Nations Human Rights Office, ‘OHCHR Fact-Finding Report: Human Rights Violations and Abuses related to the Protests of July and August 2024 in Bangladesh’ (Report, 12 February 2025) 66-67.
United Nations Human Rights Office, ‘OHCHR Fact-Finding Report: Human Rights Violations and Abuses related to the Protests of July and August 2024 in Bangladesh’ (Report, 12 February 2025) 6, 28, 31, 45, 65-66.
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (adopted 19 January 1946, amended 26 April 1946) TIAS 1589, art. 5(c).
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (adopted 18 October 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910) 205 CTS 277.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 3, art. 7(2).
Case Laws
The Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarać, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković [2002] (Appeals Chamber) IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A.
The Prosecutor v Germain Katanga [2014] (Trial Judgement) ICC-01/04-01/07 A.
The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba [2018] (Judgment) ICC-01/05-01/13.
Secondary Sources
Books
M Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity: Historical Evolution and Contemporary Application (Cambridge University Press, 2011).
Journals
Guénaël Mettraux, ‘Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and for Rwanda’ (2002) 43 Harvard International Law Journal 237, 244, 271–283.
Claus Kress, ‘On the Outer Limits of Crimes against Humanity: The Concept of Organization within the Policy Requirement: Some Reflections on the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision’ (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law.
Reports
United Nations Human Rights Office, ‘OHCHR Fact-Finding Report: Human Rights Violations and Abuses related to the Protests of July and August 2024 in Bangladesh’ (Report, 12 February 2025).
