INTRODUCTION
This article explores the United States’ role in the 1971 genocide in Bangladesh. The US formed diplomatic ties with Pakistan when the country was formed in 1947. Pakistan aligned itself with the Western bloc during the Cold War, which made it a close ally of the US. To understand the events leading up to 1971, this article will provide a brief overview of the partition of India in 1947 that divided the country by religious lines, creating two nations: Pakistan and India.
Pakistan was split into two territories: West Pakistan and East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh), with over 1,000 kilometres between them. Social disparities caused tensions to rise between both territories, which eventually led to genocide. Although the genocide in Bangladesh occurred decades ago, it is important to highlight the role that the US played in this genocide, as it would not be the first or last time that the country would be involved in such matters.
HISTORY OF THE PARTITION OF INDIA
Before its independence in 1947, India had been ruled by Britain since 1858. Several factors played a role in the country gaining its independence, such as the economic strain of World War II, rising religious tensions, nationalist movements, and political pressure. As a result, Britain announced in 1946 that it would grant India independence. At the time, the country’s population consisted of two main religious groups. The majority were Hindus at approximately 73 percent, and the rest of the population consisted of Muslims at 24 percent (BBC, 2022). Tensions between the two religious groups had steadily risen since the implementation of policies such as the ‘divide-and-rule’ policy.
Furthermore, British policies, such as the 1909 decision, gave Indian Muslims a separate electorate from Hindus in local elections, creating a divide between the two groups (Pillalamarri, 2019). Despite fighting for independence, religious minorities in the country were concerned about living in a country ruled by a Hindu majority. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League, advocated that India be separated by religious lines.
Before departing the country, the British split India (Hindu-majority) into two separate countries, resulting in Pakistan (Muslim-majority). The partition of India led to the largest mass migration in history, with close to 15 million people displaced and several million dead due to violence (Shashkevich, 2019).
Despite these two territories sharing a common religion, they differed in language, ethnicity, and culture, which eventually caused tensions to rise. Ruling elites emigrated from India to West Pakistan, which was chosen as the nation’s political centre, receiving the majority of investments and imports (Boissoneault, 2016). The Bengalis were excluded politically and exploited as resources were sent from East Pakistan to West Pakistan. Furthermore, a demeaning attitude toward Bengali culture and the Bengali population and the refusal to accept Bengali as a state language of Pakistan caused relations to sour between both territories (Zakaria, 2019).
THE BEGINNING OF THE GENOCIDE
The boiling point occurred in 1970 when a cyclone hit East Pakistan, resulting in the deaths of approximately 3,00,000 to 5,00,000 people (Griffin-Elliott, 2024). The Pakistani government was slow in sending aid to victims affected by the cyclone. Additionally, the country’s first free and fair election was won by Bengali nationalist leader of the Awami League (AL), Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. His party advocated for the autonomy of East Pakistan and won 160 out of 300 seats in the National Assembly. Some scholars believe that the failure of the Pakistani government to deal with the cyclone led to the victory of the AL (Islam et al., 2023).
The dominant party, Pakistan’s People’s Party (PPP), opposed the AL from forming the next government, and both parties reached an impasse in early 1971. As a result, AL supporters began peaceful demonstrations calling for the secession of East Pakistan. With growing demands for an independent East Pakistan, General Yahya Khan, who was serving as President, launched ‘Operation Searchlight’, aiming to repress protesters. The military crackdown resulted in the massacres of ethnic Bengalis and Hindus, supporters of the Awami League, Bengali police, students, intellectuals, and professionals. Sheikh Mujibur was blocked from taking office by the army and the existing Pakistani government and was later arrested.
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
3.1. US – Pakistan Relations
The US’s official policy was to favour Pakistan due to various agreements, partnerships, and a strategy that had been in play for several decades prior to the genocide. In 1951, Congress passed the Mutual Security Act, authorising military, economic, and technical support to friendly countries. In 1954, Pakistan signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (MDAA) with the US. These agreements allowed the US to provide military equipment and training assistance to Pakistan. Additionally, Pakistan became a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), formally becoming an ally of the US. The following year, Pakistan would become an original member of the American-sponsored Baghdad Pact (later known as the Central Treaty Organization), a military alliance created to counter the Soviet Union.
Pakistan became a valuable diplomatic partner when its government helped the US achieve a rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China in the early 1970s (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). Pakistan’s alignment with the West can be understood as a part of a global containment strategy of the Soviet Union devised by the US (McMahon, 1988). Pakistan eventually became vital to protecting the Middle East from Soviet encroachment. India was friendly with the Soviet Union during this time, which only reinforced the US’s justification for allying with Pakistan. Between 1953 and 1961, Pakistan received close to $2 billion in aid, with a quarter allocated for military assistance from the US (Reuters, 2010). All of these factors would be considered when deciding to support Pakistan after the genocide began.
3.2. The Nixon Administration
Richard Nixon was the sitting president of the US, with Henry Kissinger as his National Security advisor when the genocide occurred in East Pakistan. Despite being updated regularly with the atrocities in East Pakistan, the Nixon administration classified it as an internal conflict within Pakistan. Ganguly (2014) recaps that the Nixon administration did not pressure General Khan for several reasons.
The first reason was not wanting to lose the connection they built with China with the help of Pakistan. The second was Nixon’s animosity toward Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In 1965, an arms embargo was placed on both India and Pakistan due to armed conflict between the two countries. However, in October 1970, the Nixon administration eased the conditions of the embargo and sold Pakistan spare parts and ammunition for weapons (Welles, 1971). The administration feared that Pakistan would be severely weakened if East Pakistan seceded, so they supported Pakistan initially.
In December 1971, the US sent the U.S.S. Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal, signalling a possibility that they would assist Pakistan. The US, however, did not directly intervene, which signalled to Pakistan and India that there were limits to their commitment (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). These developments negatively impacted the US as their influence diminished in the region.
3.3 Blood’s Telegram and Dissent
Archer Blood was an American Consul General to Dacca, East Pakistan (present-day Dhaka, Bangladesh) in 1970. The genocide began on March 25th, 1971 and the consulate regularly updated the White House on the progression of human rights violations, which was largely ignored by the Nixon administration. On April 6th, 1971 Blood sent the White House a telegram vocalising that “U.S. policy related to recent developments in East Pakistan serves neither our moral interests broadly defined nor our national interests narrowly defined” (US Department of State, 1971).
The telegram further expressed that the US government failed to denounce the suppression of democracy and atrocities. Despite not adding his signature to the telegram himself, as Consul General, he approved sending it to the White House. The telegram prompted the US to publicly call for a ceasefire. Due to his dissent, Blood was reprimanded, and his career suffered as a result. He was recalled from his position in Dacca and sent to Washington D.C., where he held a position in human resources (Sarker, 2024). Several employees of the US Department of State risked their careers to speak out on the atrocities occurring in East Pakistan.
Several US senators expressed concern over whether American weapons were used against East Pakistanis. In a joint letter, they wrote that they were deeply disturbed by the recent bloodshed in East Pakistan and called on the Department of State to disclose even the most indirect American involvement (Welles, 1971). Senator Edward M. Kennedy, the chairman of the US Senate’s Judiciary Subcommittee on Refugees, also expressed concern about the US’s involvement.
Senator Kennedy visited several refugee camps in India during the genocide. On November 1st, 1971 he released excerpts from his report to the US Senate on the crisis, along with a bill to authorise $250 million to assist the international relief effort (Sarker, 2024). In the report, Senator Kennedy stated that “nothing was more clear, or more easily documented, than the systematic campaign of terror–and its genocidal consequences–launched by the Pakistani army on the night of March 25th” (U.S. House of Representatives, 2022). Senator Kennedy also criticised the Nixon administration for not putting an embargo on military supplies to Pakistan.
3.4. Post-Genocide and Recognition
East Pakistani guerilla forces, known as the Mukti Bahini and supported by India, fought with the Pakistani Army in the late autumn of 1971 (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). West Pakistan responded with air attacks on India, which started a war between the two countries. On December 16th, 1971 Pakistani military forces surrendered when tensions between India and West Pakistan reached a boiling point. The genocide resulted in approximately three million people dying, ten million fleeing to neighbouring countries, and 30 million displaced in Bangladesh (Jahan, 2012).
East Pakistan gained independence, becoming present-day Bangladesh. Despite several attempts, the genocide that occurred in Bangladesh remains largely unrecognised by various countries and organisations. There have been multiple attempts by the United Nations to recognise the genocide in Bangladesh with little success. In 2022, US Representative Steve Chabot introduced House Resolution 1430, which recognises the genocide that occurred in Bangladesh (U.S. House of Representatives, 2022). However, the bill has not moved beyond the introduction stage.
CONCLUSION
Despite the awareness of the atrocities occurring in East Pakistan, the Nixon administration chose to turn a blind eye to the genocide, dismissing the crisis as a Pakistani internal conflict. Members of the US government and employees of the Foreign Service spoke out about the genocide in East Pakistan at the risk of their careers. Even though the genocide occurred decades ago, it is essential to highlight the role that the US played in it, as it would not be the first or last time that the country would be involved in such matters. Transitional justice, which helps communities heal after periods of conflict, cannot occur without recognition and holding those responsible accountable. As a result, the scars of the genocide can still be felt today.
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