Introduction
The constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) contains (abstract) guarantees of freedom of expression and association, however, in reality, the exercise of labour rights is still heavily restricted by a complex web of statutory restrictions and regulatory monopolies. The reality is marked by corporate overwork, algorithmic exploitation and state-enforced labour. Compounding these issues, the PRC remains relatively closed regarding the transparent sharing of independent information on labour conditions. Furthermore, official data is tightly controlled, and access to verifiable primary reporting is strictly limited, thus assessing the full scope of labour rights issues poses as a major challenge. Consequently, the tension between central reform policies, especially those intended to regulate the digital economy, and the reality on the ground has become more noticeable.
This article examines the legal and constitutional frameworks governing labour relations in the PRC, the restrictive role of the state-run trade union monopoly, and the state’s obligations under international human rights standards. It assesses whether recent central reforms have significantly improved protections for vulnerable workers and examines the everyday reality of labour rights violations across various sectors. The final section offers recommendations for addressing the enforcement gaps and bringing practice into compliance with international human rights principles.
Legal and Constitutional Frameworks for Labour Rights in China
The People’s Republic of China’s Constitution guarantees its citizens “freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration” (Article 35) (All-China Federation of Trade Unions, 2008). However, the constitutional framework does not expressly guarantee the right to strike. Furthermore, Article 53 requires all citizens to “observe labour discipline and public order”, thus imposing de facto bans on both strikes and collective industrial action (Human Rights Watch, 2024). As a result, although the association is on paper protected by the constitution, collective worker defence is conditional and severely limited by the enabling legal environment.
The Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security oversees the three national legislative instruments that make up the majority of the statutory framework governing employment relations:
- The Labour Law of 1994: Established baselines for workplace health and safety, mandates overtime pay premiums and sets a standard workweek cap of 44 hours (Epstein Becker Green, 2007);
- The Labour Contract Law of 2008: Enacted to stabilise employment relations in the wake of corporate restructuring scandals, this law establishes severance guidelines, restricts the abuse of short fixed-term contracts, and requires written contracts for all employees (Dongtao, 2017);
- The Trade Union Law codified a rigid state-enforced monopoly and controls the formation and functioning of workers’ representative bodies (PTL Group, 2023).
Importantly, the only legally recognised union organisation in the PRC (the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)) is required by the Trade Union Law to be affiliated with and subservient to all trade unions (Human Rights Watch, 2024). Rather than serving as an autonomous advocate for workers’ interests, the ACFTU, which is directly led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), operates as an extension of the CCP, intended to uphold regime stability and increase corporate productivity (Lun, 2024). Therefore, due to local unions’ structural reliance on local governments, local union branches frequently prioritise social harmony and GDP targets over active labour representation (Dongtao, 2017). Ultimately, autonomous, independent trade unions are prohibited and swiftly persecuted by the state.
International Labour Rights Standards
The international legal framework that serves as a foundation for governing labour relations is rooted in a comprehensive set of global standards and instruments designed to protect worker dignity. States are required to uphold fundamental rights under frameworks such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the fundamental conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO). These include “just and favourable conditions of work”, safe working conditions, reasonable time limits, as well as the freedom of association and collective bargaining (United Nations, 1966). The ability to organise autonomous trade unions and take part in collective action is also crucial for the effective implementation of all other labour rights.
When examining domestic practices against these global benchmarks, the PRC’s engagement with international obligations reveals a persistent gap between formal ratification and real-world enforcement. In 2001, the PRC pledged to provide “just and favourable conditions of work” safe working conditions, and reasonable limits on working hours when it ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (Human Rights Watch, 2024). But after ratification, the government issued a restrictive statement stating that Article 8.1a, which protects the freedom to organise and join unions, must be applied in a way that is compliant with both the Trade Union Law and the PRC’s Constitution (Xinhua, 2022). Thus, the treaty’s fundamental protection of freedom of association was effectively made void by this reservation.
Additionally, the PRC has ratified a number of treaties as a member of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), including the recent deposition in August 2022 of instruments ratifying the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105) and the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) (International Labour Organisation, 2022). The PRC continues to oppose ratifying the ILO’s fundamental conventions on collective bargaining (Convention No. 98) and freedom of association (Convention No. 87), despite state media citing these ratifications as evidence of its commitment to human rights (International Labour Organisation, 2022). International human rights observers note that statutory worker protections are not enforceable in practice without these fundamental rights.
The Practice of Labour Rights Suppression and Exploitation in China
Labour rights are routinely violated in an environment where independent oversight is lacking and independent organising is prohibited, despite strong statutory language on paper. Several important sectors are evidence of this enforcement gap:
Domestically, migrant workers are particularly precariously positioned due to the hukou system (household registration). The hukou system systematically violates the human rights of the domestic migrant workforce, which consists of hundreds of millions of rural residents relocating to urban economic zones (Human Rights Watch, 2024). The hukou system keeps migrant workers out of municipal safety nets by directly linking public services, healthcare, and social security to a citizen’s registered birthplace (Human Rights Watch, 2010). As a result, migrant workers are disproportionately vulnerable to the withholding of wages and workplace injuries. Employers frequently postpone paying full wages until the end of the lunar year in the manufacturing and construction industries. Migrant workers are unable to effectively navigate state mediation and arbitration systems when disputes arise because they lack formal contracts or local residency (Human Rights Watch, 2010).
Labour exploitation also occurs in the tech sector, manifesting as corporate overwork. The “996” system, which mandates working from 9:00 AM to 9:00 PM, six days a week, is commonplace in the white-collar technology, e-commerce, and finance sectors (Beddington, 2025). This results in a 72-hour workweek that exceeds standard labour caps. Severe exhaustion, long-term illness, and unexpected cardiac deaths are among the human costs of this overwork culture (Beddington, 2025). For example, in November 2025, 32-year-old Guangzhou software developer Gao Guanghui passed away from a sudden heart attack after years of intense overtime. After his family disclosed that Gao had been added to a new office WeChat group while in critical condition in the intensive care unit and had been sent urgent work tasks eight hours after his death, outrage erupted online (Lu, 2026). In a similar vein, during the Lunar New Year holiday in February 2022, a 25-year-old content auditor at the video platform Bilibili passed away from a brain haemorrhage after working consecutive 12-hour overnight shifts (Davidson, 2022) These instances reflect a systematic, exploitative overwork labour culture that comes at a human cost.
Lastly, State-imposed forced labour is still a major issue for the Uyghur Muslim minority group in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Through coercive “labour transfer” programs, the CCP has been subjecting Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim minorities to systematic forced labour since 2017 (Wormington, 2024). Beyond the factories, biometric surveillance, arbitrary mass detentions, and the systematic erasure of their religious and cultural identity are all part of the pervasive apparatus of high-tech authoritarianism that the Uyghur community is subjected to. This highly repressive environment strips individuals of their basic personal freedoms, establishing climate of fear that is omnipresent. Rural workers are recruited door-to-door by government officials, making participation effectively mandatory, as refusal to comply could result in detention or serious political repercussions (Human Rights Watch, 2024). These workers are subjected to ongoing surveillance and ideological indoctrination while working in factories. These severe conditions are exacerbated in relation to labour rights, as the total absence of freedom of association, collective bargaining, or legal recourse leaves workers defenceless against state-sanctioned exploitation. This forced labour is intricately linked to global supply chains, particularly in the manufacturing of polysilicon for solar panels and aluminium, which makes up 10 per cent of the world’s supply. Independent supply-chain auditing is practically impossible due to widespread digital censorship and the intimidation of local sources (Wormington, 2024).
Reform Promises and Commitments
Chinese authorities have launched several judicial and regulatory reform programs in response to growing public dissatisfaction and economic downturns. The Supreme People’s Court and the MOHRSS jointly ruled in August 2021 that the “996” overtime schedule was illegal (Kipfer, 2025). This decision was upheld in August 2025 by the court’s Interpretation (II) on Labour Dispute Cases, which aimed to make overtime standard calculations for local arbitration bodies clearer. Despite these pronouncements, average weekly working hours remained around 48.5 hours in mid-2025, as employers circumvented the law by applying “informal overtime pressure” demanding off-the-record availability via digital tools like WeChat (You, 2025).
Yet, the effectiveness of progressive policy reforms still remains heavily undermined by the CCP’s systematic suppression of grassroots civil society and independent labour advocacy, as the state responds with harsh repression when employees try to organise outside of the official, state-approved union (Human Rights Watch, 2024). The July–August 2018 Jasic Incident in Shenzhen’s Pingshan District served as a striking example of this structural barrier (Human Rights Watch, 2025). The local ACFTU eventually opposed the factory workers’ attempts to organise an autonomous labour union under the ACFTU’s guidelines, creating a legal justification for a widespread police crackdown (Human Rights Watch, 2024). Dozens of workers, student solidarity activists, and even local union officials who advised the workers on the law were detained or imprisoned.
The State-driven systematic suppression of labour rights activism has persisted. Activists who document labour abuses or organise mutual-aid networks are routinely silenced. Prominent human rights advocates like Wang Jianbing and Li Qiaochu, as well as labour leaders in Hong Kong like Carol Ng and Winnie Yu, have been subjected to lengthy prison terms or political rights deprivation. Furthermore, some advocates like Xiong Yan have not only been detained without legal process and then “disappeared” (Human Rights Watch, 2025). Ultimately, these enforcement patterns indicate that central reform promises to serve to recalibrate party-state control over the digital economy rather than grant genuine rights of representation to the workforce.
Conclusion and Recommendations
A systemic compliance gap and the absolute prohibition on independent worker representation undermine the PRC’s formal structure of statutory labour protections. While central governments implement advanced policy guidelines to regulate and reduce corporate overwork, the absence of independent unions, a free press, and an active civil society ensures that these laws are easily bypassed. Traditional supply-chain auditing is ineffective for international stakeholders and human rights organisations due to state surveillance and the suppression of local advocates. Meaningful progress requires a shift away from top-down administrative actions and toward genuine compliance with international human rights standards, which is complicated by the CCP’s regime. To effectively bypass these issues and foster an environment of fair labour rights standards, several measures could be considered:
- Ratify and implement ILO Conventions No. 87 (Freedom of Association) and No. 98 (Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining) to bring domestic labour disputes in line with international human rights law and ensure consistent implementation and prevent enforcement gaps.
- Establish a legally binding timeline for reforming or abolishing the hukou system, ensuring that domestic migrant workers have equal, non-discriminatory access to urban social welfare, medical care, and public services.
- Repeal the ACFTU’s legal monopoly and remove the prohibition on the formation of autonomous, independent trade unions, allowing workers to elect their own representatives and conduct collective bargaining.
- Stop the state-imposed forced labour transfer programs in Xinjiang that target Uyghurs and other minority groups and provide independent access to international human rights monitors and supply-chain auditors.
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