Introduction
For a long while, Pakistan’s blasphemy laws have imposed harsh penalties, including death, for offences against religion; these laws have long been controversial for their effect on the country’s religious minorities.
While officially aiming at protecting religious devotion, these laws are often widely misused to persecute non-Muslim individuals or pursue personal vendettas. A mere accusation of blasphemy can cause group violence, which sometimes forces entire minority communities to flee in masses for safety. For example, in August 2023, hundreds of Christian homes and churches were attacked in Jaranwala after two Christians were accused of desecrating the Qur’an (HASAN, 2023). In this context, minority groups such as Christians, Hindus and particularly the Ahmadiyya Muslim community have disproportionately carried the impact of blasphemy allegations.
This article examines the legal framework of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws and critically analyses their impact on minorities, focusing on the Ahmadiyya community, a minority sect, while simultaneously considering broader human rights implications. It will also highlight the irony that, despite their historical and ongoing contributions to Pakistan’s state-building and international affairs, the Ahmadis remain one of the most targeted by these laws.
Legal Framework and Historical Background
Pakistani blasphemy laws are rooted in colonial-era provisions, which intended to prevent inter-religious violence. The original Penal Code, which was inherited at independence in 1947, included general prohibition on offending religious sentiments. However, in the 1980s, under General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime, the laws were expanded and Islamised with stricter punishments and new provisions explicitly favouring Pakistan’s Muslim majority (Amnesty International, 2016). Significant changes included Section 295-B, introduced in 1982, which criminalizes defiling the Qur’an, making it punishable by life imprisonment, and Section 195-C, introduced in 1986, which orders a mandatory death penalty for defamatory remarks about the Prophet Muhammad (Amnesty International, 2016; KHAN, 2016). Moreover, Section 298-A was added to forbid insults against the Prophet’s family or associates, which originally ordered the punishment of up to three years imprisonment. Strikingly, several provisions directly target the Ahmadiyya community. In 1984, Sections 298-B and 298-C came into effect, making it a criminal offence for Ahmadis to “pose” as Muslims or refer to their faith in Islamic terms (Amnesty International, 2016; KHAN, 2016).
Today, these laws remain in force with minimal amendments. In fact, recent changes have made them stricter. In 2023, Pakistan’s Parliament increased the penalty under Section 298-A from a maximum of three years to a minimum of 10 years to life in prison and further made the offence non-bailable (GURAMANI, 2023). While presented as safeguards for religious harmony, these provisions were passed with minimal scrutiny, amid concerns that they primarily serve to satisfy the demands of extremist groups (GURAMANI, 2023). Further, no substantial safeguards were introduced to prevent abuse of these laws. For instance, blasphemy offenses are cognisable, meaning that police can register a case and arrest the accused without a warrant as well as start investigations without a court order (Amnesty International, 2016).
In combination with ambiguous definitions and no requirement to prove intent, this legal framework is highly vulnerable to abuse.
Disproportionate Use and Misuse Against Minorities
Although presented as religion-neutral, blasphemy laws have, in practice, been weaponised against minorities and dissenters, as human rights reports have documented a disproportionate impact on non-Muslims (Amnesty International, 2016). According to Amnesty International, from 1987 to 2014 around 187 Christians and 21 Hindus were prosecuted under these laws, alongside 494 Ahmadis, even though religious minorities represent only about 4 percent of Pakistan’s population. While Muslims have also faced blasphemy accusations, minority communities are far more vulnerable in relation to their population size. The Human Rights Watch observes that the blasphemy laws deny non-Muslims equality before the law and facilitate violence against anyone accused of blasphemy (Human Rights Watch, 2025). In many cases, false blasphemy accusations are made to settle personal vendettas, undermine business competitors or seize property from members of minority communities. Since minorities often live in marginalised conditions, for instance in informal settlements without secure legal titles, an accusation can result in their displacement and others seizing their homes or shops (Human Rights Watch, 2025). This abuse of law has led to widespread fear amongst minority populations.
Notably, courts have acknowledged the prevalence of false or malicious blasphemy accusations. In landmark judgement Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri v. The State (Criminal Appeals Nos. 210 & 211 of 2015, Supreme Court of Pakistan) landmark judgment, the Court pointed out that most blasphemy cases arise from false accusations rooted in personal or familial disputes, rather than from genuine acts of blasphemy (Amnesty International, 2016). Despite this, there is minimal accountability for accusers who fabricate charges. Impunity persists for those who bring false claims or incite mobs, even when their accusations lead to violence. By contrast, individuals accused – often those who are members of minority faiths – may spend years in prison awaiting trial, typically in solitary confinement for their own protection, effectively serving a sentence before any guilt is established (HASAN, 2023).
Additionally, bail being routinely denied in blasphemy cases leads to prolonged pre-trial detention (Amnesty International, 2016). This practice is often justified by the risk of vigilante violence if an accused person were released, a threat that is both real and severe. Since the 1990s, at least 89 people have been killed by mobs over blasphemy allegations, including dozens in the past decade (HASAN, 2023; Human Rights Watch, 2025). High-profile cases include the 2011 assassination of Punjab Governor Salmaan Taseer after defending a Christian woman accused of blasphemy, the 2014 lynching of a Christian couple in Kot Radha Kishan and mob assaults such as the 2013 Joseph Colony riot and the 2023 Jaranwala violence; all triggered by unproven allegations. Such incidents reinforce a climate of intimidation, as police frequently fail to protect the accused or their communities and perpetrators of mob violence are rarely brought to justice (Human Rights Watch, 2025). This impunity strengthens extremist elements and encourages further misuse of the law.
Case Study: The Ahmadiyya Community
The plight of the Ahmadiyya Muslim community in Pakistan exemplifies the extreme impact of the Pakistani blasphemy laws on a minority group.
Ahamdis consider themselves a Muslim sect, but orthodox religious authorities see them as going against mainstream Islamic teachings as Ahmadis believe Mirza Ghulam Ahmad to be a reformer and messiah who came after Prophet Muhammad (KHAN, 2020). State law supports this marginalisation, as Pakistan’s 1974 constitutional amendment officially declared Ahmadis to be non-Muslims and Ordinance XX of 1984 criminalised their religious practice. Under the state’s Penal Code Sections 298-B and 298-C it is illegal for Ahmadis to present themselves as Muslims or refer to their faith with Islamic terminology (HASAN, 2023). For example, an Ahmadi can be imprisoned for using the common Arabic, but also Islamic greeting “As-salamu Alaikum” or calling their place of worship a mosque. Ahmadis are further prohibited from preaching or spreading their faith, reciting Islamic texts publicly or even identifying as Muslims on identity documents.
These provisions effectively criminalise the basic practice of the Ahmadis’ religion, violating their freedom of belief. To obtain a passport or national ID, Ahmadis must further condemn their own affiliation by signing a declaration that explicitly states that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was an imposter and that they are non-Muslim. Moreover, Pakistan maintains a separate electoral register for Ahmadis, excluding them from the general Muslim voter lists unless they renounce their faith, thereby establishing their political marginalisation (HASAN, 2023).
Beyond these discriminatory laws, Ahmadis have been frequent victims of blasphemy prosecutions and mob violence. Hundreds of Ahmadis have faced blasphemy charges under the general blasphemy sections such as the anti-Ahmadi clause, 298-C, for alleged misuse of Islamic terms (Amnesty International, 2016). These “crimes” often include the printing of religious literature for their own community or holding quiet worship, which then are framed as insulting Islam. In a 2014 case, four Ahmadi men in Lahore were arrested for distributing their community’s publications; the court later acquitted the men, recognising they were targeted solely due to their faith (Amnesty International, 2016). However, even after acquittal, there usually awaits prolonged detention, for instance, over a year in jail, illustrating how the process itself becomes punishment. Moreover, in an incident in 2014 a violent mob in Gujranwala burned down several Ahmadi homes after a rumour that an Ahmadi teenager posted blasphemous content on Facebook; an elderly woman and her two grandchildren died in the fire (Amnesty International, 2016). In such cases, the mere accusation against one individual translates into collective punishment. In recent years, persecution has intensified further. For example, in 2023 local bar associations and clerics imposed doctrinal tests of faith, requiring lawyers to swear an oath against the Ahmadi beliefs. Following this, Ahmadi lawyers have been harassed and even arrested. One lawyer was charged under 298-B of the Pakistani Penal Code for using “Syed” in his name, a title carrying religious significance but also a common Arabic equivalent of “Sir”, which authorities considered an offence on account of his Ahmadi faith (HASAN, 2023). There have also been several police-backed operations to demolish Ahmadi mosques or remove their minarets, which are common for Muslim mosques, on the ground that Ahmadi places of worship cannot resemble mosques. Despite a 2023 Lahore High Court ruling, affirming that Ahmadi mosques built before 1984 cannot be destroyed, several such mosques – often under police presence – have been vandalised and threatened, including the removal of minarets (SHEIKH, 2023). Extremist groups openly incite such actions and political parties, particularly the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), continue to demonise Ahmadis in their rhetoric, increasing the threat to this community (HASAN, 2023).
Ironically, this systemic exclusion persists despite the Ahmadiyya community’s profound contributions to Pakistan’s development and international standing.
In 1948, Sir Chaudhry Muhammad Zafarullah Khan, an Ahmadi, became Pakistan’s first Foreign Minister and went on to serve as President of the United Nations General Assembly in 1952 and as President of the International Court of Justice between 1973 and 1975. He played a decisive role in the drafting of Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), ensuring the inclusion of the right to freedom of religion and the right to change one’s religion (KHAN, 2023). Another leading Ahmadi, Dr. Abdus Salam, Pakistan’s only Nobel awardee in science, received the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1979. As Chief Scientific Advisor from 1960 to 1974, he was instrumental in the establishment of the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission in 1961, while also founding international research institutions such as the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in 1964 and the International Nathiagali Summer College in 1974 (DURRANI, 2024). His legacy continues to be honoured internationally, including at global tribute events in 2025 (NURI, 2025).
At the social level, the Ahmadiyya community sustains important educational and healthcare institutions within Pakistan. Nazarat Taleem, created in 1919, continues to administer schools and colleges in Rabwah and across rural areas, including Nusrat Jahan College, which offers higher education programs and hosts an Institute for Special Education. In healthcare, the Fazl-e-Omar Hospital in Rabwah, founded in 1958, remains an essential facility, providing expanded services such as obstetrics and paediatrics since 2003. More recently, in 2024, the head of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community addressed the International Conference of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Medical Association, applauding medical professionals for their service in Pakistan and urging the development of Fazl-e-Omar Hospital into a centre of medical excellence (Press Ahmadiyya, 2024). In the same year, the community also organised the Ahmadiyya Talent Awards, rewarding outstanding students and professionals, thereby strengthening a culture of academic achievement (Education Ahmadiyya USA, 2024). These examples illustrate that the community has been central to Pakistan’s diplomatic, scientific, educational and humanitarian development, making their exclusion and persecution profoundly paradoxical.
The case of the Ahmadis highlights how Pakistan’s blasphemy regime, combined with anti-minority provisions, undermines fundamental rights. The community’s inability to freely practice their religion violates the freedom of religion and the equal citizenship in Pakistan’s own constitution and international law. In fact, Pakistan’s Supreme Court has held that preventing any “non-Muslim” from practicing their faith is unconstitutional (Tahir Naqqash v. The State, PLD 2022 SC 385), yet in practice, Ahmadis are prevented from doing so. The paradox is striking, since a community that has provided Pakistan with its first Nobel awardee in science, its first Foreign Minister, and continues to sustain schools, colleges, hospitals and humanitarian initiatives is at the same time criminalised, excluded, and demonised. The psychological impact is severe, with many Ahmadis living in a constant state of fear, refraining from religious expression even in private settings, as such acts may be used as a pretext for blasphemy charges.
Human Rights Concerns and Legal Challenges
The continued enforcement of blasphemy laws raises serious human rights and rule-of-law concerns. Domestically, the laws conflict with fundamental rights guaranteed by Pakistan’s Constitution, particularly the rights to freedom of religion and freedom of speech as well as the guarantee of equal protection for all citizens regardless of religion. While Pakistan’s constitution imposes that laws be consistent with Islam, it also pledges protection for religious minorities; the blasphemy statutes, as applied, disproportionately disadvantage minorities, undermining their status as equal citizens (Human Rights Watch, 2025). The bias of the justice system is evident in how blasphemy cases proceed, for example, accusations, no matter how suspicious, are rarely critically questioned at the stage of first information report (FIR), trials are often manipulated by intimidation of judges and lawyers, and safeguards, that are common in other criminal cases, are effectively absent, as for instance the intent or evidence standards (Human Rights Watch, 2025). Judges who acquit defendants have faced death threats and some were in need of security or had to exile after high-profile cases. Consequently, lower courts often lead towards conviction or delay the hearing, in order to avoid backlash, leaving it to higher courts to finally overturn groundless charges (Amnesty International, 2016). This dynamic illustrates how legal processes are misused as punishment for minorities under the guise of blasphemy enforcement.
On the international front, Pakistan’s blasphemy laws severely conflict with the country’s obligations under human rights treaties. Pakistan is a state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) since 2010, which mandates the protection of freedom of thought, conscience, religion, Article 18 ICCPR, and the freedom of expression, Article 19, as well as equal protection of the law without discrimination, Articles 2 and 26. UN human rights bodies have repeatedly warned that blasphemy laws, especially those that carry the death penalty for speech, are incompatible with these fundamental rights (Amnesty International, 2016). The UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 34 (2011) explicitly mentions that prohibitions on “disrespect for a religion or belief system” (i.e. blasphemy) are not justified unless they meet the strict threshold of incitement to hostility, as defined in Article 20 II ICCPR. Pakistan’s blasphemy laws do not meet this threshold, as they criminalise a wide range of expressions and beliefs, including truthful statements, theological opinions, or peaceful minority religious practice, without requiring any element of incitement to violence. Moreover, the death sentence for blasphemy, as mandatory under Section 295-C of the Pakistani Penal Code, conflicts with Pakistan’s ICCPR obligation to use the death penalty only for “most serious crimes” and to uphold the right to life, Article 7 ICCPR.
International and domestic rights groups have thus called on Pakistan to at least amend these laws to prevent abuse, if not abolish them entirely (Human Rights Watch, 2025; Amnesty International, 2016). Suggested reforms could include introducing penalties for false accusations, requiring higher standards of evidence and intent, and removing the death penalty. However, successive governments have opposed substantial reforms, largely due to political pressures. Hardline religious parties mobilise mass protests whenever reform is suggested, as seen after the assassination of Shahbaz Bhatti – Minorities Minister – and Salmaan Taseer in 2011, which effectively silenced most internal debate on amending the blasphemy laws (Human Rights Watch, 2025; Amnesty International, 2016). In recent years officials have even defended the laws on the international stage, for instance, in 2023 Pakistan initiated a resolution at the UN Human Rights Council urging global action against “religious hatred” after incidents of Qur’an-burnings abroad (HASAN, 2023). This way, attention was deflected by justifying blasphemy laws in the name of protecting religion, instead of addressing the misuse of such laws at home.
Conclusion
Pakistan’s blasphemy laws have evolved from colonial-era provisions into instruments of systemic discrimination. Expanded during the Islamisation policies of the 1980s, they now contain both overly expansive prohibitions and explicitly sectarian clauses, such as those targeting the Ahmadiyya community. These provisions criminalise core aspects of minority religious practice and deprive affected individuals of fundamental civil and political rights. The laws’ ambiguous wording, absence of intent requirements and lack of penalties for false accusations make them highly vulnerable to abuse. In practice, they are routinely used to settle personal disputes, suppress dissent or seize property, with accusations often functioning as de facto punishment. This is reinforced by mob violence and the near-total impunity of perpetrators, eroding judicial independence and violating constitutional guarantees of equality before the law.
Under the ICCPR, Pakistan is obliged to protect freedom of religion and expression, ensure non-discrimination, and limit the death penalty to the “most serious crimes”. The current framework fails on all counts. Rather than pursuing reform, successive governments have strengthened the laws to appease hardline groups, further intensifying the marginalisation of minorities.
The case of the Ahmadis is particularly telling: a community that has strengthened Pakistan’s diplomacy, advanced its scientific reputation, and built enduring institutions in education and healthcare is nonetheless stripped of equal citizenship and forced into silence. Their persecution shows how blasphemy laws not only violate fundamental rights but also deprive the country of the potential of its own citizens. Meaningful reform therefore requires revoking provisions that target specific communities, introducing safeguards against false accusations, and abolishing the death penalty for speech offences. Without such measures, minorities will remain vulnerable to persecution and Pakistan’s blasphemy regime will continue to erode both the rule of law and the protection of fundamental human rights.
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