INTRODUCTION
Massive protests are taking place in two European Union (EU) candidate countries, Georgia and Serbia (McBride, 2025; Launey, 2025). Although the protests in these two countries emerged for different reasons, in both cases, the respective governments have violated protesters’ human rights and exhibited authoritarian tendencies (Amnesty International, 2025; Jovanović, 2025; Lawlor, Romero, & Khan, 2024; McBride, 2025; Balunović, 2025). These violations are particularly relevant to the EU, which has a legal responsibility to protect and promote human rights globally under Articles 3(5) and 21 of the Treaty on European Union (KUBE, 2016). Moreover, the EU sets particularly high expectations for aspiring members, requiring them to meet the Copenhagen criteria, which include strong guarantees for the protection of human rights and the upholding of democratic norms (European Union, 2022).
However, these two cases have seen different responses from the EU. This article examines how geopolitical considerations influence a state’s willingness to condemn norm violations by others and explores the factors that may have shaped the EU’s contrasting approach to protecting human rights and addressing democratic backsliding in Georgia and Serbia.
GEOPOLITICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (GENERAL FRAMEWORK)
Even though human rights are rooted in philosophical norms (Nickel & Etinson, 2024), geopolitics has also significantly influenced international human rights discourse throughout history (Terman, 2023). One example that highlights the influence of geopolitics on human rights discourse is the United States (U.S.) turning a blind eye to the murder of Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate due to its strategic partnership with Saudi Arabia (Terman, 2023).
On October 2nd, 2018, Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist, was murdered after walking into the Saudi consulate in Istanbul (BBC News, 2021). He had been an outspoken critic of the Saudi government and had self-exiled to the U.S. in 2017. In response, 22 U.S. senators sent a letter to President Trump, calling on him to open an investigation into the murder and to consider implementing sanctions (Terman, 2023, p.132). However, many foreign policymakers were hesitant to impose sanctions as they considered the enforcement costs too high (Terman, 2023). U.S. Defence Secretary Jim Mattis and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met with members of Congress behind closed doors to explain that any punitive action against the Kingdom could weaken the U.S.–Saudi partnership. This, in turn, could lead to a reduction in U.S. arms sales and the loss of a strategic ally in countering Iran (Terman, 2023).
This is one of several cases examined by Rochelle Terman in her book “The Geopolitics of Shaming: When Human Rights Pressure Works—and When It Backfires”. There are both costs and benefits when a country chooses to express its disapproval towards another state for breaking an international norm, such as human rights (Terman, 2023). For instance, one enforcement cost is the risk of upsetting a country’s geopolitical partner, potentially harming its own national interests (Terman, 2023, p. 33). As seen in the case of Saudi Arabia and the U.S., these costs could damage U.S. security and economy (Terman, 2023, pp. 132-133).
However, there are also benefits to openly condemning another country for violating the agreed norms. In some cases, these geopolitical advantages may outweigh the costs (Terman, 2023, p. 34). Terman identifies three types of benefits. First, there are behavioural rewards, meaning that a country will condemn a violator when non-compliance with a norm harms its own interests or values. By defending the norm through public condemnation, the country seeks to prevent future violations, not just by the target but also by others (Terman, 2023, pp. 34-35). Second, there are meta-norms or social pressures to punish violators and defend human rights. Condemning human rights violations and appealing to this social pressure, coming from both international actors and domestic audiences, can be beneficial for the state (Terman, 2023, p. 37). Finally, when a country has an adversarial relationship with a violator, it may choose to stigmatise the target, not necessarily to defend human rights, but rather to condemn the violations and harm the target’s reputation. For example, during the Cold War, human rights violations became a political tool used to criticise the rival (Leffler & Odd Arne Westad, 2011).
One of the most significant negative outcomes that can result from one country openly criticising another state for its violations of international norms is counter-reaction among the citizens of the targeted country (Terman, 2023, p. 56). Rather than strengthening a norm in the violator state, foreign condemnation can be perceived as a direct attack on national identity, triggering a more defensive response from society (Terman, 2023, pp. 55-61). For example, after Western countries publicly criticised Uganda and Nigeria for their efforts to criminalise homosexuality in 2014, an increase in human rights violations against LGBTQIA+ individuals was observed (Terman, 2023, p. 3). Therefore, it is essential for foreign policymakers at the state level to carefully weigh the risk of backlash in the target country when deciding whether to publicly condemn another state. These principles will be the main framework used in this article to examine the EU’s foreign policy regarding human rights violations in two candidate countries.
CASE OF GEORGIA
Georgia might be one of the most prominent concerns for the EU when it comes to authoritarian backsliding. As Markéta Gregorová, member of the EU-Georgia Parliamentary Association Committee, explains, the country was once progressing with reforms, and there was a genuine hope that it could join the EU in “ten years” (Fidias EU Parliament, 2025). However, the government of Georgia began to personally attack Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Moreover, the ruling party, Georgian Dream, is turning its own citizens against the EU by creating a “global war party”, a conspiratorial alliance, which wants Georgia to go to war against Russia (Fidias EU Parliament, 2025).
At the same time, the country is sliding toward authoritarianism under the informal leader Bidzina Ivanishvili (McBride, 2025). The government has passed several laws to restrict civil society (CSO Meter, 2025). Freedom of assembly has been restricted. For example, during the protests, the authorities used excessive force and detained protesters, some of whom are considered political prisoners (Amnesty International, 2025; Georgian Democracy Initiative, 2025). The government has also openly proposed to ban the opposition (bne IntelliNews, 2024).
The EU responded to this authoritarian shift as early as July 2024, when it cut financial assistance due to the reintroduction of the Foreign Agents Law, which restricts civil society (Baccini, 2024). The response only intensified after protests emerged in the country due to the government’s official declaration to suspend EU accession talks (RFE/RL’s Georgian Service, 2024). The protests did not stop the government from passing more restrictive laws and employing tactics against protesters, including excessive use of force resulting in human rights violations (Šuica, 2024; OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2024). At the same time, the EU created a two-year project, “REACT for Georgia: Resilient, Engaged, Active Civil Society for Transformation”, to provide financial aid to civil society and media (Natiko Taktakishvili, 2025) and redirected aid originally intended for the government to civil society organisations (Kos, 2025). Moreover, the EU suspended visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials (Council of the EU, 2025).
Since the allegedly rigged elections, Georgia has been mentioned 18 times in the EU’s Press Corner (European Commission, 2025a). Four of these mentions were official statements from the High Representative for Foreign Affairs alone or with the Commissioner for Enlargement. Thirteen referenced the Georgian government’s actions in a negative context, while the other five were neutral brief mentions. Neither official visits nor meetings with the Georgian government were mentioned in the EU’s press calendar. Additionally, Georgian authorities would likely have faced EU sanctions if not for vetoes from Hungary and Slovakia, which blocked the required unanimity (Liboreiro, 2024b).
This suggests that the EU chose to openly ‘shame’ Georgia for its human rights violations and democratic backsliding because the benefits of this move outweighed the potential costs. The enforcement cost for the EU in this circumstance is the potential loss of a geopolitically important partner that serves as the Middle Corridor between Asia and Europe (Bakuradze, 2025). On the other hand, there are benefits, such as behavioural rewards and meta-norms. From a behavioural reward perspective, if the situation in the country deteriorates, the EU’s credibility in the neighbourhood is threatened, giving Russia an opportunity to increase its sphere of influence (Meister et al., 2024). Therefore, in addition to value-based necessity, there is also an interest-based incentive to condemn the ongoing violations happening in the country. Moreover, meta-norms exist; for example, there might be “domestic” pressure from Nordic and Baltic States (Gungor, 2024); (Liboreiro, 2024a).
More importantly, there is international pressure from Georgian citizens, who are demonstrating in support of EU integration by waving the organisation’s flags (Shamim, 2024). Furthermore, Salome Zourabichvili, the fifth President of Georgia, who is viewed as the legitimate president of Georgia by the European Parliament, called for even stronger measures from the EU (European Parliament, 2025; European Parliament, 2024b). Zourabichvili is also viewed as more legitimate domestically than the sixth President of Georgia, Mikhail Kavelashvili. She is recognised by 40.1 percent of the population, while her counterpart, Kavelashvili, is seen as legitimate by 37.7 percent (The Institute of Social Studies and Analysis, 2025). This, in addition to the EU being the most trusted international institution in Georgia (EU Neighbourseast, 2024), builds confidence in the EU’s ability to act and appeal to both domestic and international audiences, without causing a backlash in Georgian society.
CASE OF SERBIA
It is difficult to assess the severity of the situation in Serbia compared to Georgia. For example, there is no evidence that the Georgian authorities use digital spyware to surveil civil society in the country, while Serbian counterparts have reportedly deployed this technology (Amnesty International, 2024). Moreover, in the Serbian Parliament, a draft law was submitted similar to Georgia’s controversial foreign agents law (RFE/RL’s Balkan Service & RFE/RL’s Russian Service, 2024). If approved, it could further restrict civil society in the country. Nonetheless, it has yet to be passed, whereas in Georgia, the law has only become stricter (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2025). Another reason Georgia may be viewed as a more severe case is the significantly higher number of political prisoners it has compared to other regions. According to Vreme, an independent news magazine in Serbia, President Vučić’s government has detained six people on political grounds (Slobodan Georgijev, 2024). Meanwhile, in Georgia, the number of political prisoners is at least 50, according to the local non-governmental organisation (NGO), Georgian Democracy Initiative (Georgian Democracy Initiative, 2025).
This comparison may create the impression that the Serbian government’s pushback is, for now, less severe. However, it must be mentioned that Vučić has called on authorities in the country to restore the “order” after students blocked the entrance to the public broadcasting channel (N1 Belgrade, 2025b). Therefore, the situation may change in the future. It is also important to consider why the protests in Serbia emerged in the first place. The demonstrations started in the country after 16 people died due to the collapse of the Novi Sad railway station (Vasovic, 2025). Allegedly, the renovation of the station by a Chinese company shortly before the disaster may have been the result of a corruption scheme (Cooper, 2025). Therefore, if the corruption and/or incompetence of the ruling party are the cause of the victims’ deaths (Smeltzer, 2025), this may constitute a violation of one of the most fundamental human rights by the government: the right to life (Heyns & Probert, 2016).
While the full extent of the severity in Serbia is uncertain, it appears that the EU’s response to Vučić’s government has been softer compared to Ivanishvili’s. In the EU’s Digital Press Corner, Serbia was mentioned 24 times, mostly briefly (European Commission, 2025b). Five of these mentions were calendar updates reporting meetings between European officials and representatives of the Serbian government. The data indicates that diplomatic ties between the EU and Serbia are not frozen and remain active. One additional calendar update was informing about a meeting between the Enlargement Commissioner and Serbian civil society. No official statement has been issued by High Representative/Vice-President Kaja Kallas regarding the Serbian situation. However, in an interview with ENR, she expressed support for Serbian citizens’ right to freedom of assembly (enr, 2025).
Nonetheless, an official statement was issued by the Enlargement Commissioner after she received letters from Serbian academia, political actors, and civil society (Kos, 2025b). In her statement, she mentioned that freedom of assembly is a fundamental value of the EU. Moreover, she called on the Serbian government to improve the rule of law, as it is one of the core criteria for accession to the EU. During a plenary debate in the European Parliament regarding the political crisis in Serbia, Commissioner Kos addressed the human rights violations that occurred during the protests and once again urged the government to accelerate reforms (Kos, 2025c). It is clear from both the statement and the speech that the Commissioner is calling on all stakeholders to engage in dialogue and commit to the EU accession path, as the reforms required for membership will help strengthen institutions in the country.
Instead of taking a harsh approach to Serbia, the EU might prefer to recreate a scenario similar to Georgia in 2021, when various political actors, through the mediation of the then-President of the European Council, Charles Michel, signed an agreement that intended to reform Georgia’s political landscape and improve the rule of law and electoral system (Euronews, 2021; European Union External Action, 2021). However, the Georgian government later abandoned the agreement, blaming the opposition, and failed to implement key provisions necessary for judicial reform (OC Media, 2021). It can be argued that this moment marked the point at which Georgia began its open slide toward authoritarianism (Parulava, 2021).
This softer approach by the EU might be explained by Terman’s framework. The enforcement costs of criticising Serbia might be too high. The country holds significance for the EU due to its deposits of lithium, a critical raw material necessary for the green transition (Weizman & Šejla Ahmatović, 2025). Under the EU’s new priority of strategic autonomy, these deposits might be more important than Georgia’s position as a Middle Corridor (González & Verbeek, 2024). Additionally, Serbia’s location in the Balkans further amplifies the potential enforcement costs. For example, Serbia has been openly Russia-friendly, and Vučić will attend the May 9th Victory Parade in Moscow despite the EU’s pushback (Dragaš, 2024; Pakhnyuk, 2025). Therefore, if the EU openly criticises the Serbian government, it risks pushing the country even closer to Russia, given Serbia’s existing political, economic, and ideological ties to Moscow and its strategic role in the region (Zweers, Drost, & Henry, 2023). This could result in the emergence of a Russian-aligned hub in the middle of the Balkans, putting neighbouring EU Member States at risk.
Additionally, there might be a lack of benefits for the EU to act, such as social pressure. Internationally, in contrast to Georgian protesters, demonstrators in Serbia are not waving the EU flag alongside Serbian ones (the New Union Post, 2025). Moreover, in the case of Georgia, every major EU political party has expressed support for actions against the Georgian government (European Parliament, 2025a). However, when it comes to Serbia, the European People’s Party (EPP), the largest political group in the EU, even rejected a debate proposal in the European Parliament regarding the situation in Serbia (Dukovska, 2025). The underlying reason for this rejection might be that Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party is an associate member of the EPP (EWB Archives, 2016).
The EU also faces another dilemma: its support might create new resistance. In contrast to Georgia, where pro-European sentiment is high, only 38 percent of the Serbian population trusts the EU (European Commission, 2024). Therefore, if the EU responds too forcefully, it might undermine the momentum of the protests, especially since Vučić has framed them as being in the interest of foreign actors (Statewatch, 2025). If these assumptions are considered, the EU may perceive that the costs of openly shaming Serbia for its democratic backsliding outweigh the potential benefits.
WHAT CAN THE EU DO?
Yet, the EU might still prefer to engage more firmly with the Serbian government if doing so leads to behavioural rewards. Past experience with Georgia has shown that authoritarian governments rarely reverse course once they begin consolidating power and often fail to uphold EU values. Serbia’s most recent enlargement report indicates backsliding (Ćerimagić, 2025). Moreover, addressing human rights violations in the country could help re-engage young people uncertain about EU membership (EWB, 2020). For instance, some students travelling to Strasbourg stated that their goal was to raise awareness in the Council of Europe rather than in the European Parliament (N1 Belgrade, 2025). This moment could present the EU with a valuable opportunity, not necessarily for sharp criticism but for firmer pressure.
For example, the EU could speak more openly about the problems in Serbia, support protesters’ demands for better accountability from the government, and provide increased financial support to civil society. Such measures might help rebuild public trust, especially among those who, in the future, will vote in a potential EU accession referendum. At present, public support for membership is declining, with more people opposing than supporting EU accession (N1 Belgrade, 2022). Taking this risk may be essential if the EU aims to expand its common market and security presence in the Balkans.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there might be a strategic reason why the EU has responded differently to human rights violations in Georgia and Serbia. As explained by Terman, there are both costs and benefits to openly disapproving another state for breaking international norms such as democracy and human rights. In contrast to Georgia, in the case of Serbia, the EU faces higher enforcement costs due to the country’s geopolitical importance and absence of a key benefit, such as strong social pressure. The absence of strong social pressure is a significant factor. However, the EU should also consider the potential behavioural rewards of adopting a firmer stance. Applying more consistent pressure may help restore public trust in the EU among Serbian citizens, particularly younger generations. Ultimately, it will be up to them to decide whether Serbia joins the EU and contributes to the common market.
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