Introduction
On April 4th, 2025, the Italian government, following the approval of Decree Law 1660 titled ‘Public Safety, Protection of Personnel in Service, as well as Victims of Usury and the Penitentiary System’ by the Chamber of Deputies in September 2024, enacted a measure described by activists, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), opposition parties, and trade unions as an ‘authoritarian drift’, aimed at tackling public order issues, anti-protest activities, and civil disobedience, under the pretext of national security, but at the risk of suppressing fundamental freedoms in its name.
The measure was defined by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni as a legitimate decision, dictated by the urgency of fulfilling the government’s commitments to citizens regarding national security and to law enforcement officers long awaiting greater protections (Spagnolo, 2025; Musco, 2025; Frosina, Salvini, 2025; Forlivesi, 2025). In the face of numerous protests by opposition parties, human rights NGOs, and trade unions—which raised concerns from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteurs—the Meloni government, accused of criminalising dissent due to the questionable constitutionality of specific provisions, opted to change strategy. Under pressure from President of the Republic Sergio Mattarella, it amended the most controversial points, yet at the same time bypassed Senate approval by transforming the draft law into a decree law on grounds of urgency (Spagnoli, 2025). Despite this, the approved decree not only increases the number of offences and penalties but also worsens already dire conditions in Repatriation Detention Centers (CPRs) and Italian prisons.
This article therefore investigates the nature of the ‘DDL Sicurezza’ and its impact on human rights, particularly on already marginalised and targeted groups such as the poor, detainees, and migrants, with immediate and concrete effects on civil liberties. In particular, it observes the modus operandi of its implementation through the transformation into a decree law, which raises significant questions about the democratic quality of the legislative process. The structure will be organised to first present the changes and key points of the new decree, followed by an analysis of national and international reactions to its introduction, in order to better understand the perspectives highlighted by NGOs in relation to human rights.
1.The Law Itself: What Is “DDL Sicurezza”? And What Are The Changes Made To The Original Draft?
To fully grasp whether the DDL Sicurezza (Security Bill), approved on April 4th, poses a threat to human rights in Italy, it is essential to trace its trajectory from its initial presentation in Parliament in January 2024 to its final conversion into a law decree.
The bill, consisting of 38 articles, introduces new criminal offences, preventive administrative measures, and harsher penalties. It spans a wide array of domains including anti-terrorism, public security, prison conditions, and civil protest (OSCE, 2024). According to Algostino (2025), the escalation of punishments and aggravating circumstances is emblematic of security rooted in public order rather than in labour protections, social safeguards, or the defence of rights. This is precisely why, as underlined by the joint signature of the Ministers of Justice, Interior, and Defence, Decree 1660 serves as a flagship piece of legislation for the current administration (Forlivesi, 2025).
The final decree, passed by the Council of Ministers, reflects a number of changes from the original version that was approved in a first reading by the Chamber of Deputies on September 18th, 2024. These amendments resulted from negotiations with the Quirinale, spurred by pressure from President Sergio Mattarella, as well as from social mobilisation by the national ‘No DDL Sicurezza’ network and various international bodies, whose responses will be addressed later. The initial draft presented in January 2024 envisioned increased sentences and the effective ‘neutralisation’ of mitigating factors in cases of violence, threats, or resistance—whether active or passive—against public officials during protests, particularly those opposing strategic infrastructure projects designated as such by the government, including road or railway blockades and sit-ins (Camilli, 2024; Chamber of Deputies, 2024). Following pressure from the Quirinale, which deemed this provision incompatible with the principles of fairness in criminal law, the aggravating factor was narrowed to cover only infrastructure related to energy provision, transportation, telecommunications, or other public services. However, it retained its criminal character, transforming what had previously been classified merely as an administrative offence (Redazione Collettiva, 2024; Spagnoli, 2025).
Closely related is the issue of passive resistance within prisons and CPRs —detention centres for migrants without valid residency permits. The initial bill proposed prison sentences of one to six years for anyone who, “together with at least three others, instigated, organised, or led a revolt through acts of violence, threats, or even passive resistance to orders given by authorities” (Camilli, 2024; Chamber of Deputies, 2024). This clause was later revised to remove passive resistance as a criminal offence; the crime would now apply only to breaches of orders directly tied to public order and security, excluding disciplinary commands (Musco, 2025; Spagnoli, 2025; Spagnolo, 2025). Another point that provoked widespread criticism in the original bill concerned detained mothers. The revised version reintroduces the discretionary deferral of pre-trial detention for pregnant women or those with children under one year of age, allowing for custody in specialised institutions rather than standard prisons—a rollback from the compulsory incarceration originally proposed (Spagnolo, 2025; Musco, 2025).
With respect to the treatment of migrants, negotiations with the Quirinale also led to the softening of certain provisions. Notably, the original text had prohibited migrants without valid residency permits from purchasing SIM cards. The final decree, however, allows for the purchase of phone cards upon presentation of a passport or identity card (Spagnoli, 2025; Chamber of Deputies, 2024). Furthermore, the decree strengthens the state’s ability to revoke Italian citizenship for individuals definitively convicted of specific crimes. While revocation was previously limited to within three years of sentencing, it may now be enacted up to ten years post-conviction (Camilli, 2025; Chamber of Deputies, 2024). The bill also establishes prison sentences ranging from two to seven years for individuals who unlawfully occupy or seize property—penalties that are further intensified when the victim is elderly or infirm (Spagnoli, 2025; Camilli, 2025; Chamber of Deputies, 2024).
Among the more contentious areas of the approved decree, is the enhancement of protections for intelligence agencies and law enforcement. One of the most controversial aspects was Article 31, concerning intelligence operations (Musco, 2025; Spagnoli, 2025; Spagnolo, 2025; Chamber of Deputies, 2024). The initial draft required public administrations, research institutions, universities, utility providers to enter into agreements with intelligence agencies, mandating the sharing of information even in contravention of existing privacy laws. This obligation sparked outcry from journalists’ unions and universities alike. The final version, following amendments, removes this requirement but broadens the list of legally protected actions that intelligence officers may carry out in pursuit of institutional goals—now including the organisation or leadership of associations linked to terrorism, even of an international nature, or subversion of democratic order (Vigneri, 2025).
Unaltered in the approved legislation is the provision known as the ‘legal shield’ for law enforcement officers (Frosina & Salvini, 2025; Chamber of Deputies, 2024). This measure provides for reimbursement of legal expenses up to €10,000 for acts committed in the line of duty, such as the use of force or firearms, provided they are justified by self-defence or the defence of others. It also eliminates automatic disciplinary sanctions, such as suspension or withdrawal of the service weapon (Spagnoli, 2025; Chamber of Deputies, 2024). Simultaneously, penalties for assaults against law enforcement personnel have increased (Musco, 2025).
New criminal offences have also been introduced, such as the possession of materials linked to the planning of terrorist attacks. Furthermore, among the most debated changes is the classification of light cannabis as a narcotic drug, thereby banning its trade, processing, and export in all forms—including all derivatives containing hemp (Spagnolo, 2025; Spagnoli, 2025; Musco, 2025; Chamber of Deputies, 2024).
Despite the amendments made to the original draft, it remains clear that—both in the methods of approval and the substance of its articles—the government led by Giorgia Meloni is pursuing a vision of national security that diverges sharply from the demands of civil society. For this reason, the following section will examine the wide array of reactions, both national and international, from actors who have expressed deep concern over the implementation of this decree.
2.The reactions: Domestic and International Criticism
Since its introduction and up to the day it was transformed into a decree-law on April 4th, 2025, the DDL Sicurezza has been met with relentless opposition from labour unions, human rights organisations, and political opposition parties. Across Italy, widespread mobilisations took place in major cities like Milan, Naples, and Rome, with mass demonstrations led by the ‘No DDL Sicurezza’ network.
On the day of its approval in the Council of Ministers in Rome, a major protest was organised in Piazza del Pantheon to resist the decree until the last moment. However, the declaration of the bill as an urgent measure made its approval inevitable (La Stampa, 2025). On the one side, the government and majority parties justified what the opposition termed a ‘bureaucratic coup’ and the decision to transform the security package being examined in the Senate into a decree-law as legitimate, claiming it was necessary to address the urgent security needs of Italian citizens and law enforcement (Spagnolo, 2025; La Repubblica, 2025; Musco, 2025; Frosina & Salvini, 2025). Meanwhile, the opposition emphasised the dangers of this move, calling it a ‘lethal blow to Parliament’ and unconstitutional due to the lack of necessity and urgency (Spagnolo, 2025; Musco, 2025; Frosina, 2025). Among the protesters, notable statements came from the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavaro, Italy’s largest trade union, which condemned the government’s decision to bypass parliamentary debate, trample on democratic institutions, and setting a disturbing precedent that does not address the needs of citizens fostering an atmosphere of repression by criminalising dissent (Redazione La Repubblica Roma, 2025).
This same network had, in February 2025, taken the protest to Brussels in an effort to shine light on the authoritarian drift that the Meloni government is promoting in Italy, in defence of freedoms, rights, and democracy (Amnesty International Italy, 2025). Furthermore, in the months prior to the introduction of the DDL Sicurezza, before the amendments were made, the bill had garnered attention from major international institutions and media outlets such as The Guardian and Ouest-France. Also among these was the OSCE, particularly the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, which issued a lengthy statement titled ‘Opinion on Certain Articles of Draft Law No 1660 on Counter-Terrorism, Public Security, Protection of Personnel in Service, and Penitentiary Organisation’ providing numerous recommendations to the Italian government and urging revisions to the proposed bill (OSCE, 2024).
The statement also included an in-depth analysis of the bill’s compliance with international human rights standards (OSCE, 2024, p.2). Moreover, the OSCE argues that while the bill may seek to address legislative gaps, it simultaneously undermines fundamental principles of criminal law and the rule of law (OSCE, 2024). The criticisms continue, highlighting provisions in the decree that
[…] could impede the exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the prohibition of ill-treatment, the rights to personal liberty and security, the freedoms of peaceful assembly, expression, and movement, as well as the rights to a fair trial and respect for private and family life, (OSCE, 2024, p.2)
due to the vague and overly broad formulation of the newly proposed crimes, which also jeopardise the principle of proportionality in criminal sanctions (OSCE, 2024, p.2). This lack of precision risks “fostering arbitrary application of the law” with inevitable repercussions on the right to life, prohibition of ill-treatment, personal freedom and security, the right to peaceful assembly and association, freedom of expression, the right to a fair trial, and the right to privacy (OSCE, 2024, p.2).
In addition, the UN, agreeing with many points raised in the OSCE’s critique, expressed numerous concerns about the bill in December 2024. Through various Special Rapporteurs, the UN raised a range of issues, including the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, human rights, racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism (UN, 2024). The communication focuses on the potential discriminatory impact of the decree, particularly towards already marginalised groups such as detainees, homeless, migrants, and vulnerable communities, which could contravene protection against discrimination as regulated by international human rights law (UN, 2024). In particular, the Special Rapporteurs reminded the Italian government of its primary responsibility to protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms through the necessary measures
[…] to create the social, economic, political, and other conditions, as well as the legal guarantees required, so that all persons subject to their jurisdiction, individually or collectively, can enjoy all these rights and freedoms in practice” (UN, 2024, p.10).
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Human rights concerns: a dangerous precedent
In this paragraph, following the previous analysis and supported by the strong foundation provided by international institutions that have criticised the now-decree law, an overview of the actual risks posed by the approval of the new law will be clarified. These risks are inevitable and non-partisan, but special attention needs to be paid to the strong support from far-right parties for this security approach which focuses on national security and anti-terrorism, but risks limiting basic human rights and criminalising non-violent civil disobedience (Malagrini, 2024). Despite the minor modifications to the original text, the approval of the DDL Sicurezza represents a dangerous precedent for the proliferation of human rights violations, as confirmed by numerous human rights organisations.
Among these, Amnesty International Italy expresses significant concern as the amendments increasingly restrict spaces for peaceful protest (Malagrini, 2024). In this context, the increased protections for law enforcement and the reduction of automatic consequences make an already negative situation even more risky, especially in a context where force is often used excessively and unjustifiably against peaceful protests. It is important to note that Italy is among the few European countries that have not adopted measures such as the introduction of identification codes for law enforcement officers (Amnesty International Italy, 2024). The right to protest and the right to freedom of assembly are fundamental pillars of democratic societies and, as emphasised in the OSCE and UN reports, are protected by significant international treaties to which Italy is a signatory.
Furthermore, the law could exacerbate difficult conditions, which have been denounced on several occasions by NGOs regarding the conditions of migrants in CPRs. As noted in the communication from UN Special Rapporteurs, the right to housing and freedom from discrimination are integral parts of the human rights framework. The decree, on the other hand, instead of providing adequate solutions for social security and the right to housing, continues in its efforts to criminalise already marginalised communities. As stated by Greenpeace (2024), this will lead, in the short and long term, to the normalisation of a rhetoric that legitimises the criminalisation of already marginalised groups. The establishment of such dynamics risks significantly worsening the state of human rights in Italy, creating, according to Legambiente (2024), a climate of fear that penalises vulnerable groups and minorities. In summary, the concerns raised by international bodies and human rights organisations should make us reflect on how the decree-law could represent a danger to the defence of human rights.
Conclusion
In conclusion, after reviewing an overview of the amendments made to the decree law, its approval, and the respective national and international reactions, it has been possible to observe, with the support of communications from the OSCE and the UN, as well as human rights organisations, the hypothetical impact of the new DDL Sicurezza on human rights. After careful analysis, it can be stated that the DDL Sicurezza raises significant concerns regarding the state of human rights in Italy and its implementation requires continuous monitoring. Despite the amendments made, the final approved decree still raises critical issues, consolidating a security vision that risks undermining fundamental rights such as the freedom to protest and the protection of the most vulnerable categories. In light of this investigation, it is crucial that the Italian government reconsider these measures to avoid serious long-term complications, placing greater attention on the fragile balance between security needs and the protection of civil rights. The difficulty in reconciling these needs is evident, but an open public debate and dialogue with civil society is necessary, given the involvement of international bodies such as the UN and OSCE, which at the same time underline the dangers of the recently approved decree.
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