INTRODUCTION
In February 2025, over 7,000 people were released from scam centres by ethnic armed groups in Myanmar (Head, Luo, & Doksone, 2025). Among these people, nearly 1,000 Chinese nationals were due to be repatriated, while approximately 260 foreign nationals from Africa, Asia, and Latin America have been transferred to Thailand (Head, 2025; Al Jazeera, 2025). The rest were stranded in makeshift camps along the Thailand-Myanmar border, awaiting their rescue. These people were suspected to have been trafficked for forced criminality involving scam operations (Head, Luo, & Doksone, 2025).
The release of 7,000 people from scam compounds sheds light on the unprecedented industrial scale of transnational organised crime (TOC) in Mainland Southeast Asia (Wu, 2024). Following the COVID-19 pandemic, scam operations emerged as a more aggravated TOC due to the complex convergence of cyber-enabled crime and human trafficking (Wu, 2024). Scam operations in this region presented a distinctive characteristic – perpetrators not only abused digital technologies to profit from online deceptions but also incorporated human trafficking to facilitate their large-scale operations (UNODC ROSEAP, 2024).
A wide range of individuals were scammed worldwide. In Southeast Asia alone, scammed victims suffered from estimated financial losses between 18 billion and 37 billion USD in 2023 (UNODC ROSEAP, 2024). However, many scammers were identified as victims of trafficking for forced criminality. The United Nations also estimated in 2023 that 220,000 people may have been forced to work in scam compounds along the borders of Myanmar and Cambodia, while thousands of others may have been held captive across Southeast Asia (OHCHR, 2023; UNODC ROSEAP, 2023). As a result, the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) issued an Orange Notice as a warning to the member states of “a serious and imminent threat to public safety” (INTERPOL, 2023).
With its proximity to Myanmar and Cambodia, Thailand has been exploited as a transit country and a secondary location for scam networks. Serving as the regional economic and travel hub, Thailand plays a major role in preventing the proliferation of scam operations (Banerjee, 2025). Since 2023, Thailand has classified this issue as one of its priorities for national security. In response, the Thai Government has launched a crackdown while rescuing victims of trafficking and protecting scammed victims at the same time (Humanity Research Consultancy, 2024).
This article seeks to explore the Thai Government’s crackdown on scam operations. The first section aims to understand offender profiles and their modus operandi, highlighting three stages of the crime: human trafficking, online scams, and money laundering. The second section will then identify disruptive policies targeting material and financial resources that facilitated scam operations, and the final section will discuss challenges arising from the crackdown policies.
OVERVIEW OF OFFENDER PROFILES AND MODUS OPERANDI
2.1 Perpetrators
Scam operations have been carried out by organised crime groups (OCGs), with the majority identified as Chinese nationals (UNODC ROSEAP, 2023). According to China’s Deputy Minister of Public Safety, as many as 36 Chinese syndicates have been running scam operations with the facilitation of local criminal associates and ethnic armed groups (Online Reporters, 2025). These OCGs used to profit from running casinos and gambling businesses until the pandemic limited travel of their overseas clients. To compensate for financial losses, the OCGs invented online scams to secure their incomes (UNODC ROSEAP, 2023).
2.2 Locations
Cambodia and Myanmar have been named the primary hotspots of scam bases (Perera & Praithongyaem, 2024). These countries designated special economic zones (SEZs) to boost economic investments, allowing the construction of casinos, entertainment complexes, and hotels along their borders with Thailand (UNODC ROSEAP, 2023). Due to weak regulations, political instability, and ongoing conflicts, the OCGs were able to exploit these business establishments to set up scam compounds (Wu, 2024).
As scam centres were constructed on the borders, the OCGs connected high-speed internet cables and utilised signals from Thailand’s telecommunication infrastructure. The compounds also benefited from essential utility supplies and exports from Thailand (Thepgumpanat, 2025; The Mekong Club, 2023).
2.3 Modus operandi
The OCGs’ modus operandi concealed their online identities and created barriers for law enforcement to investigate. This subsection will elaborate on how the OCGs carried out their scam operations in three stages: human trafficking, online scams, and money laundering.
Human trafficking: The OCGs deceptively recruited victims of trafficking via fake job advertisements on social media platforms and exploited them to conduct online scams (UNODC ROSEAP, 2023). Multilingual, educated, and tech-savvy job seekers were common targets. Online customer service positions were often offered with high-paying salaries and travel arrangements to transit countries such as Thailand and Malaysia (UNODC ROSEAP, 2023). Upon arrival, the OCGs smuggled these individuals to scam compounds by land and confiscated their personal belongings, including passports and phones (UNODC ROSEAP, 2023).
The victims have been mistreated in slavery-like practices. The OCGs confined victims, using vulnerabilities such as illegal migrant status and debt bondage as manipulation tactics. Certain victims were also traded among transnational criminal networks (UNODC ROSEAP, 2023). In confinement, victims of trafficking were coerced into becoming scammers while being subject to physical and psychological abuse if they showed resistance or could not reach the monetary targets of scam revenues (UNODC ROSEAP, 2023).
Online scams: The OCGs forced victims of trafficking to conduct online scams, tricking other individuals into revealing sensitive information or transferring money. One online scam that captured media attention was the investment romance scam (Perera & Praithongyaem, 2024). According to testimonies from trafficked victims, the OCGs instructed them to approach wealthy people as prime targets and establish online romantic relationships by following communication scripts. There have been victims of investment romance scams who took the bait from messages sent by unknown phone numbers or social media accounts (Perera & Praithongyaem, 2024).
After trust had been built, the victims of online scams were convinced to invest large sums of money in fake online trading platforms that tricked them into believing their investments were legitimate. The messaging and social media accounts for online romantic relationships would be terminated as soon as the investment amount reached the targets set by the OCGs (Perera & Praithongyaem, 2024).
With the exploitation of victims of trafficking and abuse of digital technologies, the OCGs were able to boost their revenues from scam operations and gain more access to advanced technologies developed for criminal purposes, such as artificial intelligence-generated deepfakes (UNODC ROSEAP, 2024). As a result, the OCGs could invent other forms of online scams, such as identity fraud, e-commerce scams, or fake kidnapping scams (Dickson & Preputnik, 2024; Humanity Research Consultancy, 2024).
Money laundering: To transfer money earned from online scams, the OCGs relied on money mules to launder illicit revenues into legitimate financial systems and cryptocurrency platforms (The Nation, 2025). Money mules refer to people who assist criminals with financial transactions by providing their bank accounts for money laundering purposes. These people may intentionally participate in exchange for money or unknowingly allow the OCGs to exploit their bank accounts (INTERPOL, n.d.).
For example, a Thai money mule was apprehended for his involvement in transnational crime. He was suspected of facilitating a Chinese scam leader in Poipet, Cambodia, by setting up Thai mule bank accounts, converting cash into cryptocurrency through platforms in Thailand and overseas, and transferring cryptocurrency to digital wallets associated with Chinese syndicates. In return, he earned between 8,000 and 12,000 baht per bank account and 8 to 12 percent from scam revenues (The Nation, 2025).
It is unclear how money mules were recruited and whether they were trafficked. Upon their arrest, many money mules claimed that the OCGs tricked them by offering fake job opportunities in the same fashion as trafficked victims and forcing them to open mule bank accounts (Khaosod English, 2025). However, law enforcement authorities discovered contradictory signs that these money mules were financially remunerated and were not physically abused, which led authorities to conclude that they were not trafficked (Khaosod English, 2025).
The OCGs’s modus operandi demonstrated key characteristics of a systematic, illicit scam business that allowed top criminals to hide behind their human resources by relying on forced labour from victims of trafficking and money mules who provided money laundering services (UNODC ROSEAP, 2023; The Nation, 2025; Khaosod English, 2025). This layering tactic posed critical challenges to cross-border investigations attempting to track down the ringleaders (UNODC ROSEAP, 2023). Moreover, illicit incomes from online frauds have been invested in further organised criminal services such as digital development of illegal online gambling platforms and unauthorised virtual asset service providers (UNODC ROSEAP, 2024).
THAILAND’S CRACKDOWN ON SCAM OPERATIONS
The motive of scam operations has resulted in the enlargement of illicit businesses and money laundering schemes, which provided wider criminal organisations with access to digital technologies developed for illegal activities (Dickson & Preputnik, 2024). Given the scale of the crime, the Thai Government has made arduous efforts in tightening national security with a comprehensive crackdown, including police raids, border control, and international cooperation with China and neighbouring countries (Humanity Research Consultancy, 2024).
The focus of this article will be drawn to Thailand’s disruption of material and financial pipelines as a way to dismantle the OCGs from further victimising vulnerable people and expanding their operations. In this section, Thailand’s disruptive policies will be discussed in terms of physical space (utility, infrastructure, and exports) and cyberspace (digital and financial services). This section will also briefly highlight the recent development of Thailand’s laws on cybercrime.
3.1 Physical space (utility, infrastructure, and exports)
The immediate disruption to scam operations was the utility cut and suspension of exports, aiming to pressure the OCGs and ethnic armed groups in the targeted areas to release people from scam centres (Head, Luo, & Doksone, 2025). As discovered in the previous section, primary hotspots of scam facilities were located along the borders of Thailand, where scam compounds benefitted from public utilities and regular exports from Thailand while gaining internet access from telecommunication infrastructure (UNODC ROSEAP, 2023; Humanity Research Consultancy, 2024).
Until March 2025, Thai authorities, such as the Provincial Electricity Authority and the National Broadcasting and Telecommunication Commission, suspended main utility supplies such as electricity and telecommunication services provided to Myanmar and Cambodia (PRD, 2024; Saksornchai, 2025; The Nation, 2025; Post Reporters, 2025). Specifically, targeted cities in Myanmar, such as Myawaddy, Payathonzu, and Tachileik, suffered from utility cuts (Saksornchai, 2025). In Poipet, Cambodia, Thai authorities removed telecommunication signals of international private leased circuits connected from Thailand to scam compounds (The Nation, 2025). Subsequently, the Thai Government also blocked specific export items to the three cities in Myanmar, including fuel supplies, electronic devices, computer supplies, batteries, electricity generators, and solar panels, among others (Banerjee, 2025).
3.2 Cyberspace (digital and financial services)
The key policies against scam operations in cyberspace were led by the initiative of the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society (DES) with cooperation among Thai authorities (PRD, 2024). As money laundering helped provide financial pipelines through digital means, the following measures have been implemented.
In traditional banking, Thai authorities such as the Bank of Thailand, the Anti Money Laundering Office, and the Anti-Online Scam Centre, suspended a total of 1.66 million mule bank accounts and arrested over 2,400 owners of these accounts as of December 2024 (Dharmaraj, 2025). However, illegal practices of selling bank accounts or setting up corporate mule bank accounts still require further cooperation from other agencies, such as the Ministry of Commerce (PRD, 2024).
Mobile banking services have also been screened through the cleaning mobile banking policy. This policy tackles unmatched national identification (ID) numbers linked between mule bank accounts and registered phone numbers. The result of the screening revealed that an alarming 42 percent of ID numbers were unmatched with registered phone numbers or could not be verified (PRD, 2024). As a result, the DES encouraged financial institutions and telecommunication service providers to tighten their regulations on mobile banking services, including their cooperation with the Royal Thai Police, to detect and report suspicious transaction activities in a timely manner (PRD, 2024).
On April 13th, 2025, the amendments to Thailand’s Emergency Decree on Measures for the Prevention and Suppression of Cybercrimes and Emergency Decree on Digital Asset Businesses entered into force to address legal gaps in cybercrime investigation (SEC, 2025). The amendments aimed to assist law enforcement in the following key areas.
Greater authority of law enforcement: Thailand’s law enforcement agencies will have greater authority to take action against financial institutions and cryptocurrency service providers if fraudulent transactions are detected. Thai authorities are also granted extraterritorial power to penalise overseas-based perpetrators and accomplices who commit cybercrimes that affect Thai nationals or legal entities (Suwanmatajarn, 2025).
Shared liability and severe punishments: Financial institutions, service providers, and social media platforms will share partial liability for damages resulting from cybercrimes. If financial or cryptocurrency accounts were found to be associated with criminal activities, these organisations will face legal charges. Therefore, they are required to implement proactive measures to verify the details of account holders (Suwanmatajarn, 2025).
CHALLENGES TO THAILAND’S CRACKDOWN
Following the crackdown, the Thai Government anticipated the decline of scam operations. The Office of the Prime Minister revealed that the overall scam case rate had dropped by 20 percent, and the financial losses from investment frauds fell by 97.21 percent between February and March 2025 (Khaosod English, 2025). In the same period, the country also successfully pressured the OCGs and ethnic armed groups in Myanmar to release a large number of potential victims of trafficking (Head, Luo, & Doksone, 2025). However, the OCGs remain active (Khaosod English, 2025). This section will discuss the challenges regarding the disruptive measures and identify what should be considered further.
4.1 The OCGs’ relocations and reliance on Chinese exports
Although suspending utilities and telecommunication networks reduced scam operations, the OCGs can still exploit strong transnational networks across Southeast Asia to relocate elsewhere (BBC, 2025). For example, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam have become secondary hotspots where scam networks covertly operate (Srijaem, 2025; Perera & Praithongyaem, 2024).
Moreover, the existing scam compounds relied heavily on regular Chinese exports rather than Thai exports. According to the BBC News (2025), most material resources connected to scam compounds originated from Chinese exports that transited via Thailand. Although the Thai Government imposed an export ban on specific supplies, scam facilities in Myawaddy, for example, could continue running their operations with large electric generators and other imports from China (BBC, 2025).
Therefore, the bilateral trade cooperation between Thailand and China is recommended to discuss ways to prevent Chinese exports from aiding criminal activities, particularly exports which transit via Thailand.
4.2 The absence of pragmatic digital assets confiscation
The amendments to the two Emergency Decrees will pave the way for law enforcement authorities in Thailand to hold cyber criminals and scammers accountable, even if they are based outside of Thailand. The legal amendments will also incentivise digital and financial service providers to tighten their security measures on customer due diligence (Suwanmatajarn, 2025). However, confiscating cryptocurrency remains the major challenge, with Thailand yet to develop mechanisms to block the illicit flow of digital assets (Publisher, 2025).
Around 70 percent of cyber frauds were transferred to cryptocurrency accounts (Publisher, 2025). Unlike traditional financial systems, cryptocurrency is a digital asset on non-financial systems that does not require a third party to verify transactions, meaning that two account holders can transfer their cryptocurrency values to each other directly. Without a third party, criminals can exploit this loophole to exchange digital assets among their networks by using money mules (ACAMS, n.d.; The Nation, 2025). Cryptocurrency service providers also utilise blockchain technology that creates irreversible transaction records, making it impossible to freeze cryptocurrency assets. Moreover, seizing cryptocurrency accounts without a government cryptocurrency wallet or a central deposit will be difficult (Publisher, 2025).
Due to this technical challenge, Thai authorities may be unable to prevent money laundering through cryptocurrency in a timely manner (Publisher, 2025). Therefore, public-private partnerships are encouraged for Thai government agencies to intensify their collaborations with cryptocurrency service providers worldwide (Polkuamdee, 2025).
CONCLUSION
Scam operations in Mainland Southeast Asia demonstrated how advanced TOC has become with the facilitation of digital technologies, a large-scale exploitation of trafficking in persons, and subsequent money laundering schemes (UNODC ROSEAP, 2023). The modus operandi of the OCGs revealed how they evaded police detection through the use of proxies, such as victims of trafficking and money mules, while illicit revenues from scams helped fuel further investments in criminal services and technologies such as artificial intelligence solutions and illegal online gambling platforms (UNODC ROSEAP, 2024).
Due to the complexity of scam operations, Thailand’s crackdown policies targeting material and financial pipelines were key to dismantling organised crime networks. Nevertheless, more efforts are needed to effectively prevent scam operations from proliferating, particularly when the OCGs can relocate across Southeast Asia, take advantage of Chinese exports, and leverage cryptocurrency to fund their wrongdoings (UNODC ROSEAP, 2024). Since the crackdown on scam operations is ongoing at the time of writing, further studies on future developments are encouraged.
Building resilience against scam operations also requires further international cooperation, as the Thai Government should not bear the burden alone (Humanity Research Consultancy). The Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is anticipated to consolidate regional efforts among its member states, including China, to consider a pragmatic strategy in upcoming ASEAN senior-level meetings (Shen & Zhao, 2025). ASEAN should seize the opportunity to realise the ASEAN Centre on Transnational Crime after being proposed in 1997, while the establishment of an ASEAN Cybercrime Task Force should also be expedited (Luong, 2024; Sharon, 2025).
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