Introduction.
Along the forested and mine-riddled landscapes of the Bosnian-Croatian border, thousands of migrants have found themselves stuck in a perpetual cycle of violence, legal uncertainty and humanitarian neglect. In 2016, Hungary shut its borders to migrants and refugees (Human Rights Council, 2025), spurring those seeking to enter the European Union (EU) to search for alternative pathways. Bosnia and Herzegovina, among other Balkan states, has consequently emerged as a critical transit point for those fleeing persecution, poverty and conflict in hopes of a better life. Yet, these hopes too often clash with harsh realities. Whether it is systematic pushbacks by Croatian authorities or arbitrary detention within Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), the search for a better life is hardly straightforward.
Multiple allegations of beatings, theft of personal property and even the deployment of dogs as a tactic of intimidation are not consistent with the binding provisions under European and international law that prohibit degrading treatment and collective expulsions. The detention of children and families, despite a global consensus that the practice is inherently damaging, is indicative of fragile compliance with protections under international legal frameworks.
In a world where migration and the treatment of migrants are heavily divisive in political and economic discourse, it has never been more important to examine the situation through a legal and human rights lens. One must situate the testimonies, lived realities and field evidence in the context of international obligations in order to assess the structural choices that enable violations to occur.
Pushbacks and Border Violence
One of the most pressing concerns is the systematic practice of pushbacks at the Bosnian-Croatian border. The Danish Refugee Council, between January 2020 and December 2022, recorded nearly 30,000pushbacks from Croatia to Bosnia, with at least 13 percent involving children, either alone or with family (Human Rights Council, 2025). These figures likely underestimate the reality, given the clandestine nature of the operations. In 2024, the International Organisation for Migration interviewed 553 migrants in BiH. From those interviewed, a startling 76 percent stated that they had unsuccessfully attempted to cross the border into Croatia at least once in April of that year (IOM, 2024).
Testimonies collected by the Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN) and other humanitarian organisations with a presence on the ground paint a consistent pattern of behaviour: migrants intercepted at the BiH-Croatian border are routinely denied access to asylum, subjected to violence and expelled across the border in groups. The use of violence by the Croatian border police is not uncommon, with BVMN member organisation Collective Aid recording the utilisation of physical abuse, theft and destruction of personal belongings (BVMN, 2025). Witnesses have recorded instances of forced undressing of those on the move by Croatian officials, coupled by the burning of their belongings (BVMN, 2023). Croatia’s illegal border practices aim to strip those attempting to enter the EU of their valuables and items vital for contacting family members or emergency services, such as their mobile phones and power banks (Blind Spots, 2022). One gentleman interviewed in the month of June claimed “I was going to die when I tried to go seven times […] the Croatians beat me and took my phone and money” (BVMN, 2025). Respondents have reported being beaten with batons, metal bars, and belts; chased and bitten by police dogs; and forced to strip in degrading circumstances. Others recount the destruction of mobile phones, documents, and even vital medical equipment such as insulin pens, acts that not only strip people of their dignity but also deliberately place their lives at risk (BVMN, 2025). This inhumane treatment can be observed as far back as early 2019, with the the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) reporting the following “the officials used torches and pepper spray to blind the people trying to cross the border – and later subjected them to prolonged, brutal assaults, using electric shocks, among others. The Syrian’s and other refugees’ asylum requests were roundly dismissed, no individual assessment took place and they were ordered to cross back over the border” (ECCHR, n.d.). Physical violence has been observed to extend into sexual abuse, with a 23-year-old pregnant refugee reporting an instance of sexual assault by Croatian officers in December 2023. The woman, having had her belongings burnt, claimed that border guards “subjected her to an invasive strip-search, including inside her genitals, and threatened to rape her” (The Guardian, 2024).
These pushbacks not only constitute a clear breach of international law, which obliges states to allow individuals to lodge an asylum claim once they are within their territory, but are further compounded by the deliberate destruction of documents and personal belongings essential for pursuing such claims upon reaching the EU (The Guardian, 2024). The illegality of these practices is evident. Under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, torture, inhumane or degredating treatment of any kind is prohibited in all circumstances. Article 4 of Protocol 4 to the ECHR expressly prohibits collective expulsions, understood as “any measure compelling aliens, as a group, to leave the country, except where such a measure is taken on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual alien of the group” (Khlaifia and Others v Italy (2016)). Article 33 of the Refugee Convention enshrines the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits state parties from expelling refugees to territories where their life or freedom would be under threat. The top declared countries of origin include countries that suffer under dictatorial regimes and political chaos, such as Afghanistan, Iran and Syria (IOM, n.d.), where refugees may face adverse or even dangerous circumstances if sent back to their country of origin. The Convention requires that the safeguard be applied not only to recognised refugees but to all persons who seek protection and whose claims have not yet been determined. Furthermore, Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), much like Article 3 ECHR, imposes an absolute prohibition on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Human Rights Committee, in numerous General Comments, has consistently affirmed that the provision entitles an obligation of non-refoulement wherever there are significant grounds for believing that a removal would expose an individual to such treatment (Human Rights Committee, 2004). The aforementioned treatment of refugees by Croatian border police, including the destruction of personal property, physical and sexual violence and intimidation indisputably meets the threshold for inhuman and degrading treatment.
Despite clear protections provided under international law, practice at the Bosnia-Croatia border is indicative of a persistent disregard. In the pending case S.B v Croatia, pending before the European Court of Human Rights, the applicants complain that through returning them to BiH, in the absence of any assessment of the potential conditions or risk they would face in the state, there has been a violation of Article 3 ECHR. They further allege that they had been collectively expelled from Croatia with numerous other refugees, without their circumstances being reviewed. In December 2020, the ECCHR assisted in the submission of a complaint to the UN Human Rights Committee, concerning Croatia’s practice of collective expulsions to BiH. The case was brought by a 21-year-old Syrian man and detailed six pushbacks over a three month period in 2018. During this time, he and others were beaten, blinded by torches and pepper spray and even electroshocked until unconscious (ECCHR, 2020). The applicant alleged violations of Article 7 ICCPR, Article 2(3) (right to an effective remedy) and Article 16 (recognition before the law), arguing that Croatia deliberately operated a “rights-free zone” (ECCHR, 2020).
These accounts align with pre-existing independent evidence: Members of the European Parliament estimated that well over 7,000 people were summarily expelled from Croatia between 2018 and 2019 (European Parliament, 2019). Whistleblowers within Croatian police have anonymously described orders to “return everybody without paperwork, to take their money, to smash their cellphones, and return the refugees to Bosnia by force” (ECCHR, 2020). Even Croatia’s former president, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, admitted in an interview with Swiss broadcaster that “a little bit of force is needed when doing pushbacks” (Foreign Policy, 2019). Such acknowledgements, coupled with video evidence, Non Governmental Organisation (NGO) reports and confirmed border casualties undermine the current government’s denials that a de facto policy of violent expulsions operates.
Conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Across BiH, migrants and those seeking asylum face an incredibly precarious existence that oscillates between detention in closed facilities and a life in under-resourced reception centres. The only dedicated immigration facility as of 2024, the Lukavica immigration centre near Sarajevo, has been described by observers as a legal “black hole” (Human Rights Council, 2025). Though it was initially designed in order to meet EU pre-accession requirements, the reality paints a different picture. Detainees are frequently reported to be cut off from communication, with their phones confiscated and little access to reliable legal aid, interpretation, or information about asylum procedures (Collective Aid, 2024). Some have reported being held for months without full understanding of the reasons for their confinement or knowing when they may be released (Collective Aid, 2024). Under Bosnian law, detention may last up to 18 months, with vague references to national security routinely invoked to justify prolonged deprivation of liberty (BVMN, 2025; Human Rights Watch, 2025).
The detention of children is particularly troubling. United Nations (UN) bodies and global consensus have shown that immigration detention is never in the best interests of a child. The Committee on the Rights of the Child, in their General Comment No. 23 on children in the context of international migration took the following stance:
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has asserted that the detention of any child because of their or their parents’ migration status constitutes a child rights violation and contravenes the principle of the best interests of the child. In this light, both Committees have repeatedly affirmed that children should never be detained for reasons related to their or their parents’ migration status and States should expeditiously and completely cease or eradicate the immigration detention of children.
In 2022, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recommended amending the Law on Foreigners to prohibit child detention, stressing that “any kind of child immigration should be forbidden by law and such prohibition should be fully implemented in practice” (UNHCR, 2022). In the same year, 16 children were recorded among the 714 detainees in Lukavica centre, with one unaccompanied minor from Syria even being detained with an unrelated adult (Human Rights Council, 2025). This practice was found to have violated the ECHR and the principle of the best interests of the child by the BiH Constitutional Court in August 2023 (Human Rights Council, 2025). Nevertheless, the detention of children persists, often in circumstances that heighten the trauma and fear displacement causes. Testimonies collected by BVMN reveal instances of incommunicado detention in cage-like structures, where individuals were deprived of food, water, and blankets (BVMN, 2019). Such practices amount to inhuman and degrading treatment.
Other than detention, many migrants find themselves in temporary reception centres, including Lipa, Ušivak, and Blažuj. These facilities, despite being supported by international organisations (IOM, 2021), remain plagued by less than adequate conditions. In Lipa, residents have described meals so meagre that breakfast may consist of just a banana and a few nuts, with dinner being a few slices of bread and a can of tuna (Human Rights Council, 2025). Ušivak, located high in the mountains outside Sarajevo, provides slightly better conditions for families, but is largely isolated from urban life and essential services, enhancing the risk of extreme cold in winter months and social exclusion (Human Rights Council, 2025).
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has previously raised the alarm regarding the capacity and living conditions in Bosnia’s reception system. They warned that they fall below international human rights standards (CESCR, 2021). The Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants also noted the lack of outdoor access, insufficient provision of information on legal aid and a general failure to ensure the dignity of those detained (Human Rights Council, 2025).
At the same time, one must not ignore the glimmers of progress. In September 2023, Bosnia amended its Law on Foreigners. The amendment shortened holding periods to six hours for initial checks, with the Article 123(2) of the legislation mandating that minors be treated with “special care and respect”. While still allowing for family detention, it at the very least acknowledges BiH’s duty to align with international standards of child protection. In December 2024, the UN Refugee Agency documented several achievements, such as 216 people assisted with psychosocial support and 103 people having been provided with legal information on asylum in BiH through individual and group counselling. 25 were assisted with free legal aid (UNHCR, 2025). These kinds of initiatives are invaluable for protecting those at risk. There are currently four reception centres with a capacity of 4,600. Two of these centres are specifically designated to accommodate the vulnerable migrant categories, including women, families and children (HRC, 2025).
Structural and Legal Challenges.
These difficulties faced by migrants in BiH cannot be understood in isolation from the legal framework of the country itself and how it is positioned on the margins of the EU. Bosnia’s Law on Foreigners, last amended in 2023, continues to raise serious concerns. The law permits foreigners to be detained for up to six hours while authorities attempt to establish their identity and further clarify the circumstances of their irregular border crossing (Article 14(4)-(5)). Upon the expiry of this period, the individual is to be released. If the identity cannot be confirmed within this six-hour window, however, the person may be placed “under surveillance” and subjected to an expulsion order (Article 14(11)). Article 106 provides a list of grounds for expulsion, including irregular entry, overstaying after the rejection of an asylum claim and rather ambiguously “posing a threat to public order or national security”, the assessment of which leaves the door open for racially biased or discriminatory decision-making. While the law provides for the right to appeal an expulsion decision, they do not carry a suspensive effect. In practice, this means that removals can be executed prior to an appeal being heard, raising concerns under the principle of non-refoulment.
Recognition rates for international protection remain incredibly low and the average wait time for a first-instance decision can extend up to 344 days (Human Rights Watch, 2023), far exceeding international standards for timely protection. Human Rights Watch stated “While awaiting the decision, asylum seekers are essentially without rights, and can only legally seek employment nine months after registering” (Human Rights Watch, 2023). Many asylum seekers face administrative hurdles, such as the requirement of a registered address, which many reception centres do not provide. This dysfunction leaves many vulnerable to exploitation by smugglers, who are largely motivated by the opportunity of extensive payments rather than humanitarian incentives (Blind Spots, 2022). Preliminary data by EU border agency Frontex also noted “increased violence by smugglers” (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2025).
Simultaneously, Bosnia is under immense pressure to demonstrate effective border control as part of its EU accession process. In July 2025, BiH signed a cooperation agreement with the EU’s border agency Frontex, which will result in the deployment of Frontex officials to Bosnia’s major borders and airports (InfoMigrants, 2025). In a statement by the European Commission, it was made clear that “Stepping up the cooperation on border management is a key element of the EU’s engagement with Western Balkan partners, preventing irregular border crossings and strengthening the security of the region” (InfoMigrants, 2025).
Alongside legislative changes, Bosnia and Herzegovina has adopted a Migration and Asylum Strategy (2021-2025), which sets out seven mid-term objectives, including improving the asylum system, strengthening border control, combating migrant smuggling and trafficking and supporting the integration of legally resident foreigners (BiH Ministry of Security, 2021). The strategy was developed in consultation with EU institutions, UN agencies and NGOs. It commits Bosnia to align its migration policies with European standards while ensuring the protection of vulnerable groups. It is true that implementation has been arguably uneven and resources remain limited, but the strategy is representative of a formal recognition to build a system that balances border management with respect for human rights.
Conclusion.
The Bosnia-Croatia border illustrates how Europe’s migration management has produced a zone where rights are consistently undermined. Pushbacks are carried out with violence and impunity. Detention in facilities like Lukavica are often prolonged, with inadequate conditions. This entrenches a system where those seeking freedom from persecution, war and poverty are exposed to treatment that violates the core prohibitions of international law.
The Balkan Bottleneck will remain for as long as Europe continues to shift responsibility without closing the protection gap. Respect for non-refoulement, humane reception and recognition of migrants as rights holders rather than security threats are not matters of discretion but binding legal obligations. Bosnia and Croatia, with the EU’s backing, must decide whether to persist in a cycle of illegality and neglect, or to prioritise a system that upholds international law and safeguards human rights.
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