Introduction
In October 2025, human rights lawyers, led by Omer Shatz and Juan Branco, exposed the names of 120 European leaders to the International Criminal Court (ICC), based on the collection of evidence, linking European migration policies with the Libyan Coast Guard to Crimes Against Humanity and migrant deaths in the Mediterranean.
After six years of investigations, it became possible to publish more detailed annexes to the document submitted to the ICC in 2019, following the collection of information from seventy senior EU officials (Brito, 2025). This direct internal channel traced a direct chain of responsibility between European immigration strategies and the abuses against migrants in Libya. The list of ‘suspects’ contains prominent names, including Emmanuel Macron and former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, as well as Mark Rutte, current Secretary General of NATO and former Prime Minister of the Netherlands, together with high-ranking EU officials such as the former EU foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini (Brito, 2025).
Since the killing of dictator Moammar Gadhafi in 2011, the Libyan situation presents a continuous power chaos in which rival administrations are supported by rebel militias and foreign governments (United Nations Security Council, 2025; Di Maio et al., 2023; ICC, 2011). The lack of an accountability system has inevitable repercussions for human rights and migrants, posing a serious challenge to European strategic interests. For this reason, it is essential to emphasise that stability in North African countries represents a buffer for the EU, and maintaining good relations, both economically and diplomatically, favours the preservation of its external borders’ security.
The publication of the names strongly highlights the need to investigate even more deeply the conditions of migrants trapped in unstable regimes such as the Libyan one. Academic support and reports, including a 2023 UN-backed Human Rights Council conclusion, confirm that EU logistical support enabled Libyan forces to commit crimes against humanity, leading to forced returns, unlawful detentions, and widespread violence (Keaten & Magdy, 2023).
This article will examine the strategic importance of relations with Libya, the legal framework of the ICC submission, and how Articles 7 and 25 of the Rome Statute support the case against high-ranking politicians.
The International Criminal Court’s Investigation on the Situation in Libya
The Court’s investigation in Libya has characterised both the period of the regime of the Government of Muammar Gaddafi and after his fall, due to the strong instability of the country and the struggle for power between militias and rival governments (United Nations Security Council, 2025; Di Maio et al., 2023; ICC, 2011). Libya’s fifteen years of instability have transformed the country into a key transit hub for land routes from West, East & North Africa, and the beginning of the Mediterranean route, defined as the most dangerous maritime route in the world (IOM, 2024; Open Arms, n.d.; Di Maio et al., 2023; Phillips, 2020). The EU’s maintenance of good diplomatic and commercial relations with Libya facilitates the Union’s control of its external territorial borders (Zafar, 2017).
The maintenance of relations between the EU and Libya, despite awareness of the limited respect for human rights in the country, has had catastrophic consequences for migrants. For this reason, Branco and Shatz published an additional document to highlight the degrading conditions faced by migrants, through a detailed annexe to the previous 2019 complaint concerning the link between the responsibilities of EU migration policies and violations of the Rome Statute (Brito, 2025). In 2019, the request sent to the Court concerned the need to hold European migration policies responsible for facilitating crimes against humanity, regarding the interception of migrants in the Mediterranean Sea, their pushback and consequent deportation to detention camps in Libya (Hinnant, 2019). The initial request did not specifically name the officials and politicians deemed responsible for migrant deaths or for the torture committed by the Libyan coast guard. However, even without direct references, it highlighted the need to hold the EU accountable for approving policies that facilitated such acts (Hinnant, 2019). After its submission in 2022, the case was declared admissible by the Court as part of the ICC’s Libya investigation, effectively opening an investigative procedure (front-LEX, n.d.).
A common thread connects this case to the series of investigations the ICC has opened since 2011. Both cases, in fact, are based on ICC investigations into crimes against civilians in Libya and the use of the Rome Statute as a legislative framework, emphasising the need for accountability for the systematic abuse of human rights. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), following the mistreatment of civilians protesting against the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, who came to power in 1969, requested the Court to monitor the situation in Libya starting from February 2011, making the jurisdiction of the Court lawful over the crimes listed in the Rome Statute committed on Libyan territory (ICC, n.d.). This investigation led to the issuing of warrants for suspects, including former dictator Gaddafi, for the use of force against civilians, systematic violations of human rights, including the violent repression of peaceful protests, crimes against humanity and war crimes (Corder, 2024; ICC, n.d.). Meanwhile, the last investigation on Libya conducted by the Court led to the release of six arrest warrants, concerning not only mass killings perpetrated by a brutal Libyan militia and war crimes but also mass graves discovered in 2020 (Corder, 2024).
The Complaint Against EU Officials and Responsibility for Crimes Against Migrants
Now the case moves to different crimes in the same unstable territory as fifteen years ago, where crimes against humanity are perpetrated against individuals in situations of vulnerability. The documentation provided is extensive and includes:
expert opinion on the situation of migrants in Libya; a victim statement confirming the involvement of the LYCG in smuggling, trafficking and detention of migrants; internal documents of high-level EU organs, […]; statements by policymakers, […]; and reports by civil society organizations on the ‘dire and unacceptable’ human rights situation in Libya (Shatz et al., 2019, p. 213).
Focusing on three key moments of migration policies—the transition from the Italian rescue operation Mare Nostrum to Frontex Joint Operation Triton; the ousting of NGOs conducting search and rescue (SAR) missions; and the EU’s cooperation with the Libyan Coast Guard—the current publication decides to say enough and name those responsible (Shatz et al., 2019). The list features particularly well-known names belonging to senior representatives of European countries, such as Mark Rutte, Donald Tusk, Federica Mogherini, and the former head of Frontex, Fabrice Leggeri (Brito, 2025). According to the lawyers, the criminal responsibility of the individuals listed and the resulting alleged violations concern the approval of policies that led to
the death by drowning of thousands of migrants, the forced pushback of tens of thousands of migrants attempting to flee from Libya, and complicity in the subsequent crimes of deportation, murder, imprisonment, enslavement, torture, rape, persecution and other inhumane acts committed in Libyan detention centers and torture houses (Shatz et al., 2019, p. 8).
The approval of collaborations and border externalisation policies with the late dictator Muammar Gaddafi, and the subsequent adoption of a deterrence-based migration policy aimed at dissuading other individuals from undertaking the same journey, have turned the Mediterranean into the deadliest migration route in the world (Shatz et al., 2019). Failing to reduce the number of migrants, these policies caused a greater number of deaths, recording between 2014 and 2017 a total of 14,500 deceased (Shatz et al., 2019). These data are confirmed by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), which to date records 32,958 missing migrants (IOM, 2024).
Legal Basis of the Accusations: Individual and command Responsibility Under the Rome Statute
From a legal perspective, the charges are based on Articles 7 and 25 of the Rome Statute and are meticulously reviewed by Shatz and Branco. Article 25(3)(b) of the Rome Statute refers to the criminal responsibility of individuals who, for “the purposes of facilitating the commission of a crime, orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted” (Shatz et al., 2019, p.205; ICC, 2021). Shatz and Branco’s complaint indeed holds that there was a causal link between political-level orders and the crimes committed “given by EU and Italian officials […] with awareness of the certainty, […], that these orders would be followed by the execution of the crimes” (Shatz et al., 2019, p.205).
Moreover, the hierarchical position of the EU and the LYCG inevitably makes superiors indirectly responsible if, while in effective control, they did not take adequate measures to prevent or punish the crimes (Shatz et al., 2019). These failures occurred with full awareness of what was happening in Libyan territory and in the Mediterranean since, starting in 2012, numerous intergovernmental bodies such as the United Nations (UN), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), International Criminal Court (Office of the Prosecutor), IOM had denounced the inhumane situation of migrant treatment and the atrocious crimes committed, including the involvement of the LYCG (Shatz et al., 2019). Conversely, the EU’s collaboration continued through funding, refresher and training courses, and coordination for the interception of migrant boats and their subsequent repatriation to Libya.
Secondly, the crimes committed violate Article 7 of the Rome Statute, which defines crimes against humanity as “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population,” which were referenced by the authors of the complaint, specifying the terms and elements for which EU leaders and officials are considered responsible (International Criminal Court, 2021, art. 7 p.3; Shatz et al., 2019). In the case at hand, migrants were subjected to persecution, particularly by the EU’s second externalisation policy, as it concerned the systematic targeting of vulnerable civilian populations at a moment of extreme difficulty (Shatz et al., 2019). In this context, persecution also includes refraining from rescuing, to stop migration flows and ensure that death and other forms of suffering did not occur in the Mediterranean but out of sight of European states and apparently beyond the reach of international law (Shatz et al., 2019).
Another element of violation lies in the crime of deportation or forced transfer, described in Article 7(2)(d) as “forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law” (Shatz et al., 2019, p.167). Unlawful imprisonment further adds to the list of crimes against humanity for which Shatz and Branco accuse not only field agents delegated by the EU, but also the leaders who approved the migration policies that led to their implementation in the Mediterranean, violating principles of international law (Shatz et al., 2019). The list of crimes culminates with murder and enslavement, understood as part of a direct and systematic attack on the civilian population, in this case, the migrants (Shatz et al., 2019). All these elements caused the forced involvement of migrants in human trafficking, forced labour, torture, rape, and other forms of sexual violence (Shatz et al., 2019).
For this entire series of crimes, and the common plan of action in coordination with the LYCG, the EU was made directly or indirectly complicit in supporting operations intercepting migrants on the high seas and pushing them back (Shatz et al., 2019). The public officials named are particularly responsible as they held the highest political authority positions, qualifying them as co-perpetrators due to their essential contribution to the plan, which required not only operational cooperation but also legislative action and the signing of specific agreements such as the Italian government and the UN-backed Government of National Accord (“GNA”) Memorandum of Understanding, the EU Malta Declaration, and EU decisions internalizing these plans and agreements (Shatz et al., 2019). Shatz and Branco (2019) further highlight that, without a doubt, the European Union acted ‘to achieve a non-criminal goal’ while at the same time accepting that the implementation of the common plan would lead to the commission of crimes on Libyan soil.
Conclusion
The publication of the names of the leaders attached to the previous complaint to the ICC by the group of lawyers, led by Omer Shatz and Juan Branco, should symbolise a turning point in the debate on Europe’s accountability for its external migration policies. Despite this, the attention is not as wide as it should be, since the exposure of the direct and indirect responsibilities of the European leaders and officials will not only be analysed within a proceeding already accepted by the ICC, but also risk seriously undermining European governance, which, in the attempt to protect its borders, does not respect the human rights on which it is founded. The Libyan situation remains complex, and its political instability has serious repercussions on the migratory system. However, it is necessary to go beyond the mere political and legal dimensions of the case, addressing its moral aspects.
The thin line between security borders management and human rights violations has been crossed too many times, as demonstrated by the evidence brought by the lawyers before the court. The breaches of Articles 7 and 25 of the Rome Statute, relating to crimes against humanity and individual responsibility, leave no room for ambiguity. The work of Shatz and Branco has led to the definition of a causal link between the orders at the political level and the crimes committed by the Libyan coast guard. Not having taken adequate measures to prevent and punish the crimes committed on the Libyan front has inevitably made the European leaders, who approved the policies and the officials who implemented them, co-perpetrators, as they were perfectly aware of the risks thanks to numerous reports and dossiers from governmental and non-governmental organisations. Through a continuous institutionalisation of violence, the undertaken policies have caused the formation of a climate of violence, impunity, illegal detentions, deportations, and systematic human rights abuses, completely failing to achieve the predetermined strategy of migration deterrence.
The situation necessitates a re-evaluation of externalised border control policies to avoid a double standard, given the EU’s role as a human rights promoter. The disclosure of the names aims to refocus attention on European migration policies and act as a moral mirror for the EU as a whole. Although the ICC’s decision is uncertain, it’s clear that sacrificing the human component for a security vision based on pushbacks and human rights is unacceptable.
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