INTRODUCTION
The government of Singapore has adopted a series of technological measures to surveil its citizens and control their movements, habits, and even political beliefs. Digital systems, policies, and other measures of control were enacted particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, with the justification to increase public safety and implement mandatory vaccinations, mask-wearing, and physical distancing in public. However, once the pandemic ended and most of Southeast Asia and the Pacific returned to their old ways, the new surveillance framework – not only the digital systems but also the new regulations – remained in place in Singapore.
These measures were introduced into Singaporean daily life with little to no discussion prior to their implementation; they were merely announced and publicised as bringing improvement to their lives, even though they have inherent privacy and security risks related to the large-scale collection and storage of personal data. Some examples include a Quick Response (QR) code system requiring individuals to check in and out of public locations, TraceTogether, a Bluetooth app to ping close contacts, and the instalment of almost 90,000 police cameras across the island (The Interpreter, 2021).
This article will explore how the current Singaporean legal framework fails to provide sufficient protection to individuals’ privacy rights, the extensive powers given to law enforcement authorities and what measures need to be implemented to avoid further violations of crucial fundamental rights.
CURRENT LANDSCAPE
While newcomers may view this constant surveillance as a significant intrusion, most citizens have accepted how their lives have been reshaped by routine tracking measures when they enter public spaces like malls, restaurants, and their offices, seeing this as part of a new normal. Beyond the surveillance advancements during COVID-19, other developments have rung alarm bells. The Immigration and Checkpoints Authority announced that iris and facial scans will become the predominant biometric identifiers for immigration clearance. Furthermore, facial recognition and verification have also been rolled out as part of the government’s Smart Nation programme, including being tested on lampposts (The Interpreter, 2021).
The full extent of the government’s surveillance capabilities remains undisclosed. In 2022, reports surfaced linking the Singapore government to Israeli spyware firm QuaDream, which exploited a flaw in Apple software. While officials acknowledged the use of various intelligence technologies for national security, they refrained from providing specifics. Notably, Sylvia Lim, the chairman of the opposition Workers’ Party, received a notification from Apple indicating potential targeting by state-sponsored attackers, though the government denied any involvement (Freedom House, 2022).
In 2023, Singapore expanded its digital surveillance and content control powers through new legislation. The government passed laws allowing authorities to block access to online content and services deemed harmful, such as the Online Criminal Harms Act and the Online Safety Act. These measures are added to existing laws that already gave the State wide discretion to remove content and monitor online activity (Freedom House, 2023).
LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
Singapore has still not signed or ratified many of the major international treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which has been ratified by 168 states, including many in Asia (The Right to Privacy in Singapore, 2015). The right to privacy under Article 17 provides that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation” (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966). However, Singapore is a member of the United Nations and is therefore expected to uphold the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights even though it is non-binding, including Article 12 providing for the right to privacy (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948).
Concerning the domestic framework, there is no right to privacy enshrined in Singapore’s Constitution (The Right to Privacy in Singapore, 2015). Privacy interests are protected through a combination of the Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA) and other laws regulating the processing of personal data, including in the public sector (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, 2022). Some examples include the Computer Misuse and Cybersecurity Act, the Official Secrets Act, the Statutory Bodies and Government Companies (Protection of Secrecy) Act, the Electronic Transactions Act, the Banking Act, and the Telecommunications Act. Other relevant legislation includes the Law of Confidence, which addresses misuse and publication of confidential information (The Right to Privacy in Singapore, 2015).
DERIVING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
In practice, these laws are insufficient to safeguard the right to privacy and the right to data protection due to their limited scope, numerous exemptions and lack of strong oversight mechanisms. The PDPA excludes public agencies and the police from its coverage, creating a significant gap in the protection of personal data, notably in the context of government-led surveillance initiatives (OneTrust DataGuidance, 2022). The Cybersecurity Act criminalises unauthorised access to data but does not regulate or address its lawful collection. Furthermore, the law provides extensive powers to judicial and law enforcement authorities, and does not impose a need for prior judicial authorisation to conduct surveillance interception. This decision is shocking, especially if compared with the recent Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act enacted by the European Union (EU), which prohibits the use of real-time remote biometric identification systems in publicly accessible spaces for law enforcement purposes, except in strictly limited cases (AI Act, 2024).
This raises significant concerns in light of the fact that the Singaporean legal framework falls short of applicable international human rights standards. The right to privacy and data protection are fundamental human rights, central to the protection of human dignity and forming the basis of any democratic society. In this sense, activities that restrict them, such as surveillance, censorship and data collection, can only be justified when they are prescribed by law and are proportionate, and necessary to achieve a legitimate aim.
The situation goes beyond the public sector: in fact, the right to privacy is also being violated in people’s own homes, illustrated by the State’s proposal to monitor smoking through digital surveillance on people’s balconies as a way of dealing with the harms of second-hand smoke (The Interpreter, 2021). Moreover, the mandatory installation of tracking and monitoring software on students’ laptops allows authorities to view their screens, close tabs, and control usage even outside school hours, constituting a disproportionate intrusion into children’s private lives (Human Rights Watch, 2021).
CONCLUSION
Singapore’s current approach to surveillance reflects a systemic disrespect for its citizens’ right to privacy, data protection, and related fundamental freedoms. While initially justified by public health concerns during the COVID-19 pandemic, these intrusive digital systems have not only remained in place but have also expanded. The State’s radical surveillance model both in the public and private space, combined with opaque intelligence operations, and the absence of appropriate judicial safeguards, contributes to an uncontrolled governmental power. This situation is further emphasised by the lack of constitutional recognition of the right to privacy and the exclusion of public agencies from key data protection legislation.
A series of measures needs to take place to stop this democratic decline and create a society where Singaporeans’ privacy rights are upheld. For starters, Singapore must urgently ratify and implement the ICCPR to align with international norms and restore trust in its institutions, enshrining the right to privacy within its Constitution and establishing clear legal boundaries for state surveillance. EU legislation, such as the AI Act and the General Data Protection Regulation, serves as a useful guide for how this objective might be attained, as these pieces of legislation seek to uphold fundamental rights. In addition, instead of continuing to expand mass surveillance mechanisms, the government should prioritise empowering its population, especially the younger generations. This includes investing more resources in strengthening digital literacy to empower children to navigate the internet critically, confidently, and safely (Human Rights Watch, 2021).
Without these reforms, Singapore risks normalising a future where democratic values are subordinated to technological control. A change of trajectory is needed, or the country runs the risk of using any future event, whether it be a new pandemic or something else, to expand the government’s control over its citizens’ movements.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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