

The Right to Choose: Migration Crisis in Calais and Dunkirk

**Chiara Innocenti, Elisabedi Koridze, Jasmin Kaur
Rajwant, Filippo Turetta, Giulia Villa, Megan
Howlett-Farmer, Uliana Kalinina, Zurab Kochladze
Europe Team – 31.08.2025**



Photo source: Calais informal camp © Lou-Anne Drevon, 2025.



Riviermarkt 5, 2513 AM The Hague, Netherlands



+ 31 62 72 41006



info@ghrd.org



<https://www.ghrd.org>

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	5
1. A PRIORI HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS	5
1.1 Due to the living conditions of migrants in informal settlements and on the move	6
1.2. Due to vulnerabilities	10
1.2.1 <i>Non accompanied minors</i>	10
1.2.2 <i>Women and girls</i>	12
1.2.3 <i>Other at risk groups</i>	12
2. INFLECTED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS	13
2.1. Forced Evictions from Informal Settlements	13
2.2 Document Checks at Transport Hubs and Urban Areas	15
2.3 Violence and Obstruction at the Beach and Departure Points	16
2.4 Forced Transfers: “Mise à l’abri” and Bus Relocations	17
3. CRIMINALISATION OF MIGRANTS	18
3.1 Context: Criminalisation of Migration in international and the European Law	19
3.1.1 <i>Some examples of Criminalisation of migration in Calais</i>	20
3.1.2 <i>The recent developments in France</i>	21
4. THE RISK OF SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING	22
4.1. Definitions and Regulatory Framework	22
4.2 Local Context: Calais and Dunkirk as Hubs of Migrant Trafficking and Smuggling	25
5. UK-FRANCE RELATIONS	27
5.1 The end of Dublin regulation and the UK’s new approach	27
5.2 France as Buffer State	28
5.3 November 2021 English Channel Tragedy	29
5.4 Critique of EU Migrations System	31
6. ADVOCACY PROPOSALS: RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO MIGRATION	32
6.1 Recognition of Agency and the Right to Choose	32
6.2 Legal Pathways and Safe Access	33
6.3 Cross-border protection mechanisms and EU-UK Cooperation	34
CONCLUSION	36

Abbreviations	Full terms
CAES Centres	Centers for reception and situation examination
CESCR	Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CRC	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CRS Officers	Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité (Republican Security Corps)
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
EU	European Union
EUAA	European Union Agency for Asylum
EUROJUST	European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation
EUROPOL	European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICRMW	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families
ID	Identification
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NGO HRO	NGO Human Rights Observers
NGO MSF	NGO Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders)

OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PICUM	Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants
RIBs	Rigid Inflatable Boats
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WHO	World Health Organization

INTRODUCTION

The migration crisis in Calais and Dunkirk is not something new. Its roots date back to 1999, when the first migrant centre was opened in Sangatte with the support of the Red Cross and the French government. By that time, many people were fleeing wars in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and they were provided with shelters in Sangatte. Later, when the shelter in Sangatte was closed, a new shelter appeared, including the so-called “Jungle”. It was first formed in 2009 and then again in 2014. After each demolition, a new camp would quickly grow again, but one thing that stayed unchanged during these years is the lack of human rights protections for the migrants and refugees who seek asylum. Even when the number of residents reached around ten thousand, the camp was never officially recognised as a refugee camp; therefore, it never received proper humanitarian aid.

Today, there are hundreds of people living in Calais. They are not allowed to put up tents, and their rights are still not generally respected. This report aims to look closely at the human rights violations and structural failures that have allowed the crisis to continue for more than two decades.

The first chapter of the report discusses the human rights violations in Calais and Dunkirk generally, as well as the living conditions of migrants who are on the move or stay in informal settlements. One subchapter is dedicated to the most vulnerable people in those shelters, including unaccompanied minors, women, girls, and other risk groups who have even more difficulties living in the camps. The second chapter of the report examines the exact human rights violations that have occurred in Calais and Dunkirk, for example, forced evictions, document checks, violence, and obstruction along the northern French coast. Forced transfer is another very serious human rights violation that is discussed in the report. After discussing all the human rights violations happening in Calais and Dunkirk, the report also scrutinises the UK-France relations and provides a critique of the EU migration system that clearly can not deal with the human rights violations of refugees and migrants in Calais and Dunkirk. Lastly, the report provides possible solutions to the migration crisis in Calais and Dunkirk.

1. A PRIORI HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS



Photo Source: Photo by Paul Lesur. Via Unsplash/August 2nd, 2024.

1.1 Due to the living conditions of migrants in informal settlements and on the move

Despite its size and an approximate of ten thousand people living in the Calais camp, the camp never gained legal status as a refugee camp and resultantly, never really received humanitarian support (Amnesty International, 2019b). When the second Jungle camp was demolished in 2016, some migrants were transferred to different parts of France, but many continued living in Calais and the suburbs of Dunkirk (Amnesty International, 2019b). According to Amnesty International, refugees and migrants, including children, do not have regular access to food, water, sanitation, shelter, or legal assistance, and they are subject to harassment, abuse, violence, and even evictions (Amnesty International, 2019b). Not only the refugees and migrants, but also their defenders are harassed while doing their job, providing humanitarian aid, and advocating for the rights of migrants (Amnesty International, 2019a).

Following the closure of the second Jungle camp 2016, crossing the border from France to the United Kingdom (UK) became even more dangerous than it was before because of the increased security measures and militarisation on the border (Acidere, 2025). Nowadays, there are approximately 700 migrants in Calais, and they are not allowed to put up tents. Moreover, the police carry out evictions multiple times a week (Acidere, 2025). These never-ending human rights violations are a result of an agreement between the UK and France, under which the UK paid the French government hundreds of millions to stop migrants from crossing the border (Grierson, 2021). Back in 2021, Human Rights Watch reported on human rights violations in Calais, saying that adults and children living in

migrant camps around Calais were subject to degrading treatment (Human Rights Watch, 2021). The report, “Enforced Misery: The Degrading Treatment of Migrant Children and Adults in Northern France”, further states that the migrants are subject to mass eviction operations, police harassment, and restrictions, with no access to humanitarian assistance. With this kind of treatment, the authorities are trying to force them to leave and move somewhere else (Human Rights Watch & Bochenek, 2021).

The living conditions migrants and asylum seekers face in Calais and Dunkirk are very difficult. As many human rights groups have shown, these conditions are the result of state policy. The goal seems to be to make life so hard that people give up and leave. It also violates some of the most basic rights, including the right to food, clean water, sanitation, health, shelter, and to simply live in dignity. All of these are protected under Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). This section will look at how these rights are being systematically denied, not through one-off incidents, but through a system that is designed to keep people out, no matter the human suffering it causes.

Article 25 of the UDHR states that everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for their health and well-being, including access to food, clothing, housing, medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, and other circumstances.

Having access to clean water is the bare minimum standard to have adequate conditions for health and well-being. Many reports show that the access to the clean water in Calais is very limited. The coalition of humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that aim to improve the living conditions of refugees and migrants launched a campaign called, *The Water For All/De L'eau Pour Tous*, in the summer of 2023 (Collective Aid, 2024). The campaign showed that at the time of research, refugees and migrants had access to an average of just 4.9 litres per person per day in Calais, meanwhile, the World Health Organisation (WHO) highlights that the safe minimum is 150 litres per day (Collective Aid, 2024). The lack of clean water also causes serious skin infections; for instance, one in four people suffer from scabies (Collective Aid, 2024). Moreover, according to the survey which was conducted by Doctors of the World in 2019, nearly 60% of the respondents in Dunkirk did not have sufficient access to the drinking water, and 80% could not shower because of the same reason (Doctors of the World, 2019).

RESPONDENTS IN DUNKIRK




Figure 1: Graph created by Author using information from Doctors of the World 2019 Report

In 2023, during the United Nations (UN) Universal Periodic Review, the French government was asked to accept the recommendations and improve water access for the refugees and migrants (Collective Aid, 2024). Later, in October 2023, the French government said that they would accept many recommendations, for example, to improve water sanitation conditions, to increase efforts to provide safe drinking water, to ensure that everyone has access to clean water, etc. but according to the Collective Aid, the French government failed to fulfil these recommendations (Collective Aid, 2024). It is worth mentioning, that in 2017, the court ruling directed authorities to provide migrants and refugees with the access to drinking water, toilets and facilities for showering or washing the clothes (Human Rights Watch, 2017). According to the Human Rights Watch, instead of implementing this ruling, the French authorities appealed it. This clearly shows that the French government is unwilling to provide migrants and refugees in Calais and Dunkirk with clean water, and tend to have this pattern to uphold fundamental rights even when it is legally mandated or international organisations recommend it. This demonstrates the systemic failure of accountability mechanisms.

When it comes to sanitation, the survey conducted in 2019 by the Doctors of the World showed that 80 percent of the refugees and migrants did not have access to showers and 87 percent did not have access to toilets (Doctors of the World, 2019). The same organisation, Doctors of the World, looked into the living conditions of migrants and refugees in Calais back in 2015, which makes it clear that the living conditions and situations never improve for migrants and refugees in Calais and Dunkirk (Nordeclair, 2015).

Food is another major problem. Even though Article 25 of the UDHR states that food is an essential requirement to have adequate living conditions, the survey by Doctors of the World showed that more than half of the respondents do not have enough to eat (Doctors of the

World, 2019). Moreover, in 2017, the Human Rights Watch documented that police sometimes used pepper spray on migrants' food and water to press them to leave the area, and when migrants returned to Calais, the local authorities responded by impeding their access to food (Human Rights Watch, 2017). The aid workers also described occasions when riot police blocked migrants' access to aid workers and knocked food out of the workers' hands (Human Rights Watch, 2017). One thing is that food is not accessible for migrants and refugees because of its shortage, but also because the authorities are deliberately taking food away from them to force them to leave and make them suffer, which obviously violates article 25 of the UDHR. Intentionally depriving people of food, water, and other basic necessities can be considered as inhumane treatment.

The right to an adequate standard of living under Article 25 of the UDHR also includes the right to health and well-being. Reportedly, in 2015, Doctors of the World was the only group that was providing medical care to the thousands of refugees and migrants in Calais and Dunkirk (Cooper, 2015). According to the organisation, trauma injuries caused by attempts to climb the security fences were very common; they have witnessed ripped skins, dog bites, injuries from police batons, and broken limbs. Although they had a lot of cases like this, there was only one clinic and a small staff of volunteers to help refugees and migrants (Cooper, 2015). As mentioned before, scabies is also one of the biggest problems prevalent there. According to the doctors, 30-40 percent of patients had it, mostly because of the living conditions (Cooper, 2015). Colds and flu were also very common, because any infectious condition could spread very fast in a place like the Jungle camp (Cooper, 2015).

The living conditions and harsh treatment in Calais and Dunkirk affected not only physical health, but also the mental health of refugees and migrants. The article published by Doctors of the World in 2019 states that the refugees and migrants were exhausted, stressed, and angry because of constant evictions. Many of them suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) because of their journey to get to Calais (Doctors of the World, 2019). Reportedly, there was no psychological support for them in Calais. In Dunkirk, while there was a state psychologist, the psychologist was only available once a week and there was no one to help people who had attempted suicide and/or self-harm (Doctors of the World, 2015). In July 2023, Doctors Without Borders started providing medical, psychological, and social support to unaccompanied minors in a day centre in Calais (Médecins Sans Frontières - Doctors Without Borders, 2024). Since then, 152 minors had consultations with psychologists; the most frequent symptoms experienced by them were anxious rumination, nightmares, insomnia, and a feeling of powerlessness (Médecins Sans Frontières - Doctors Without Borders, 2024). According to the coordinator of Doctors Without Borders, "this repeated physical and psychological violence illustrates the human cost that France and the UK are ready to pay to secure their common border" (Médecins Sans Frontières - Doctors Without Borders, 2024).

In addition to Article 25 of UDHR, Article 11 of the ICESCR also states that everyone has the right to an adequate standard of living and adequate housing. These are fundamental human rights, but in Calais and Dunkirk these rights are violated systematically.

According to Amnesty International, hundreds of adults, teenagers, and families with young children live in dire conditions in tents and informal camps (Amnesty International, 2019a). Another organisation, Care4Calais said that the vulnerable adults and children in the refugee camps in Calais are being subjected to degrading and inhumane conditions: they have little or no shelter, they sleep in open patches or pavements, and there are very few tents to go around (Care4Calais, 2020). The city of Calais even installed barriers, rocks, and barbed wires to prevent people from setting up tents to sleep at night (Médecins Sans Frontières - Doctors Without Borders, 2024). This is not really a shortage of housing or shelters, it is more like the policy in Calais. According to Amnesty International, the authorities in Calais have introduced a policy of preventing so-called “attachment points” to deter people on the move from coming and staying in the area, and this is carried out by demolishing new camps, removing tents, and failing to provide adequate emergency shelter (Amnesty International, 2019a). This policy clearly violates Article 11 of ICESCR and Article 25 of UDHR as it intentionally deprives migrants and refugees of the most basic form of shelter.

Even though the UDHR is a relevant guiding instrument and the ICESCR is legally binding on France, it is obvious that the French government has deliberately failed to provide access to food, clean water, sanitation, housing, and healthcare to the migrants and refugees coming to Calais and Dunkirk to allow them to have an adequate standard of living. Moreover, the police harassment and evictions that became routine for the most vulnerable people, create even more inhumane conditions for them.

1.2. Due to Vulnerabilities



Photo Source: Photo by Project Play, 2023.

1.2.1 Non accompanied minors

Children, especially when not accompanied, are a particularly vulnerable group among the refugees in northern France. They reportedly face higher risk of trafficking, abuse, and sexual violence (Refugee Rights Europe, 2019). Unaccompanied children are particularly exposed because they lack protection from family and are often unaware of their rights as minors (Refugee Rights Europe, 2019). They encounter longer waiting times when registering as asylum seekers because they need an appointed guardian to start the process (Refugee Rights Europe, 2019). The insufficient capacity of the guardianship system produces further delays (Refugee Rights Europe, 2019).

Unaccompanied children are also often not identified by authorities due to a lack of proper social assessment and are therefore subject to the same treatment as adults, including forced evictions with rubber bullets and tear gas (MacTaggart, Hall, & O'Neill, 2025). Research has shown that children asylum seekers in northern France are more likely to be subjected to police violence than adults (Gerlach, Timberlake, & Welander, 2021). Additionally, given children's small size, higher breath rate, and limited cardiovascular stress response, they are among the individuals that are most impacted by tear gas, as canisters are usually deployed closer to their height (MacTaggart, Hall, & O'Neill, 2025).

Limited financial capabilities particularly impact unaccompanied minors. Before the destruction of refugee camps, traffickers would charge an entry fee and unaccompanied minors who were unable to pay were often forced to perform tasks for the adults (Gerlach, Timberlake, & Welander, 2021). It is not uncommon to find children forced to commit crimes

or be subject to sexual abuse and exploitation by traffickers (Donnelly, & Muthiah, 2019; Gerlach, Timberlake, & Welander, 2021).

Limited financial resources put unaccompanied minors at further risk when trying to cross to the UK. Unaccompanied children are more likely to attempt crossing without paying, risking violence from traffickers and intermediaries (MacTaggart, Hall, & O'Neill, 2025). Unaccompanied minors often try to cross to the UK in lorries and containers as they cannot afford paying an intermediary to organise a boat trip for them (MacTaggart, Hall, & O'Neill, 2025). Additionally, unaccompanied children who cannot pay intermediaries, can sometimes join a boat crossing in exchange for driving the boat (MacTaggart, Hall, & O'Neill, 2025). As captains of the boat, once on the UK shores, they can be charged for having facilitated illegal entry of people (MacTaggart, Hall, & O'Neill, 2025). Multiple instances of unaccompanied children seeking accommodation after failed crossing attempts who were denied shelter by authorities have been reported (MacTaggart, Hall, & O'Neill, 2025).

In addition to the lack of humanitarian support, stricter migration policies put asylum seekers, especially children, in progressively deadlier situations. The 2022 UK Nationality and Borders Act shrank protection for victims of trafficking, thereby further jeopardising support for minors and women (MacTaggart, Hall, & O'Neill, 2025). Furthermore, recent changes in policy ended the European Union (EU)'s Dublin III arrangements and the Dubs Scheme, which is reportedly affecting children separated from their families and are trying to reunite in the UK (MacTaggart, Hall, & O'Neill, 2025). All of this while the number of children killed during crossing attempts rose by 1,500 percent (MacTaggart, Hall, & O'Neill, 2025).

The latest report by Project Play, an organisation of volunteers active in the territory, details numerous violations of children's rights established by the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). One of the core principles of the Convention, enshrined in Article 3, is the child's 'best interest', which indicates the duty of State Parties to prioritise the child's well-being in all actions affecting them (UNHCR, 2008). The UK and France, States Parties to the CRC, are failing to meet the needs of child refugees.

With a lack of adequate safe routes for entrance and asylum in both France and the UK, many unaccompanied children attempting to cross are denied their right to reunite with family, which is protected under Articles 9 and 10 of the CRC (MacTaggart, Hall, & O'Neill, 2025). According to the UNHCR (2008), family reunification must be considered as being in the best interest of the child, even when it entails resettlement.

Similarly, Project Play reports violation of Articles 19 (protection from violence), 20 (right to care for unaccompanied children), and 36 (protection from exploitation) by the UK and France (MacTaggart, Hall, & O'Neill, 2025). As mentioned above, unaccompanied children in northern France are subject to police violence and exploitation, with little access to support. Provision of temporary care to unaccompanied children is considered to be in their best interest (UNHCR, 2008). More broadly, unaccompanied minors attempting to cross to the UK experience violations of their right to life, survival and development (Article 27) (MacTaggart, Hall, & O'Neill, 2025).

1.2.2 Women and girls

Women are a particularly vulnerable group among the asylum seekers residing in Calais and Dunkirk. Women are at risk of sexual exploitation and face significant barriers to the enjoyment of reproductive health.

Sexual exploitation has been a concerning phenomenon for years. At the previous encampments, there have been reports of women falling into arrangements with other refugee men, where they exchange sex for protection (Refugee Rights Europe, 2019). In addition, there have been several known cases of women and girls being forced to perform sexual acts in exchange for the chance of crossing to the UK (Refugee Rights Europe, 2019). Research revealed that women in Calais and Dunkirk were extremely scared of falling victim to sexual exploitation at the hands of people smugglers (Gerlach, Timberlake, & Welander, 2021). If sexual exploitation results in pregnancy, women are forced to undergo termination or being left as a single parent (Refugee Rights Europe, 2019). In 2022, the Refugee Women's Centre also reported that women were being molested and assaulted, having no protection offered as the tents cannot be locked.

Lack of hygiene and provision of reproductive health have also been detailed by various organisations (Hangul, Paton, Stanton, & Welander, 2016; Gerlach, Timberlake, & Welander, 2021; Refugee Women's Centre, 2022). In particular, Hangul, Paton, Stanton, and Welander (2016) report sanitary conditions that put women and girls at risk of disease, disability, complications during childbirth, and death.

1.2.3 Other at-risk groups

Other groups also face heightened risk when seeking asylum. Project Play reports further risks for people with disabilities. For instance, Project Play reports the case of asylum seekers asking volunteers for support in crossing to the UK with a wheelchair (MacTaggart, Hall, & O'Neill, 2025).

Furthermore, queer asylum seekers face barriers to the recognition of the right to asylum based on risk of persecution. In fact, asylum claims often hinge on proving their sexual orientation and providing evidence for a well-founded fear of persecution (Gartner, 2015). This is difficult given the subjective and private nature of sexuality, and the usual impossibility to find tangible evidence (Gartner, 2015). Additionally, "discretion" reasoning, the idea that one's sexuality can be disguised to avoid persecution, remains present in French asylum practices (Wessels, 2017).

2. INFLICTED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS



Photo Source: Photo by Mathias Reding. Via Pexels/March 15 2022.

2.1. Forced Evictions from Informal Settlements

In the informal migrant encampments in both Calais and Dunkirk, forced evictions have become a routine occurrence, casting a shadow of fear over the daily lives of migrants. In 2024 alone, NGO Human Rights Observers (HRO) recorded a grand total of 818 evictions from informal living spaces in these regions (HRO, 2025). The rampant evictions close to the Franco-British border inevitably place those exiled in a position of extreme vulnerability, facing severe repression and limited legal avenues to move; a reported 89 individuals have died at these locations last year (HRO, 2025). In the Calais area, evictions have been a daily occurrence, with police officers, or even riot police, entering the campsites to clear both the inhabitants and their belongings. Near Dunkirk, while less frequent, camp clearances have been reported to have occurred roughly twice per week.

In order to grasp the scale and magnitude of forced evictions in the regions, one must turn to the reliable statistics put forward by HRO in their 2024 report. In Calais alone, there were a reported 782 evictions, resulting in the expulsion of 14,729 individuals. In Dunkirk, there were 36 forced evictions and 3,074 people expelled (HRO, 2025). The level of harassment of those living in informal living spaces was relentless, with some sites being evicted up to 141 times in a single year. Camps are often dismantled early in the morning, forcing migrants to choose between leaving to access services, risking the seizure of their belongings or staying to protect their tents.

These operations typically involve the systematic destruction or seizure of personal property. In 2024 alone, the evictions in Calais were coupled with the seizure of approximately 1,685

tents (122 of which were still filled with the exiled's personal belongings), 42 sleeping bags and 103 mattresses. 28 shelters were completely destroyed (HRO, 2025). This phenomenon is not novel in northern France. For years, police or contracted crews have torn down tents, tarps and makeshift structures. They have been reported to have slashed tents with knives, occasionally with the inhabitants still inside to persuade them to exit (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Photographic evidence of this behaviour during evictions in Dunkirk and Calais have been submitted to local NGOs, prompting "false statements" from the Ministry of Interior and the Minister of Justice (Observatoire Des Expulsions, 2024). Furthermore, the Calais team of Doctors Without Borders have observed,

[...] that on several occasions, individuals have lost their treatment medications or medical papers during evictions, sometimes violent, by law enforcement. MSF recently had the case of an unaccompanied minor who lost his medications during an eviction after 3 days of starting treatment, while he had enough for a week (Observatoire Des Expulsions, 2024).

This is not the only means by which exiled individuals in northern France are subjected to degrading treatment. On the second and fourth of January 2024, CRS officers were reported to be urinating on the living areas of exiled individuals. In March, HRO researchers found evidence of law enforcement in Dunkirk destroying shops and a mosque surrounding informal living spaces, whilst mocking the *Quran*, following three large-scale expulsions in the region (HRO, 2025). Leaked documents and witness testimony have exposed even more aggressive methods used by the French police when intercepting vessels at sea, such as deliberately attempting to flood or hit the boats, puncturing them at sea or threatening passengers with pepper spray (Lighthouse Reports, 2024).

The eviction practices in Calais and Dunkirk raise severe concerns under both international and regional law. These operations are often conducted in the absence of notice or judicial oversight, nor do officials often provide alternative accommodation. Firstly, France is a State Party to the ICESCR, which, by virtue of Article 11, guarantees the right to an adequate standard of living. Defined by the UN Committee on Economic and Cultural Rights (CESCR), forced evictions are defined as "permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection" (CESCR, 1997). In their seventh General Comment on Forced Evictions, the Committee observed that it is essential for State Parties to create national legal frameworks that "include measures which (a) provide the greatest possible security of tenure to occupiers of houses and land, (b) conform to the Covenant and (c) are designed to control strictly the circumstances under which evictions may be carried out" (CESCR, 1997). CESCR further stipulates that evictions must be preceded by adequate notice, genuine consultation, legal remedies and the provision of alternative housing. The daily or weekly mass evictions in both Calais and Dunkirk, characterised by the destruction of tents, the confiscation of personal property and absence of relocation measures, evidently fail to meet these obligations.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) both protect the right against arbitrary interference with one's home, privacy and family life, in Articles 17 and 8 respectively. The European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence has demonstrated that even informal shelters such as tents can be considered homes for legal purposes. In the case of *Connors v UK* (2004), the Court found that the eviction of an individual from a local Traveller site amounted to a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR as the individual had no opportunity to legally defend his possession in court. Justice Sachs invoked the following reasoning:

[...] [T]he absence of any significant attempts by the Municipality to listen to and consider the problems of this particular group of occupiers, and the fact that this is a relatively small group of people who appear to be genuinely homeless and in need, I am not persuaded that it is just an equitable to order the eviction of the occupiers (Travellers Times, 2009).

The routine destruction of shelters and forced evictions in Calais and Dunkirk absent legal justification is a flagrant and unlawful interference with this right. The evictions were often carried out during harsh weather conditions and coupled with the deliberate destruction of food, water and other essential survival materials. As aforementioned, there were also numerous reported incidents of physical and verbal harassment directed towards those exiled by police authorities. The victims of this treatment were vulnerable and subjected to a series of measures aiming to humiliate, harass and exhaust them. The cumulative impact of said measures may meet the threshold for inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 7 of the ICCPR and Article 3 of the ECHR. According to established jurisprudence, notably *M.S.S v Belgium and Greece* (2011), the combination of exposure to degrading conditions of living, lack of shelter and intentional acts of hostility may meet the threshold of the treatment prohibited by Article 3.

2.2 Document Checks at Transport Hubs and Urban Areas

In 2024, police forces in Calais and Dunkirk routinely conducted identity and immigration document checks at local transit hubs, most commonly train stations and bus stops, under the guise of controlling migration. HRO documented 28 violent operations conducted at public transportation hubs in these regions, with the police routinely conducting body searches and baggage inspections. The police presence at Calais Ville station, for example, was reported to be nearly permanent, creating an environment of intimidation that deters migrants from using public transport (HRO, 2025).

Furthermore, the process of document checks was intensely racialised, with passengers or bystanders being grouped by racial characteristics. One such instance was on April 23rd, 2024, where 60 exiled individuals were escorted off a train by heavily armed police (HRO, 2025). No white-passing passengers were questioned. On July 31st, 2024, at Calais bus station, officers only checked migrants and NGO volunteers, ignoring other white bystanders. Eight migrants were arrested by border police. HRO observers on the ground reported that on

numerous occasions police quite literally sorted passengers by skin colour before conducting checks (HRO, 2025). Racial profiling is not an uncommon phenomenon in France, with a national study by a human rights watchdog finding that those appearing Arab or North African were four times more likely to be stopped by police and twelve times more likely to face invasive searches or custody during checks (Reuters, 2025). UN experts have repeatedly called upon France to address this systemic issue (OHCHR, 2023). This is a consequence of a systematic racial bias in police enforcement, whereby migrants and minorities in Calais and Dunkirk experience the worst of over-policing.

French laws require that identity checks be justified and not based on physical characteristics, yet evidence suggests that the opposite is true with officers often operating arbitrarily. One incident investigated by the French national ombudsperson in Grand-Synthe concluded that identification (ID) checks were unjustified, carried out for the sole purpose of intimidating humanitarian observers (HRO, 2025). Officers had targeted migrants explicitly due to their perceived origin. The right to non-discrimination, enshrined in Article 26 of the ICCPR, is at the centre of this issue. Policing on the basis of race or presumed migration status means that people are treated as suspects solely because of what they look like, behaviour which violates the fundamental principle of equality before the law. This is coupled with the fact that the migrants often face barriers to seeking justice, either fearing retaliation or lacking the resources to file complaints. This is in breach of the right to an effective remedy guaranteed by Article 2(3) of the ICCPR and Article 13 of the ECHR. Human rights groups have played a major role in the documentation of abuses and have even secured official recognition of wrongdoing, yet accountability remains rare. The large gap between acknowledgement and action means that the victims of unjust checks in Calais and Dunkirk rarely obtain redress or any form of guarantee of non-repetition.

2.3 Violence and Obstruction at the Beach and Departure Points

Along the northern French coast and its departure zones, law enforcement have increasingly utilised violent tactics to obstruct migrant crossings of the English Channel. Reports from HRO and Utopia 56 throughout 2024 have repeatedly documented incidents of physical assaults, intimidation and deliberate destruction of boats and other essential equipment. These measures are aimed at preventing irregular migration and have resulted in severe human rights violations.

Police interventions on the beaches of Calais and Dunkirk often involve a use of force that far exceeds what is necessary and proportionate. Reports of migrants being beaten with batons or being subjected to verbal abuse during early morning operations are common. In a few cases, law enforcement officers have even deployed chemical agents such as tear gas or pepper spray at groups attempting to board inflatable boats, even in the presence of children or infants (HRO, 2025). One striking example occurred in August of 2024 when gendarmes in Calais slashed an inflatable boat onshore and fired tear gas into a crowd. Video footage

from December 2023 also shows officers spraying tear gas directly into the faces of people wearing life jackets on Calais beach (HRO, 2025).

One of the most dangerous recorded practices is the intentional destruction of boats adjacent to the shore. HRO field observers have documented more than one occasion where officers used knives to deflate or puncture these inflatable boats, sometimes even when people were already on board. The use of intimidation and coercion at departure points is also common. Police units often deploy vehicles, drones and other equipment to encircle groups present on the beaches, shouting threats and warning that any boats launched will be destroyed. In July of 2024, a vessel carrying 65 people was deflated while still in shallow water, forcing the migrants to retreat in fear (HRO, 2025). Not only do these actions destroy essential equipment but create life-threatening situations in unpredictable tidal conditions.

Chiara Innocenti, a researcher and coordinator with Global Human Rights Defence, had the opportunity to interview a representative from Utopia 56, a NGO present in Calais. When asked what were some of the most serious human rights violations they had witnessed on the ground, they responded, “The baton blows. Stones being thrown... I’ve seen police officers throw stones — and that’s dangerous, especially when they hit someone in the head. That’s attempted murder, plain and simple.” The violence suffered by those exiled is extensive. What’s worse, HRO have reported that this violence is occasionally accompanied with the confiscation of mobile phones and other personal items, preventing them from calling for help (HRO, 2025).

From a legal perspective, these actions violate multiple human rights norms. The deliberate destruction of boats and the utilisation of chemical agents directly endanger lives, contravening the right to life protected by Article 6 of the ICCPR and Article 2 of the ECHR. The infliction of pain, fear and humiliation through beatings or chemical exposure may meet the threshold of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment outlined earlier in this report. Moreover, the systematic blockade of departures without providing alternative access to asylum procedures undermine the right to seek asylum as enshrined by Article 14 of the UDHR. Unfortunately, the Declaration only possesses symbolic standing and lacks legal enforceability.

2.4 Forced Transfers: *Mise à l’abri* and Bus Relocations

In 2024, authorities in Calais and Dunkirk continued the established practice of forcibly transferring migrants under the guise of *mise à l’abri* (emergency shelter), a system designed to provide humanitarian accommodation. In reality, it is a practice used as a tool for displacement. HRO documented multiple large-scale operations where migrants were compelled to board buses to be relocated to reception centres across France. This is often carried out in the absence of informed consent or clear explanations of rights (HRO, 2025).

On April 4th, 2024, at least 100 people were expelled from a living site close to Calais and placed on buses headed to centres in other regions. This transfer was operated under intense

police presence, with the settlement subsequently being raided by bulldozers and chainsaws (HRO, 2025). A similar operation occurred in October, where 60 migrants were transported by bus to Arras (HRO, 2025). In both cases, the individuals were reported to have had neither voice nor choice in the matter and were given minimal information as to where they were being taken. These transfers often result in the loss of contact of those exiled with their available support networks, increasing the vulnerability of an already marginalised people.

These bus relocations raise serious concerns under international human rights law. The involuntary nature of the transfers contravene the right to liberty and freedom of movement under Article 13 of the UDHR and Article 12 of the ICCPR. The procedures are not transparent and there have been numerous failures on behalf of the state to provide proper information or obtain consent, undermining the right to dignity. Moreover, the absence of guarantees for adequate accommodation following relocation is incompatible with the right to adequate housing and shelter enshrined in Article 11 of the ICESCR. It is important to note that while the ICESCR is binding on France, it is not directly justiciable in the same way as the ICCPR. Article 2, however, does impose a duty on state parties to progressively realise the rights set out in the Covenant. Furthermore, affected individuals have no effective means to challenge the transfers, violating the right to an effective remedy.

3. CRIMINALISATION OF MIGRANTS




Photo Source: Photo by RDNE Stock project. Via Pexels/December 3, 2020.

In 2017, journalist Haydée Sabéran from *Libération* and Mariam Guerey, an employee of *Secours Catholique* (Catholic Relief), were briefly detained in Calais for an act of solidarity. They had been driving seven unaccompanied migrant minors to the *Secours Catholique* facility so the children could take showers. However, the police showed up, arrested them and took them to the police station. Although they could potentially face custody, there was a free hearing court and they were released. (Franceinfo, 2017; ReSoma, 2020).

This is not just one isolated incident, as explained by the President of *Secours Catholique*, Didier Degrémont, this instance clearly captures the “establishment of a repressive system” around the issue of migrants in Calais (Franceinfo, 2017). According to him, it was an intimidation operation to prevent the association from giving the minors a shower (Franceinfo, 2017; ReSoma, 2020). In addition, this incident further exemplifies a broader pattern of criminalisation of migration and solidarity across Europe.

The term “criminalisation of migration” means that governments apply criminal law or its instruments to immigration and use immigration penalties to respond to criminal law infringements (Provera, 2015; Wrobel, 2023). For example, adopting criminal law enforcement strategies such as detention or involving state actors such as judiciary and enforcement officials can also be considered the criminalisation of migration (Provera, 2015; Wrobel, 2023). In addition, in the broader understanding, criminalisation of migration can also refer to “the discourses, facts and practices made by the police, judicial authorities, but also local governments, media, and a part of the population that hold immigrants/aliens responsible for a large share of criminal offences” (Palidda, 2016; Rosina, 2024)

Meanwhile, the criminalisation of solidarity refers to the state using criminal and immigration laws to prevent individuals or other actors in assisting and supporting migrants (Centar za mirovne studije / Centre for Peace Studies, 2020). According to the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM) media monitoring data, in 2024, at least 91 people were criminalised for crossing borders in the EU. Concurrently, 142 individuals have faced criminal or administrative proceedings for acting in solidarity with migrants (PICUM, 2025).

While in Calais and Dunkirk it is less common for individuals to face criminal or administrative proceedings because they acted in solidarity with migrants, the situation for human rights defenders and volunteers is still not adequate. According to a 2018 report, police intimidation and harassment of aid workers is a significant issue in both cities (Civics Monitor, 2018.) Between November 2017 and July 2018 alone, 645 incidents of police surveillance, ID checks, searches, and violence were documented. NGO workers were forcibly prevented from providing aid to refugees in need (Civics Monitor, 2018).

3.1 Context: Criminalisation of Migration in International and European Law

Under international law, migration is not a crime (OHCHR, 2018). Criminal law is intended to punish individuals who harm others or society as a whole (OHCHR, 2018). The Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants is concerned with the recent trend of criminalisation of migration since irregular entries or stays “are not per se crimes against persons, property or national security” and cannot be considered a criminal offence (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2012). As noted in the report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, migrants in an irregular situation across the world should not be treated as criminals (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2009). Accordingly, migrants in Calais should not be regarded or treated as offenders either.

Additionally, according to the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, even administrative detention should follow the principle of proportionality, meaning it must be used only as a measure of last resort (United Nations Human Rights Council, 2010). In this context, the detention of migrants in UK-run facilities in northern France may appear disproportionate, particularly given that, between 2022 and 2023, more than 350 unaccompanied children were held in such facilities near Calais and Dunkirk over a 21-month period (Syal & Corcoran, 2024). Moreover, the high number of detainees in 2023–2024, 9,139 migrants of all ages, also raises concerns about how the principle of proportionality is adhered to by the respective authorities (Corcoran & Bancroft, 2025).

On the EU level, criminalisation of migrants is not entirely prohibited but some restrictions still exist (Vavoula, 2019). The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has made it clear that any criminal law related to immigration must comply with fundamental rights and must not undermine the objectives of the Return Directive. This directive aims to ensure the return of migrants in a humane, timely manner and via the least coercive measures as possible (Vavoula, 2019).

Therefore, the Court in its rulings held that imprisonment of a migrant before or during the return process is incompatible with EU law (Vavoula, 2019). This conclusion was first taken in the case *El Dridi v. Italy* in 2011. On the other hand, imposing a fine may be permissible, provided it does not delay the return process and that the return of a migrant remains the priority as it was ruled in Case C-430/11, *Sagor*. Imprisonment may only be justified if the return procedure has already been implemented but has failed, and there is no valid reason for the migrant’s non-return (Vavoula, 2019). Moreover, detention is also allowed under the EU return directive (Dumbrava, Madatali, & Radjenovic, 2025).

Although the EU law still does not fully align with international law interpretations regarding criminalisation, it has still led positive development in France. To adjust with the EU law, France abolished the offence of “illegal residence” in 2012. The French Court, considering the CJEU’s position, ruled that police custody could not be used solely on the grounds of irregular residence status. As a result, the offence became unenforceable (Cuoco, 2024). Nevertheless, this legal change did not mean that France decriminalised migration. In reality,

the continued use of other criminal law tools allowed under EU law, combined with dominant narratives that depict migrants as criminals, still show that criminalisation of migrants is an existing problem across France and naturally in Calais as well.

3.1.1 Some examples of Criminalisation of migration in Calais

One of the most prominent examples of the criminalisation of migration in Calais is deployment of the *Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité* (CRS), France's national riot police. This mobile unit takes care of public order and border duties, including demonstrations and migrant management. For example, in Calais, they have been stationed to control the displaced migrant population (Edmond-Pettitt, 2018). As argued by Anya-Edmond-Pettitt, the European Research Programme assistant at the Institute of Race Relations, the deployment of CRS supports portraying refugees and migrants as violent and criminal people that “must be dealt with through an exceptional securitised state response” (Edmond-Pettitt, 2018).

Moreover in France, since 2017, exceptional counter-terrorism measures have been used by official authorities to protect “ordinary citizens”. These measures included expanding identity check zones to within 20 kilometres of borders, which effectively normalised racial profiling (Hagan, 2018). As a result, migrant populations were further criminalised, legitimising the control of their movement and the targeting of their living spaces (Hagan, 2018).

3.1.2 The recent developments in France

Although yet to be approved by the French parliament, the government has decided to bring back the criminal offence classification for irregular stay (Dumont, 2025). The right and far-right wing parties see this as an incentive for individuals to avoid falling into an irregular situation. The Minister of Interior, Bruno Retailleau, also believes that reinstating the offence will help the Ministry to identify suspects and disrupt illegal networks (Dumont, 2025). Furthermore, French Ministry of Interior source in the Telegraph article stated:

Where I think there will be quite a lot of agreement is on criminalising illegal residence. It is a matter of principle. When someone breaks into your home, it is a crime. When someone breaks into a country, it should be a crime (Hymas & Samuel, 2025).

This raises serious concerns, as mentioned earlier, criminal law is intended to punish individuals who harm others or society as a whole. Associating migrants in an irregular situation with housebreakers can be both inappropriate and misleading. Furthermore, although France has yet to reintroduce the offence, over 4,000 police and military personnel conducted nationwide raids at train stations to detain undocumented migrants (Pascual, 2025). The scale of the operation can be compared to those targeting organised crime. While not grounded in criminal law, this recent operation can still be seen as part of the broader trend of criminalisation, since it adopts features typically associated with criminal law.

Naturally, this recent discourse in France will also affect migrants in Calais. Those who seek to reach the UK could face imprisonment solely for being in France without legal status. Furthermore, framing migrants as criminals will deepen existing stigma, which even “low-level” criminalisation (administrative law mimicking criminal law) tends to do (Rosina, 2024). In addition, looking at the recent raid, there is a high chance that large-scale operations to dismantle camps may increase, and with migrants officially classified as criminals, such actions could more frequently lead to imprisonment.

The future of these recent developments is not yet certain, but it is clear that the risk of further criminalisation of migration in France is real. If the offence of irregular stay is reintroduced and intensified policing operations continue migrants’ life quality in Calais and Dunkirk will be further harmed.

4. THE RISK OF SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING



Photo Source: Blue inflatable raft on beach © Kishor. Via Unsplash/ June 1, 2019.

4.1. Definitions and Regulatory Framework

The situation analysed above presents numerous critical issues, especially regarding the physical and psychological safety of migrants, the lack of institutional capacity of the countries involved to regulate the migratory route that starts from the French coast and ends on the English coasts, which for many represents only the last step of a long migratory

journey. This context is worsened by the smuggling and trafficking of migrants, considered among the fastest-growing in terms of transnational criminal activities, which is likely to increase in environments where migrants and lack of access to safe migratory routes are involved (Shelley, & Pardo-Herrera, 2018).

The migrants' need to overcome national barriers and reduce frustrating timeframes is exploited by criminal individuals who take advantage of the degrading and dangerous conditions in which migrants find themselves, offering solutions that facilitate the crossing of borders in order to create profit (Shelley, & Pardo-Herrera, 2018). These criminal activities can be formed by national networks or interconnected with other international hubs and although the places where such practices are more widespread in the Mediterranean and for reaching North Africa, also territories such as those under examination can be victims of such phenomena (Shelley, & Pardo-Herrera, 2018). Although of different scale and intensity, still placed at the centre of the issue is the very serious situation in which criminals take advantage of people in severe difficulty by exploiting their aspirations (Shelley, & Pardo-Herrera, 2018).

The UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime provides a fundamental framework for the definition and fight against both phenomena with specific supplementary protocols. According to the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, the Palermo Protocol, the smuggling of migrants is defined as,

[T]he procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident (United Nations, 2000a, p.2).

According to the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, the term “trafficking of migrants” is explained as,

[T]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs (United Nations, 2000b, p.2).

Both phenomena include the steps of recruitment and movement but at the same time the main differences lie in the concepts of “consent, purpose of exploitation, transnationality, the source of criminal profits, and the object of the crime” (Shelley, & Pardo-Herrera, 2018, p.383; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2021). Understanding these differences is crucial for the identification of trafficking victims and to fight against such phenomena effectively (Shelley, & Pardo-Herrera, 2018).

According to Eurojust and Europol, 90 percent of migrants on European territory rely on smugglers (Shelley, & Pardo-Herrera, 2018; Council of the European Union, 2023; Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, 2025a). This situation is further exacerbated by the fact that individuals who initially consent to being smuggled often become victims of human trafficking, which significantly worsens their circumstances. (Shelley, & Pardo-Herrera, 2018; Council of the European Union, 2023; Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, 2025a). Specifically, the spread of human trafficking is related to serious difficulties in prevention and reduction, the development of an effective judicial and law enforcement response, victim identification and support, and the need for stronger international cooperation. (Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, 2025b). All these elements have been aggravated following the COVID-19 pandemic due to the acceleration in the use of digital space (Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, 2025b).

To prevent the phenomenon of smuggling at the level of European institutions, a progressive improvement of the legislative framework has been carried out to combat both human smuggling and trafficking based on policing and prevention. Following the adoption in 2005, the Convention of the Council of Europe on the fight against human trafficking, and of the EU Anti trafficking Directive 2011/36/EU, Member States have been strongly pushed to implement measures aimed at the protection and identification of victims (UNICEF France, & UNICEF UK, 2016; Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, 2024b).

Regarding human smuggling, starting from November 2023, the European Commission launched two legislative proposals for the revision of the 2002 Directive, to introduce a minimum of rules to follow, with the aim to prosecute this crime effectively, clarify the definition of smuggling and harmonise the penalties (Council of the European Union, 2023, 2024a, 2025; Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, 2024). Secondly, it was necessary to strengthen the role of Europol and the sharing of data between member states (Council of the European Union, 2023, 2024a, 2025). Moreover, following the first European anti-trafficking law of 2011 for the prevention and fight against human trafficking in December 2022, the proposals to update the law resulted in a provisional agreement in December 2024 (Council of the European Union, 2024b).

This orientation on European territory has influenced the countries involved in the case under examination, namely France and the UK, leading numerous initiatives for a paradigm shift focused in particular on the protection of trafficking victims but also on the weakening of the networks that organise smuggling. In France, in fact, starting from 2013 this new vision of maximum priority of protection of trafficking victims was embodied through the implementation of a National Plan for the fight against human trafficking 2014–2016, adopted in May 2014 by the Council of Ministers, and expanding the definition of human trafficking through the Law No. 2013-711 (UNICEF France, & UNICEF UK, 2016).

Before the ratification of the Council of Europe Anti-Trafficking Convention ratified in 2008 in the UK, trafficking and smuggling was punished within the immigration laws but it was in 2015 that a real effective legislative framework was implemented through the Modern Slavery Act, which in the following years facilitated the launch of International Joint Actions against smuggling operations (Attorney General Office, 2012a; 2012b). Subsequently, in 2023, the UK joined the Global Alliance launched by the European Commission to counter migrant smuggling and at the national level, proceeded with the implementation of the Illegal Migration Act, establishing the Border Security Command for coordination between different armed forces against smuggling in the following year (European Commission, 2023; UK Border Security Command, 2024; Home Office, 2023). Despite the establishment of this legislative framework in both countries, based on the news of June 2025 relating to an agreement between France and the UK on illegal channel crossing, it is evident how the issue of countering trafficking and smuggling in human beings is tremendously current and requires extreme collaboration between the countries involved (Home Office et al., 2025).

4.2 Local Context: Calais and Dunkirk as Hubs of Migrant Trafficking and Smuggling

Despite the regulatory framework, Calais and Dunkirk have become concentration points for migrants of the English Channel and consequently, perfect for the spread of phenomena such as smuggling and trafficking. Large-scale events, in particular of human smuggling across the English Channel, are not new but have undergone numerous changes caused by various factors over the years, such as an increase in demand, the response of the states involved, technological developments and most recently the COVID-19 pandemic and Brexit (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024). Constant border controls are making crossings increasingly dangerous, increasing the cost of services offered by facilitators, raising profits and risks for migrants, particularly women and children.

In particular, the predominant *modus operandi* used to cross the English Channel lies in the use of small boats or rigid inflatable boats (RIBs), making the crossing particularly deadly and risky. 2024 was identified as the year with the most deaths in the attempt to cross the France-UK border, but at the same time compared with other methods more economical between £2500 and £4000 per person (Walsh & Cuibus, 2025; Europol, 2022). The numbers in January 2024 showed at least 100,000 people who had crossed the Channel since 2018, with the highest peak of crossings, 45,000, in 2022 (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024). The increase in the use of small boats, about 50 percent of irregular arrivals in the UK in 2020, and the greater mortality recorded are elements closely connected to the intensification of law enforcement controls especially near the Eurotunnel, which have made other types of border crossings much more complicated (Walsh & Cuibus, 2025; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024). A further element of motivation regarding the increase in the use of small boats or RIBs to cross from the French coast to the UK lies in the expansion of smuggling operations in recent years, which have become increasingly professionalised in criminal groups to compensate for the increase in

controls on the French coast (Walsh & Cuibus, 2025; Mixed Migration Centre & Praxis Labs, 2023; Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024; Europol, 2022). This method, although considered by smugglers as more efficient and easy, at the same time presents a serious increase in risks for migrants as the English Channel is one of the most trafficked maritime routes in the world (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024). Moreover, the boats are overloaded by the smugglers to maximise profit, but according to IOM Missing Migrants projects this causes the disappearance of numerous individuals; between 2014 and September 2023 at least 220 missing or dead migrants were identified including children (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024; IOM, 2025).

Thus, through a process of commercialisation of the route, human smuggling networks have increased profits with competitive prices and launched even more persuasive methods for recruitment in the migrants' countries of origin (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024). Europol (2022) in fact declared in its Sixth Annual Report on Smuggling of migrants in Europe, that “the lack of opportunities to reach the UK via safe and legal routes combined with increased border surveillance have pushed migrants and refugees into the hands of smugglers and to take greater risks to cross irregularly” (Mixed Migration Centre & Praxis Labs, 2023, p.26).

To cross the border and arrive in the UK there are different types of agreement depending on the methods of payment, usually organised by networks independent from those that deal with bringing migrants into the European Union, but certainly connected to transnational criminal networks (Mixed Migration Centre & Praxis Labs, 2023). Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic are two other fundamental elements that have led to an increase in the phenomenon of smuggling and trafficking due to greater pressure and fear that English borders might be much more controlled or even closed, increasing the sense of urgency of migrants and the need to resort to smuggling (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024).

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (2024), through fieldwork in northern France, the UK and Belgium, including interviews with law enforcement, migrants, smugglers and civil society organisations, between 2022 and 2023, identified in Iraqi Kurdish criminal groups those who currently hold control, identifying in northern France specific zones of interest in collaboration with groups of Albanian origin. The system in place includes packages either from the country of origin, mainly Iraq and Iran, or transit via Germany or Turkey, along with standalone Channel crossings, paid through informal money networks called *Hawala* payment system (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024). The crossing process for migrants includes long waits and suffering violence in makeshift camps, but also, to compensate for the increase in controls in inland areas in France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024). When conditions are deemed favourable, movements occur towards transit hubs around Calais and Dunkirk where, through intermediaries in the UK, meetups

with the smugglers on the French coasts are organised (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2024).

As for the phenomenon of trafficking, UNICEF in collaboration with the United Kingdom Committee in 2016, conducted a groundbreaking sociological study and drafted and published a report titled *“Neither Safe Nor Sound”* (UNICEF France, & UNICEF UK, 2016). This document constitutes a valuable testimony of what happens between the French coasts and the United Kingdom through the dramatic accounts of unaccompanied children who faced the migratory route of the English Channel and the North Sea. The report made it possible to study the fundamental characteristics of their journey, providing a key perspective to better understand the situation (UNICEF France, & UNICEF UK, 2016). Among these elements is involvement in human trafficking, whose real measurement is made particularly difficult due to the lack of registration and monitoring of unaccompanied children (UNICEF France, & UNICEF UK, 2016).

The interviews conducted led to the identification of specific forms of exploitation before leaving the French coasts. Among these, what struck young women the most was the widespread practice of promising passage to the UK in exchange for sexual services and the diffusion of forced prostitution to gather the money necessary for the border crossing (UNICEF France, & UNICEF UK, 2016). As for the boys, testimonies revealed the possibility that some of them were abused directly by the traffickers (UNICEF France, & UNICEF UK, 2016). In addition to sexual exploitation, the victims are used as lookouts to prevent the settlement of other trafficker groups or law enforcement agencies (UNICEF France, & UNICEF UK, 2016). Finally, the exploitation is economic as many victims are promised the crossing to the UK, where they will then have to work without pay to repay the debt (UNICEF France, & UNICEF UK, 2016).

The constant increases in the number of migrants show not only an adaptive capacity of the criminal networks managing smuggling and trafficking but highlight the shortcomings of the countering systems put in place by the countries involved. The new strategies, including methods to circumvent law enforcement show an unpleasant resilience explained in part by the context created of border securitisation and the absence of legal channels to reach the UK, along with the creation of a hostile environment that repels migrants and pushes them to use dangerous and deadly methods just to reach the life promised to them (Bonnevalle, 2022).

Numerous recommendations have been produced by international organisations and humanitarian organisations to prevent future loss of life in the Channel. Among these are the assumption of responsibility by the UK and French government institutions for the deaths in the Channel, improving life-saving operations and support, alongside ending the criminalisation of migrants through ensuring safe and accessible routes, but above all the need to create reception policies that prioritise the dignity and human rights of those who seek better life prospects (MacTaggart, Hall, & O’Neill, 2025). At the local level, for the reduction and fight against the phenomena of trafficking and smuggling, there is an urgent

need for safe spaces of protection on-site, especially for unaccompanied children, together with the introduction of training for the identification of trafficking victims (UNICEF France, & UNICEF UK, 2016).

5. UK-FRANCE RELATIONS

5.1 The end of Dublin regulation and the UK's new approach

While the UK was still a part of the EU, its asylum process operated under the Dublin III Regulation. According to the Dublin Regulation, asylum seekers should have their claims processed in the country of their first entry into the EU zone (European Union, 2013). This rule ensured the absence of the so-called “asylum shopping” where asylum seekers could pick the country in which they wanted to seek refuge. The Regulation also streamlines the processing of claims as it denotes that it is necessary to redirect the asylum request to a responsible country.

However, after Brexit, the UK was left out of the Dublin system, meaning that requests for redirecting asylum seekers to the country of entry were no longer processed by the EU side. Moreover, no replacement bilateral agreements were made between the UK and the EU, leaving no legal ways for refugee exchange. There were some efforts to come up with a suitable regulation, but the countries that are the most exposed to migrant flow – Italy, Greece, Spain, Malta, and Cyprus opposed the agreement (Taylor, 2025).

Despite the absence of a regulation, the UK still makes an effort to externalise its responsibilities in regards to asylum seekers by shifting those responsibilities to third countries. The most prominent example of those efforts is the UK-Rwanda Asylum Partnership, according to which the UK is able to send asylum seekers to Rwanda without processing their claim.

As stated by the agreement between the two states, Rwanda was deemed a “safe third country” which can process asylum claims from migrants from the UK (Murphy, 2023). The UK government frames this partnership as aiming at discouraging people from crossing the English Channel on boats. The way in which the main objective of the Agreement is described makes it clear that the priority was not to actually provide asylum seekers with a way to receive the necessary and adequate help but to simply discourage them from seeking asylum in the first place.

The described process constitutes a breach of multiple rights of asylum seekers, but mainly it concerns the principle of non-refoulment. According to the non-refoulment principle, asylum seekers cannot be relocated to the country in which they may face serious human rights abuses. As reported by the Freedom House, Rwanda has low scores in areas that concern human rights such as Political Rights and Civil Liberties (Freedom House, 2024). Rwanda has also been repeatedly called out for large-scale human rights violations from curbing

freedom of expression to using torture towards people in detention (Amnesty International, n.d.). Therefore, it cannot be considered a country that can provide adequate refuge to migrants.

5.2 France as Buffer State

As a result of the migrant crisis that was expedited by Brexit, in the past decade, Calais and Dunkirk became *de facto* buffer zones that absorb the consequences of the lack of proper asylum cooperation between the UK and the EU.

In recent years, the UK has responded by heavily investing in surveillance infrastructure on the French side of the Channel, formalised through the Sandhurst Treaty. Signed in 2018, the treaty was designed to strengthen joint efforts in curbing unauthorised boat crossings of the English Channel (Home Office & Border Force, 2019). Measures under this agreement include the deployment of advanced surveillance technologies, increased border policing, and the construction of physical barriers such as fencing (Léchenet & Webber, 2023). These actions reflect a strategy of externalised border control, wherein France becomes a frontline enforcer of UK migration policy.

This led to the emergence of the practice of non-intervention and mutual deterrence. The British side pays France to keep migrants away from the UK borders while French authorities focus on dismantling informal settlements and discouraging encampments near the coast. At the same time, neither of the sides offers asylum seekers meaningful alternatives for relocation or protection, leaving them stranded between the two states, neither of which is willing to have them.

5.3 November 2021 English Channel Tragedy

The policy of mutual deterrence and responsibility shifting has led to deaths of hundreds of migrants. The most prominent case happened on November 24th, 2021, when 27 people died as a result of an inflatable dinghy capsizing on the way from France to the UK. On the evening of November 23rd, 2021, 32 migrants boarded the inflatable boat designed to carry 20 people in order to cross the English Channel. A couple of hours after midnight, the boat started taking in water, and passengers made first contact with the French rescue centre, reporting that their boat was deflating and that their engine failed (Murphy, 2023).

Overall, they made about 15 distress calls and shared their location with both French and British authorities, but both sides redirected them to each other. The help came more than ten hours later, after a call made by a French fisherman who spotted the bodies in the water (Murphy, 2023).

Immediately after the disaster, neither of the parties was willing to take the blame. The French side claimed that they received no information about a boat in distress prior to the fisherman's call, and the British side still maintains that the boat was never in British waters,

and therefore, it was not their responsibility to rescue its passengers (BBC News, World Service, Visual and Data Journalism teams, 2021).



Photo Source: A small boat in the middle of a large body of water © He Junhui. Via Unsplash/ December 4, 2024.

The UK government later made a statement designed to shift attention to the harmful nature of illegal border crossings and human trafficking (Department for Transport, Marine Accident Investigation Branch, & The Rt Hon Mark Harper, 2023). France called the UK out for insufficient cooperation in investigating the case (Shankar, 2021). Neither of the countries made statements on the absence of an established mechanism of cooperation in dealing with refugees as one of the possible causes of the tragedy.

Both countries held investigations in regards to the disaster. In November 2022, Harem Ahmed Abwbaker appeared in UK court in connection with the incident and was charged with being a part of a group that transported migrants to the UK (BBC, 2022). On the French side, five French soldiers have been charged with failing to help the sinking boat (Murphy, 2023).

According to the IOM , the tragedy is the deadliest of such disasters since they started collecting data in 2014 (Murphy, 2023). As a result of the investigation the disaster was deemed “entirely predictable” by the Cranston Inquiry that was set up to look into the tragedy (Taylor, 2025). The investigation also revealed that the lack of cooperation between the French and UK sides prevented both from providing adequate emergency assistance.

In the following years, at least 128 more people lost their lives during dangerous crossings of the English Channel (Taylor, 2025). Despite the danger that the crossing poses, asylum seekers in Calais and Dunkirk do not have any choice but to try and cross the Channel as French police dismantle their camps.

5.4 Critique of EU Migrations System

The EU has always prided itself on putting human rights at the forefront of its policies. However, its approach to migration reveals that actual policies often oppose declarative values. Since the 2015 migration crisis, the EU has tried to come up with a migration approach that would work on the basis of shared responsibility. However, it turned out that it is not an easy task to create shared responsibility between the countries that are not evenly exposed to migration routes.

Naturally, the countries that share borders with non-EU states bear a heavier burden with the Dublin Regulation not helping to mitigate the issue. The failure to reform the Dublin regulation or to create a meaningful and working EU-wide migration framework has led to the rise of responsibility shifting between member states and sometimes third countries. As a result, the unspoken practice of the EU and its member states became to deter asylum seekers from its territory.

A central pillar of this approach became the practice of outsourcing migrants to third countries through mutual agreements. This tendency culminated in the proposal for the creation of a return regulation that would allow for the EU to deter asylum seekers from third countries and establish the so-called “return hubs” (The New Union Post, 2025). As a part of this initiative, several possible routes were proposed. One such example is the agreement between Italy and Albania according to which Albania agrees to process asylum claims of migrants intercepted at sea on their way to enter Italy. Another example is a similar agreement between Denmark and Kosovo, according to which Kosovo agrees to receive 300 inmates that serve their sentences in prison in Denmark (The New Union Post, 2025).

Undoubtedly, the migration crisis in Europe is an issue that creates a lot of tension and has a negative effect on the Union’s economy. However, the measures undertaken both on the EU and national levels suggest that the efforts to come to a meaningful resolution of the crisis are limited. Instead of tackling the issues of absence of legal pathways of sharing the burden, the union engages in responsibility shifting. Instead of finding solutions to get migrants to safety, the states enter into agreements with third countries that cannot provide the same protection and cannot be considered safe. Such an approach provides temporary solutions to a systemic problem that needs to be addressed on a deeper level, which is impossible without cooperation and an agreement to share responsibility.



Photo source: Migrants transporting their belongings in grocery carts ©Credit Project Play, 2022.

6. ADVOCACY PROPOSALS: RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO MIGRATION

6.1 Recognition of Agency and the Right to Choose

Migrants are rights-holders regardless of their legal status. Their rights are enshrined in several international human rights treaties, like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and IOM principles. They enjoy the right to freedom of movement, the right to seek asylum, and to choose their residence.

The UDHR grants migrants the freedom to move and leave any country in article 13 (2) of the treaty, including their own. Also, Article 12 of the ICCPR grants the right to leave a country and liberty to move. Article 14 of the UDHR grants individuals the right to seek asylum from persecution. The French enforcement officers cannot physically prevent migrants from Calais or Dunkirk from leaving the country to go to the UK. Many, who have family members in the UK, or fear returning to their home country, are therefore entitled to move across borders and seek protection, even to the UK.

The IOM (2011) affirms migration is a right, and asylum seekers are active agents that enjoy such rights, to seek protection where they want and choose where they live. Alongside these rights migrants have will, autonomy and dignity (IOM, 2011). Under the UDHR and ICCPR, asylum seekers are not committing crimes by seeking protection by moving to and seeking asylum in the UK. Yet, they are often portrayed as victims or villains, a narrative perpetuated by policymakers, activists, media and academics (Mainwaring, 2016). In the UK, the media and political leaders have strategically implicated migrants as villains, and have advocated

for a securitisation approach to deal with the ‘migration crisis’ (Crawley, McMahon, & Jones, 2016). Such framings obscure their agency, despite the tremendous agency portrayed by them, evident through their dangerous journeys (Mainwaring, 2016).

Some migrants even enjoy the right to choose one's own residence, under article 39 (1) of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW). Since France is not a party to this treaty, the protections under this treaty therefore do not apply to asylum seekers in Calais and Dunkirk. This highlights the gaps in legal protection for migrants.

6.2 Legal Pathways and Safe Access

Post Brexit, there are no legal or safe routes to seek asylum in the UK from Calais and Dunkirk (Amnesty International, 2016) and as the legal and safe routes to the UK diminish, many migrants are ultimately forced to take irregular routes to the UK (Syal, 2022). Such conditions, besides endangering the lives of migrants, also violate numerous international legal obligations of the UK and France.

Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention prohibits States from penalising refugees for irregularly entering a country, when they are fleeing from persecution. Under the Refugee Convention, they need to present themselves without delay, and can showcase a good cause for entering without authorisation, to receive a refugee status. The provision protects refugees, even the ones who have entered the UK through irregular crossing by small boats.

The UK domestic law incorporates these protections through Section 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, and grants legal defence for asylum seekers who enter with unauthorised documents or illegally whilst fleeing danger. This provision has been cited in several court cases, to prevent wrongful deportation of refugees or treating them as criminals (Migration Watch UK, 2013). In the case *R v. Uxbridge Magistrates Court and Another, Ex parte Adimi* [1999], the High Court affirmed that refugees should not be criminalised for wanting to enter the UK, pursuant to Article 31 of the Immigration and Asylum Act. More recently, the UK's Illegal Migration Act enacted in July 2023 (the Act) undermines these protections by declaring that refugees reaching the UK through irregular routes like in small boats, cannot claim for asylum or protection (International Rescue Committee (IRC) UK, 2023). There is a contradiction in the UK's obligation under international law and its current policies.

The Refugee Council has called for immediate revocation of this Act (Guy, 2024). As it prevents people fleeing war from claiming asylum in the UK, which is even more problematic because there are currently no safe alternative routes for them to travel to the UK (IRC UK, 2023). The UK must uphold the principle of non-refoulement granted under the article 33 of the Convention. The United Nations Human Right Council (UNHCR) (2023) also expressed concerns about the implications of the Act and warned that the act could lead

to an asylum ban in the UK, which would violate the UK's obligation under the Refugee Convention and international human rights law. As of 2025, migrants in Calais or Dunkirk have no legal mechanism by which they can apply for asylum in the UK, from French territories.

Whilst many European countries offer humanitarian corridors and extraterritorial asylum procedures, the UK does not offer the asylum seekers such opportunities to safely relocate. France and Italy have introduced innovative pathways to overcome challenges of safely relocating refugees. Since 2016, Italy has had humanitarian corridor programmes in place in cooperation with religious and civil societies, to relocate vulnerable Syrian refugees through safe and legal routes from Lebanon (World Council of Churches, 2018). Additionally, there are humanitarian admission programmes in place in several European countries, where the country admits and provides temporary protection to groups of refugees on the grounds of humanitarian protection (European Union Agency for Asylum [EUAA], 2022). Despite having viable precedents in European civil society partnerships, the UK has avoided adopting humanitarian corridors, extraterritorial asylum or humanitarian asylum programmes.

6.3 Cross-border protection mechanisms and EU-UK Cooperation

The exit of the UK from the European Union meant that the UK was no longer required to follow the obligations set out under the Dublin III Regulations. Dublin III allowed the family members to be transferred to the UK if they had close family members living in the country. In many cases the migrants face linguistic barriers or risk discrimination in France and prefer to choose the UK as their destination. Since 2020, after Brexit, the UK did not establish any bilateral or multilateral treaties to replace the Dublin Regulations (Newson, 2020). This has direct implications on refugees and migrants who lose the opportunity to legally and safely reunite with their family members in the UK. It has created a legal vacuum, which directly violates many international legal frameworks offering family reunification for refugees and migrants..

The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHCR) recognises family reunion as a universal legal right and emphasises it as the fundamental unit of society. It concludes that family reunion can even reduce the usage of dangerous and irregular routes (UNHCR, n.d.). The end to Dublin III Regulations and the UK no longer offering opportunities for the families to unite means that the UK is in violation of international legal obligations. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) grants the right to private and family life in Article 8 and Articles 10 and 22 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) emphasise the need for family unity for refugee children.

Migrants facing harsh and precarious living conditions in Calais and Dunkirk, hope to unite with their families in the UK (Amnesty International, 2016). The lack of current legal routes to the UK forces the migrants to take irregular crossings, endangering their lives. This calls

for an urgent need for safer and legal cross-border humanitarian and rights-based mechanisms for the migrants in France. The UK can create bilateral agreements with the European Union and offer safe humanitarian transfers, creating safe passage and opportunities for family reunification. This proposal draws from the Italian-Lebanese humanitarian corridor that has been vastly successful and has helped 7,200 refugees across Europe (Migrant Affairs, 2024). Such a mechanism would protect the dignity of migrants, and align with the UK's human rights obligations.

The UK has continued to push for harsher interception efforts, even pressurising France to increase maritime crackdowns on Channel crossings, instead of addressing the root cause. In May 2025, almost 1200 migrants reached the UK crossing English channels with small boats, which has been blamed by many on Brexit and the end to legal obligations (Bathke, 2025). There is an urgent need to accommodate the 'migrant crisis' through official programmes that could actually help avoid it, safeguard migrants and possibly offer a solution for the UK's dilemma with illegal migration. A rights-based approach would have to centre access, dignity and legality, and counter the policies that criminalise movement of migrants whilst denying safe alternatives for migrants.

More recently, the UK government has been debating to even introduce reforms to the ECHR, stating that it does not reflect the 'changing political realities' (Tabahriti, 2025). The head of the UK's Refugee Council, Enver Solomon, has criticised the present discussion of the exit from the ECHR, claiming that such action would evade the UK's human rights responsibilities (Lindsay, 2025). The political tensions greatly threaten the UK's commitment to international human rights law and complicates any cross-border mechanism.

All in all, advancing a rights-based approach to migration would entail recognising migrants as active agents, providing safe and legal access for them for protection, fostering UK-EU cooperation. Without such policies there will be continued criminalisation of migrants, who are merely seeking safety and continued human rights abuses in Calais and Dunkirk. A humanitarian, legal and humane approach to migration is long overdue.

CONCLUSION

Calais has been experiencing the current migration crisis for about 20 years now. People in need of protection keep coming to the shore in hopes of building a better future for themselves and their kids. However, instead of humanitarian assistance, they receive a cold welcome accompanied by human rights violations and hostility.

Some of the basic human rights, such as the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being are being denied to those migrants every day. They face difficulties in accessing water, adequate food supplies and medical treatments. Their tents are being demolished, their belongings destroyed. Moreover, disadvantaged populations, such as women, children and people with disabilities bear even higher costs. Women and girls have a higher chance of being involved in sex trafficking while children are often not aware of their rights making them an easy target.

Migrants also face policy brutality when batons, tear gas and pepper sprays are being used on them and their boats are being slashed to prevent them from crossing the Channel. They become subject to racial profiling and are in general treated as criminals, even though international legislation clearly states that irregular entry and stay is not a crime. Additionally, volunteers and NGOs helping migrants also face harassment and intimidation.

Due to harsh conditions and the lack of protection, migrants often make the choice to flee as soon as possible in search of better living conditions. With criminal networks profiting off of boat transfers thriving, channel crossings become increasingly more dangerous. Tragedies such as the 2021 boat capsizing that killed 27 people, happen more and more often.

The fact that the UK and France keep pushing responsibility to each other with neither side expressing readiness to deal with the crisis, does not provide for an optimistic prognosis for Calais and Dunkirk. In order to stop the crisis it is important to come up with solutions swiftly. Those measures can include stronger migrant protections, better international cooperation agreements and improved rescue operations. What is even more important is to adopt a rights-based approach to migration where human rights will be put at the forefront.

BOOKS

Palidda, S. (2016). *Racial Criminalization of Migrants in the 21st Century*. Routledge.

EUROPEAN UNION BODIES

Council of the European Union. (2023, November 30). *Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down minimum rules to prevent and counter the facilitation of unauthorized entry, transit, and stay in the Union, and replacing Council Directive 2002/90/EC and Council Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA* (Document ST 16149 2023 INIT). Council of the European Union.

Council of the European Union. (2024b, May 29). *Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on enhancing police cooperation in relation to the prevention, detection and investigation of migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings, and on enhancing Europol's support to preventing and combating such crimes, and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/794* (Document ST 16204 2023 INIT).

Council of the European Union. (2024, May 27). *Fight against human trafficking: Council strengthens rules*. Council of the European Union.
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/05/27/fight-against-human-trafficking-council-strengthens-rules/>

Council of the European Union. (2025, June 2). *Fighting migrant smuggling and human trafficking*. Council of the European Union.
<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migrant-smuggling-human-trafficking/>

Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs. (2024, July 10). *Legal and Policy Framework*. Migration and Home Affairs.
https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/internal-security/organised-crime-and-human-trafficking/together-against-trafficking-human-beings/legal-and-policy-framework_en

Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs. (2025a). *Trafficking in human beings statistics - Statistics Explained - Eurostat*. Europa.eu.
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Trafficking_in_human_beings_statistics

Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs. (2025b, July 16). *EMN study outlines efforts to combat trafficking in human beings*. Migration and Home Affairs.
https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/news/emn-study-outlines-efforts-combat-trafficking-human-beings-2025-07-16_en

Dumbrava, C., Madatali, H., & Radjenovic, A. (2025). *Planned revision of the EU Return Directive*. In *EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service*. EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service.

- European Commission. (2023, November 28). *Commission launches a Global Alliance to Counter Migrant Smuggling and proposes a strengthened EU legal framework*. Directorate-General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-launches-global-alliance-counter-migrant-smuggling-and-proposes-strengthened-eu-legal-2023-11-28_en
- European Union. (2013, June 26). *Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast)*. *Official Journal of the European Union*, L180, 31–59.
- European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA). (2022, May). 4.16.3.1. Humanitarian admission programmes. In *Asylum report 2022*. EUAA. <https://euaa.europa.eu/asylum-report-2022>
- Europol. (2022). *European Migrant Smuggling Centre – 6th annual report*. Publications Office of the European Union.

GOVERNMENTAL BODIES AND GOVERNMENT-ASSOCIATED

- Attorney General's Office. (2012a, March 13). *The role of UK law as a model for combating human trafficking and slavery Speech by Dominic Grieve QC MP at City University on human trafficking*. GOV.UK. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-role-of-uk-law-as-a-model-for-combating-human-trafficking-and-slavery>
- Attorney General's Office. (2012b, October 10). *Prosecuting human trafficking and slavery: the law and the UK response Speech by Solicitor General, Oliver Heald QC MP to students of Peace Studies at Bradford University*. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prosecuting-human-trafficking-and-slavery-the-law-and-the-uk-response>
- Department for Transport, Marine Accident Investigation Branch, & The Rt Hon Mark Harper. (2023, November 9). *Inquiry into Channel incident of 24 November 2021*. GOV.UK. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/inquiry-into-channel-incident-of-24-november-2021>. Written statement to Parliament.
- Home Office. (2023, July 20). *Illegal Migration Act 2023 [Collection]*. GOV.UK. <https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/illegal-migration-bill>
- Home Office, & Border Force. (2019, October 15). *UK-France joint action plan on illegal migration across the Channel in small boats (accessible version)*. GOV.UK. <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-france-joint-action-plan-on-illegal-migration-across-the-channel/uk-france-joint-action-plan-on-illegal-migration-across-the-channel-in-small-boats-accessible-version>. Policy paper.

Home Office, Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street, Border Force, & Border Security Command. (2025, July 10). UK and France agree major deal to crack down on illegal Channel crossings. GOV.UK.
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-france-agree-major-deal-to-crack-down-on-illegal-channel-crossings> GOV.UK accessed 15 July 2025

Newson, N. (2020, September 17). *Brexit: Refugee protection and asylum policy*. House of Lords Library. <https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/brexit-refugee-protection-and-asylum-policy/>

Tudor, S. (2022, December 1). *Refugees and asylum-seekers: UK policy*. House of Lords Library. <https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/refugees-and-asylum-seekers-uk-policy/>

UK Border Security Command. (2024). About Border Security Command. GOV.UK.
<https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/border-security-command/about>

LEGAL SOURCES REFERENCED

Connors v. United Kingdom, App. No. 66746/01 (European Court of Human Rights, 27 May 2004).

Council of Europe. (1950, November 4). *Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms* (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11, 14, and 15, ETS No. 005). Entered into force September 3, 1953

M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, App. No. 30696/09 (European Court of Human Rights, January 21, 2011).

R v. Uxbridge Magistrates Court and Another, ex parte Adimi, [1999] EWHC Admin 765; [2001] Q.B. 667 (High Court of England and Wales, 29 July 1999).

NEWS

Acidere, O. (2025, May 5). Life for the displaced in Calais – in pictures. *The Guardian*.
<https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2025/may/05/life-for-the-displaced-in-calais-in-pictures>

Bathke, B. (2025, June 2). Record Channel crossings prompts UK to urge France to speed up interception plans. *InfoMigrants*.
<https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/64891/record-channel-crossings-prompts-uk-to-urge-france-to-speed-up-interception-plans>

BBC. (2022, November 30). Man appears in court over English Channel dinghy deaths. *BBC*.
<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-63809207>

BBC. (2024, June 13). What is the UK's plan to send asylum seekers to Rwanda? *BBC*.
<https://www.bbc.com/news/explainers-61782866>

- BBC News, World Service, Visual and Data Journalism teams. (2021, December 21). Channel migrants tragedy: Terrifying final hours of their fatal journey - BBC News. *BBC News*. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-b7bd2274-88b1-4ef9-a459-be22e180b52c>
- Bish, A. (2025, July 12). A decade of small boat migrants - how did it begin? *BBC*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy0w9zw57glo>
- Chahuneau, L. (2025, July 9). “Four to five crossing attempts per day”: Small boats overwhelm coastline from Calais to Gravelines. *InfoMigrants*. <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/65662/four-to-five-crossing-attempts-per-day-small-boats-overwhelm-coastline-from-calais-to-gravelines>
- Cooper, C. (2015, September 26). Calais crisis: Migrants are living in appalling conditions, say doctors | The Independent. *The Independent*. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/calais-crisis-migrants-are-living-in-appalling-conditions-say-doctors-a6668631.html>
- Corcoran, C., & Bancroft, H. (2025, February 8). Revealed: Thousands of migrants held at UK-run French detention centres “shrouded in secrecy.” *The Independent*. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/migrants-france-detention-border-control-b2688270.html>
- Cuoco, N. (2024, September 25). What is the offence of illegal residence? *Lejdd.fr*. <https://www.lejdd.fr/societe/quest-ce-que-le-delit-de-sejour-irregulier-149866>
- Doctors of the World. (2019, September 3). The stick, do you remember that? On Calais, Dunkirk, and the Channel - Doctors of the World. *Doctors of the World*. <https://www.doctorsoftheworld.org.uk/news/the-stick-do-you-remember-that-on-calais-dunkirk-and-the-channel/>
- Dumont, J. (2025, March 6). France: What is the “illegal residence offense” that Bruno Retailleau wants to reinstate?. *InfoMigrants*. <https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/63191/france-what-is-the-illegal-residence-offense-that-bruno-retailleau-wants-to-reinstate>
- Franceinfo. (2017, February 15). Calais : une salariée du Secours catholique et une journaliste brièvement arrêtées par la police aux frontières. *Franceinfo*. https://www.franceinfo.fr/monde/europe/migrants/calais-une-salariee-de-secours-catholique-et-une-journaliste-brievement-arretees-par-la-police-aux-frontieres_2061853.html
- Grierson, J. (2021, July 20). UK to pay £55m to French border patrols to fund migrant clampdown. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/20/uk-french-border-patrols-migrant-clampdown-priti-patel>
- Guy, E. (2024, October 21). Refugee Council Call For Immediate Repeal Of Illegal Migration Act - EachOther. *EachOther*.

- <https://eachother.org.uk/refugee-council-call-for-immediate-repeal-of-illegal-migration-act/>
- Human Rights Watch. (2017, July 26). France: Police Attacking Migrants in Calais. *Human Rights Watch*.
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/26/france-police-attacking-migrants-calais>
- Human Rights Watch. (2021, October 7). France: Degrading Treatment of Migrants Around Calais. *Human Rights Watch*.
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/07/france-degrading-treatment-migrants-around-calais>
- Hymas, C., & Samuel, H. (2025, July 13). French police to get powers to arrest migrants who enter country illegally. *The Telegraph*.
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/07/13/france-police-powers-arrest-illegal-channel-migrants-macron/>
- Imran Rahman-Jones. (2016, October 24). The history of the Calais “Jungle” camp and how it’s changed since 1999. *BBC News*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/newsbeat-37750368>
- Jones, S. (2025, June 30). English Channel small boat migrants undeterred by new crackdown. *BBC*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c23gm9r502ro>
- Léchenet, A., & Webber, E. (2023, November 13). Helicopters, riding boots and vacuum cleaners: How French border force spends UK money. *POLITICO*.
<https://www.politico.eu/article/helicopters-riding-boots-and-vacuum-cleaners-how-french-border-force-spends-uk-money/>
- Lindsay, F. (2025, June 20). U.K. Eyes Changes To Visa System And Targets Human Rights Convention. *Forbes*.
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/freylindsay/2025/06/20/uk-eyes-changes-to-visa-system-and-targets-human-rights-convention/>
- Médecins Sans Frontières - Doctors Without Borders. (2024, August 1). In Calais, a violent horizon for unaccompanied minors. *Médecins sans Frontières - Doctors without Borders*.
<https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/calais-violent-horizon-unaccompanied-minors>
- Migrant Affairs. (2024, June 4). Syrian Refugees Arrive in Italy Through Humanitarian Corridors. *Migrant Affairs*.
<https://migrantaffairs.info/syrian-refugees-arrive-in-italy-through-humanitarian-corridors/>
- Murphy, M. (2023, May 25). Channel migrants tragedy: Five French soldiers accused of failing to help. *BBC*. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65714082>
- Nordeclair. (2015, October 15). Access to care: Doctors of the World warns about the situation of migrants. *Nordeclair*.

<https://web.archive.org/web/20190611022311/http://www.nordeclair.fr/archive/recup/france-monde/acces-aux-soins-medecins-du-monde-alerte-sur-la-jna0b0n897938>

- Pascual, J. (2025, June 20). French police launch nationwide crackdown on undocumented migrants. *Le Monde.fr*.
https://www.lemonde.fr/en/france/article/2025/06/20/french-police-launch-nationwide-crackdown-on-undocumented-migrants_6742532_7.html
- Patterson, S. (2016, October 24). Looking back at love in the Calais Jungle. *BBC*.
<https://www.bbc.com/bbcthree/article/0e5ec20b-a93c-4ccf-bb6e-80ac6d9afae>
- Reuters. (2025, June 26). Europe's top rights court rules against France in racial profiling case. *Reuters*.
<https://www.reuters.com/world/europes-top-rights-court-rules-against-france-racial-profiling-case-2025-06-26/>
- Shankar, P. (2021, November 25). France, UK trade blame over Channel deaths. *DW*.
<https://www.dw.com/en/france-and-uk-engage-in-blame-game-over-english-channel-tragedy/a-59937302>
- Syal, R. (2022, November 14). “More of the same”: UK-French deal fails to address causes behind crossings. *The Guardian*.
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/nov/14/more-of-the-same-uk-french-deal-fails-to-address-causes-behind-crossings>
- Syal, R., & Corcoran, C. (2024, May 5). “Alarming” number of lone children held in UK-run facilities in France. *The Guardian*.
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/article/2024/may/05/alarming-number-of-lone-children-held-in-uk-run-facilities-in-france>
- Tabahriti, S. (2025, June 18). Britain, under pressure on immigration, urges reform of European human rights framework. *Reuters*.
<https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/britain-under-pressure-immigration-urges-reform-european-human-rights-framework-2025-06-18/>
- Taylor, D. (2021, November 2). Life, death and limbo in the Calais “Jungle” – five years after its demolition. *The Guardian*.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/02/life-death-and-limbo-in-the-calais-jungle-five-years-after-its-demolition>
- Taylor, D. (2025, March 3). Channel migrant dinghy tragedy “entirely predictable”, inquiry hears. *The Guardian*.
<https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2025/mar/03/channel-migrant-dinghy-tragedy-entirely-predictable-inquiry-hears>

The New Union Post. (2025, March 11). How Kosovo and Albania sets a precedent for EU “return hubs.” *The New Union Post*.
<https://newunionpost.eu/2025/03/11/return-hubs-migrants-eu-kosovo-albania/>

World Council of Churches. (2018, April 12). “Humanitarian Corridors” open for Syrians fleeing Lebanon. *World Council of Churches*.
<https://oikoumene.org/news/humanitarian-corridors-open-for-syrians-fleeing-lebanon>

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Amnesty International. (2016, February 15). *The UK and France must cooperate to ensure swift transfer of family units from Calais/Dunkirk (EUR 21/3431/2016)* [Public statement]. Amnesty International. Retrieved from
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur21/3431/2016/en/>

Amnesty International. (n.d.). Human rights in Rwanda. *Amnesty International*. Retrieved July 21, 2025, from
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/east-africa-the-horn-and-great-lakes/rwanda/report-rwanda/>

Amnesty International. (2019b, June 5). The Jungle may be gone but solidarity lives on in Calais. *Amnesty International*.
<https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/06/the-jungle-may-be-gone-but-solidarity-lives-on-in-calais/>

Care4Calais. (2020, September). Written evidence submitted by Care4Calais (CHA0029). UK Parliament. <https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/99666/html/>

Civics Monitor. (2018, September 13). NGO workers assisting migrants regularly harassed by police - Civics Monitor. *Civics Monitor*.
<https://monitor.civics.org/explore/NGO-workers-harassed-police-refugees/>

Edmond-Pettitt, A. (2018). Territorial Policing and the “hostile environment” in Calais: from policy to practice. *Justice, Power and Resistance*, 2(2), 314–334.

Freedom House. (2024). Rwanda: Freedom in the World 2024 Country Report | Freedom House. *Freedom House*. <https://freedomhouse.org/country/rwanda/freedom-world/2024>

Gartner, J. L. (2015). (In)credibly Queer: Sexuality-based Asylum in the European Union - Humanity in Action. In *Transatlantic Perspectives on Diplomacy and Diversity*. Humanity in Action Press.
https://humanityinaction.org/knowledge_detail/incredibly-queer-sexuality-based-asylum-in-the-european-union/

Hagan, M. (2018). Disassembling the Camp: The Politics of Policing Exiles in Calais, France. *SSRN Electronic Journal*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3274536>

- International Rescue Committee UK. (2023, March 29). *IRC UK statement on the new bill on the right to asylum* [Press release]. International Rescue Committee. Retrieved from <https://www.rescue.org/uk/press-release/irc-uk-statement-new-bill-right-asylum>
- Lighthouse Reports. (2024, April 24). Sink the Boats. *Lighthouse Reports*. <https://www.lighthousereports.com/investigation/sink-the-boats/>
- Mainwaring, C. (2016). Migrant agency: Negotiating borders and migration controls. *Migration Studies*, 4, 3. <https://doi.org/10.1093/migration/mnw013>
- Migration Watch UK. (2013, August 2). Forged Documents - Refugee Convention Article 31. *Migration Watch UK*. <https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/313/forged-documents--refugee-convention-article-31->
- Provera, M. (2015, February 11). *The Criminalisation of Irregular Migration in the European Union*. CEPS. <https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/criminalisation-irregular-migration-european-union/>
- Roberts, C. (2024, November 18). *Crisis in Calais: France's Human Rights Disaster - Journal of Political Inquiry*. Journal of Political Inquiry . <https://jpinyu.com/2024/11/18/crisis-in-calais-frances-human-rights-disaster/>
- Rosina, M. (2024). Criminalising Migration: The Vicious Cycle of Insecurity and Irregularity. *Social Sciences*, 13(10). <https://doi.org/10.3390/socsci13100529>
- Shelley, L., & Pardo Herrera, C. (2018). Human smuggling and trafficking into Europe. Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, George Mason University.
- Travellers Times. (2009, November 5). A human rights defence. *Travellers Times*. <https://www.travellerstimes.org.uk/features/human-rights-defence>
- Vavoula, N. (2019). Criminalisation of irregular migration in the EU: The impact of El Dridi. In *The Court of Justice and European Criminal Law Leading Cases in a Contextual Analysis*. Hart.
- Wessels, J. (2017). Publicly Manifested—Fatefully Determined—Invariably “Discreet”: The assessment of sexuality-based asylum claims in germany and france. *Canadian Journal of Women and the Law*, 29, 343–374. <https://doi.org/10.3138/cjwl.29.2.343>
- Wróbel, W. (2023). CRIMINALISATION OF IMMIGRATION LAW. *Studia Iuridica*, 300-320. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.31338/2544-3135.si.2024-100.19>

REPORTS

- Amnesty International. (2019a). *Targeting solidarity: Criminalization and harassment of people defending refugee and migrant rights in northern France*.
- Bonnevalle, P. (2022). *L'État français et la gestion de la présence des personnes exilées dans la frontière franco-britannique : Harceler, expulser et disperser*. Plateforme des Soutiens aux migrant.e.s (PSM), 40, 43, 48.
- Centar za mirovne studije / Centre for Peace Studies. (2020). *Criminalisation of Solidarity in the EU - what should be done to stop it? - Centar za mirovne studije*. In *Centar za mirovne studije / Centre for Peace Studies*.
<https://www.cms.hr/en/publikacija/criminalisation-of-solidarity-in-the-eu-what-should-be-done-to-stop-it/>
- Collective Aid. (2024). *Water for all / De l'eau pour tou-te-s*. Collective Aid. Retrieved from <https://www.collectiveaidngo.org/water-for-all-23>
- Crawley, H., McMahon, S., & Jones, K. (2016). *Victims and Villains: Migrant Voices in the British Media*. Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations, Coventry University.
<http://www.coventry.ac.uk/research/about-us/researchnews/2016/victims-and-villains/>
- Donnelly, E. R., & Viknes, M. (2019). *Protecting women and girls in refugee camps: states' obligations under international law*. In <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/110299/>. London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Gerlach, F. M., Timberlake, F., & Welande, M. (2021). *Five Years On: An Analysis of the past and present situation at the UK-France border, five years after the peak of the Calais "Jungle" Camp - Save the Children's Resource Centre*. In *Save the Children's Resource Centre*. Refugee Rights Europe.
<https://resourcecentre.savethechildren.net/document/five-years-on-an-analysis-2>
- Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. (2024). *Small boats, big business: The industrialization of cross-Channel migrant smuggling*. Geneva, Switzerland.
- Hangul, Ö., Paton, E., Stanton, N., & Welande, M. (2016). *Unsafe Borderlands: Filling data gaps relating to women in the Calais camp*. Refugee Rights Europe.
- Human Rights Observers (HRO). (2025). *Rapport Annuel 2024*. In <https://humanrightsobservers.org/reports/>.
- Human Rights Watch. (2024). *"Not the France I Imagined" Housing, Health, and Education for Unaccompanied Migrant Children in Marseille*.
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/01/30/not-france-i-imagined/housing-health-and-education-unaccompanied-migrant-children>
- Human Rights Watch, & Bochenek, M. G. (2021). *Enforced Misery: The Degrading Treatment of Migrant Children and Adults in Northern France*. Human Rights Watch.
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/10/07/enforced-misery/degrading-treatment-migrant-children-and-adults-northern-france>

- MacTaggart, L., Hall, K., & O'Neill, K. (2025). *We Want to Be Safe: The impact of violence against children on the UK-France border in 2024*. Project Play.
- Mixed Migration Centre, & Praxis Labs. (2023). *Northern France and Belgium: Mixed migration trends and dynamics*. MMC.
- Observatoire des expulsions de lieux de vie informels. (2024). *2024 Report: Health Evicted – 6th Annual Report*.
- PICUM. (2025). *Criminalisation of migration and solidarity in the EU 2024 report*.
- Refugee Rights Europe. (2019). *Left Out In The Cold: The vulnerable children on Britain's doorstep and the urgency of post-Brexit family reunion rules*. Refugee Rights Europe.
- Refugee Women's Centre. (2022). *Annual Report 2022*.
- ReSoma. (2020). *The criminalisation of solidarity in Europe*.
- Walsh, P. W., & Cuibus, M. V. (2025, June 16). *People crossing the English Channel in small boats (Migration Observatory Briefing)*. Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford.

UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

- International Organization for Migration. (2011). *International migration law: Legal and normative framework* (International Dialogue on Migration No. 9).
- International Organization for Migration. (2025). *Missing migrants: Europe. Missing Migrants Project*.
- Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). (2018, July 5). *Technical note: Criminalisation of irregular immigration (2018)*. OHCHR.
<https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/tools-and-resources/technical-note-criminalisation-irregular-immigration-2018>
- Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). (2023, July 7). *Statement on France by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination*. OHCHR.
<https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/07/statement-france-un-committee-elimination-racial-discrimination>
- UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. (1997, May 20). *General Comment No. 7: The right to adequate housing (Article 11(1)): Forced evictions* (E/1998/22). United Nations.
- UNHCR. (2008). *UNHCR Guidelines on Determining the Best Interests of the Child*.
- UNHCR. (2016, October 14). *UNHCR: France decision to close Calais "jungle" camp welcome; Proper care in next steps crucial* | UNHCR. UNHCR.

<https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing-notes/unhcr-france-decision-close-calais-jungle-camp-welcome-proper-care-next-steps>

UNHCR. (2023, July 18). *The Illegal Migration Act*. UNHCR UK.

<https://www.unhcr.org/uk/what-we-do/uk-asylum-policy-and-illegal-migration-act/illegal-migration-act>

UNHCR. (n.d.). *Family reunification*. In *Build better futures: Solutions – Complementary pathways*. UNHCR.

<https://www.unhcr.org/what-we-do/build-better-futures/long-term-solutions/complementary-pathways/family-reunification>

UNICEF France, & UNICEF UK. (2016). *Neither safe nor sound: Unaccompanied children on the coastline of the English Channel and the North Sea*. UNICEF France & UNICEF UK.

United Nations. (1966, December 16). *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (entered into force March 23, 1976), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.

United Nations. (1966, December 16). *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (entered into force January 3, 1976), 993 U.N.T.S. 3.

United Nations General Assembly. (1948, December 10). *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (GA Res. 217 A [III]). United Nations.

United Nations Human Rights Council. (2009). *Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention: Chairperson-Rapporteur Manuela Carmena Castrillo* (A/HRC/10/21).

United Nations Human Rights Council. (2010). *Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention: Chairperson-Rapporteur El Hadji Malick Sow* (A/HRC/13/30).

United Nations Human Rights Council. (2012). *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François Crépeau* (A/HRC/20/24).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2000a). *Annex III: Protocol against the smuggling of migrants by land, sea and air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2000b). *Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2011). *Smuggling of migrants: A global review*. United Nations.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2021). *Global report on trafficking in persons 2021*. United Nations.

