Introduction
“A Specter Hunts Europe – a Specter of Foreign Agents Law”.
Under a shadow of “transparency”, more and more governments in Eastern Europe adopt so-called “Foreign Agents Laws” to solidify their autocratic rule and undermine freedom of expression in their respective societies. Foreign Agents legislation first appeared in Russia in 2012. It played an important role in supporting President Vladimir Putin’s attempts to destroy any kind of resistance, especially among the civil society in Russia. A similar law under the label of “transparency of foreign influence” was initiated in Georgia in 2023, when huge public resistance made the government withdraw it, only to reinitiate and finally adopt it one year later, in 2024 and make it even more restrictive in 2025. More recently, Slovakia also adopted legislation against NGOs in April 2025, while Hungary introduced the “Transparency in Public Life” bill in May 2025. This new Kremlin-inspired instrument is becoming a popular tool among populists and authoritarians around Europe.
This article will review the foreign agents’ laws in Georgia, Slovakia and Hungary, highlighting the similarities between them. Furthermore, the article reviews legal and socio-political arguments that have been made against foreign agents laws in Hungary, Georgia and Russia by different competent bodies such as the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Court of Human Rights and the Venice Commission.
Foreign Agents Laws under the shadow of “transparency”
The laws that were adopted or introduced in Georgia, Hungary and Slovakia are similar both to each other and to the legislation adopted in Russia in 2012. They require Non-Governmental Organisations that receive funding from foreign donors to register in a special registry. Non-compliance leads to significant fines that could effectively impair the abilities of the NGOs to pursue their aims. These laws use vague wording that is designed to label the independent Civil Society Organisations as “agents of foreign influence”. Even if legislation does not include this terminology, such as in case of Slovakia where government decided to remove it from the law, if the government officials still use this narrative, it still effectively manages to label NGOs as foreign agents and undermine their credibility in the eyes of population, contributing to stigmatisation and delegitimisation of their activities. Furthermore, the NGOs that would register in the required registry are heavily burdened with reporting and auditing requirements that leave them fewer resources to devote to their actual mission and vision.
Interestingly enough, all three governments try to describe this legislation as an act for increased transparency and protection of national sovereignty. These arguments are used to try to mobilise public support for their actions and label anyone who tries to fight against this legislation as traitors or corrupt actors.
Political Context
Foreign agents laws are adopted within a specific political context of democratic backsliding and autocratic consolidation, as well as Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and its attempts to undermine both the European Union’s (EU) enlargement and the EU’s united front against Russia.
Hungary and Slovakia are both members of the European Union, while Georgia is a candidate country. Therefore, the EU is an important stakeholder in these cases and has repeatedly stated its opposition towards foreign agents legislation in these countries. When it comes to Hungary and Slovakia, the EU and specifically the European Commission has a powerful tool of infringement procedure that can be used against member states that do not comply with EU law. The infringement procedure against these 2 countries will most likely succeed as there are previous precedents, such as the ECtHR ruling against Russia’s foreign agents’ law and the CJEU ruling against similar legislation adopted in Hungary earlier. However, the European Union appeared to lack substantive influence on the adoption of foreign agents legislation in the candidate country, Georgia, where numerous condemnations did not have any impact on the behaviour of the ruling party.
These legislations are often met with significant public resistance. The whole process of initiating and adopting the law was accompanied by significant public mobilisation and demonstrations in Georgia. Since the adoption of the law, the NGOs have publicly declared civil disobedience, and most of them did not register as “agents of foreign influence”. Nationwide protests were also sparked in Slovakia that pushed the government to remove some of the measures, but it was not enough to make them withdraw the law altogether.
International human rights defence organisations have also been actively advocating against the foreign agents legislation. Amnesty International described Slovakian legislation as “full-frontal assault on civil society”, highlighted that Georgian legislation poses “a direct threat to the rights to freedom of association and expression,” and called Hungarian law “a severe and existential threat to democratic principles, human rights and the rule of law in Hungary and in the EU as a whole.”
Legal Arguments
3 legal documents from different entities discuss the dangers of foreign agents laws in length. The first one is the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which was issued after the European Commission started an infringement procedure against Hungary when it adopted similar legislation in 2017. Another one is the ruling of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the foreign agents law in Russia. The third one is the opinion of the Venice Commission on the legislation in Georgia. The first 2 rulings were binding in their nature, while the 3rd one had a recommendatory character. Together, these 3 documents discuss the legal and socio-political dangers of this new toolkit in the hands of authoritarians.
CJEU ruling on Hungarian law focused on the breaches of the EU fundamental values and rights, specifically – Freedom of association enshrined in Article 12 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, right to respect for private life and protection of personal data – Articles 7 and 8(1) of the Charter; Free movement of capital – Article 63 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union. The court found that the legislation in question was violating all these provisions as Hungary failed to provide sufficient justification for restrictions based on overriding reasons in the public interest.
ECtHR found the violations of the European Convention on Human Rights due to the application of Russia’s Foreign Agents Act. The court ruled that the legal regime introduced by the law was creating a “chilling effect” on the choice of seeking or accepting any amount of foreign funding, while the designation of the organization as “foreign agent” [agent having the meaning of spy in Russian language] would create a negative public perception and restrict organisations’ ability to continue their activities. Furthermore, the act created disproportionate sanctions on non-compliance, including high fees and even imprisonment, which effectively led to the liquidation of many organisations. According to ECtHR, the creation of a special status of “foreign agents” and the imposition of additional requirements and restrictions lacked relevant and sufficient reasons and resulted in unforeseeable and disproportionate punishment, leading to a disproportionate restriction of the rights to freedom of association and expression (Article 10 and Article 11 of ECHR).
The Venice Commission’s urgent opinion on the foreign agents law in Georgia highlighted its stigmatising effect and vague and ambiguous wording that created uncertainties. It also highlighted the discriminatory characteristics of the law, specifically by treating all foreign support similarly and labelling the recipient of any kind of funding as one “pursuing interests of a foreign power”. The Venice Commission concluded that restricting dissent by undermining civil society and independent media cannot be considered a measure to protect democracy and that the law ultimately affects open, informed public debate, pluralism, and democracy and highlighted that the law contradicts the freedom of association and expression, right to privacy, right to participate in public affairs and prohibition of discrimination.
All 3 legal documents point to similar arguments against the foreign agents law and highlight the similar dangers to freedom of expression and association. Fundamentally important is the stigmatising effect of labelling civil society organisations in a certain, negative way. These documents also highlight the lack of necessity and proportionality in adopted measures and their discriminatory nature.
These arguments demonstrate the danger behind the foreign agents legislation. These laws effectively undermine independent civil society organisations that have an important role in holding the governments accountable. Therefore, autocrats and populists use this tool to further shrink the civil space and solidify their rule.
The Role of the European Union
The European Union is a normative power. It has an ambition to shape the norms and discourses of international relations. Human rights play an important role in the policy framework of the EU, both internally and externally.
The EU has a powerful tool of infringement procedure against its member states, like Hungary and Slovakia. As mentioned above, the previous infringement procedure against similar law in Hungary was successful, therefore, it can be expected that the CJEU will rule against this legislation once again. The EU also has a nuclear option of Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union – in case of consistent breaches of EU fundamental values, a member state may be deprived of its right to vote in the Council. However, the Article 7 procedure is extremely complex and requires unanimity (except the country concerned) in the Council. Furthermore, the European Commission can and is leveraging its financial tools through the rule of law conditionality mechanism, the impact of which is yet to be measured. The problem with the EU approach towards its members is that it is rather reactive than proactive. After the infringement procedures are finished, the harm will already be done. The ultimate aim of legislation on foreign agents is not the creation of some registry, but empowering the narrative that independent civil society organisations are enemies of the state and agents of foreign powers.
The EU’s influence is even more limited when it comes to third countries like Georgia. Diplomatic demarches, diplomatic pressure, halting aid, ceasing high-level meetings and even freezing the country’s EU accession process did not prove to be enough to stop the authoritarian tendencies of the ruling party. A more thorough analysis of this failure is needed, however, it is clear that current policy tools were ineffective.
If the European Union is serious in its ambition to play a global role through its normative power, then it needs to sort out how to proactively counter the democratic backsliding among its member and candidate states.
Conclusion
The rise of “foreign agents laws” in Eastern Europe, which are similar to Russia’s 2012 legislation, demonstrates a worrying trend of democratic backsliding. Georgia, Slovakia, and Hungary are adopting these laws under the guise of transparency, undermining freedom of expression and consolidating the autocratic power of the ruling elites.
International bodies like the CJEU, ECtHR, and Venice Commission have consistently argued that similar laws violate fundamental rights. They disproportionately restrict freedom of association and expression, impose burdensome requirements, and stigmatise organisations as “foreign agents”, hindering civil society’s crucial role in accountability and public discourse. Such measures are deemed unnecessary, disproportionate, and discriminatory, failing to genuinely serve the public interest.
The European Union has more tangible tools against democratic backsliding among its member states and less so when it comes to the candidate countries. When thinking about new policies and mechanisms, the EU needs to take into consideration that the true aim of these legislations is for autocrats and populists to control the public debate and discourse and frame independent actors and opposition as agents of foreign influence and enemies.
References:
Commission v Hungary (Transparency of Associations), No. C-78/18 (Court of Justice of the European Union, June 18, 2020). https://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-78/18
Ecodefence and Others v. Russia, No. 14 June 2022 (European Court of Human Rights). https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-217751%22]}
Fazekas, P. (09:58:18Z). Orban’s Party Proposes New Legislation Critics Liken To Russia’s Foreign Agent Law. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/orban-legislation-russia-foreign-agent-law-magyar-dissent/33414208.html
Georgia approves controversial “foreign agent” law, sparking more protests. (2024, May 14). https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-69007465
Georgia: Stop the bill “On transparency of foreign influence” that threatens civil society. (2024, April 16). Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/04/georgia-stop-the-bill-on-transparency-of-foreign-influence-that-threatens-civil-society/
Hungary: Joint open letter on the bill entitled “Transparency of Public Life.” (2025, May 23). European Institutions Office. https://www.amnesty.eu/news/hungary-joint-open-letter-on-the-bill-entitled-transparency-of-public-life/
Slovakia: Anti-NGO law a ‘full-frontal assault on civil society.’ (2024, April 30). Amnesty International. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/04/slovakia-anti-ngo-law-a-full-frontal-assault-on-civil-society/
Slovakia passes law on NGOs amid criticism – DW – 04/17/2025. (n.d.). Dw.Com. Retrieved May 25, 2025, from https://www.dw.com/en/slovakia-passes-law-on-ngos-amid-criticism/a-72268853
Slovakia: President must not sign Russia-style ‘foreign agent law.’ (2025, April 25). ARTICLE 19. https://www.article19.org/resources/slovakia-president-must-not-sign-russia-style-foreign-agent-law/
Spread of ‘foreign agent’ laws in Central, Eastern Europe a growing threat to civil society. (2025, February 26). ISHR. https://ishr.ch/latest-updates/spread-of-foreign-agent-laws-in-eastern-europe-pose-increasing-threats-to-civil-society/
Urgent Opinion of the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence. (2024). European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-PI(2024)013-e
