INTRODUCTION
In 2025, Malaysia assumes leadership as the Chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). As the country leads ASEAN under the theme “Inclusivity and Sustainability”, Malaysia is expected to play a defining role as ASEAN commemorates the 10th anniversary of the ASEAN Community (Singh, 2025). According to Malaysia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, as the ASEAN Chair, prioritises the strengthening of ASEAN centrality, the concept that positions ASEAN as a “primary platform to address regional challenges and engage with external powers” (About ASEAN 2025, n.d.; Yaacob, 2024).
To achieve this priority, Malaysia has pledged to “promote strategic trust among nations through sustained dialogues, diplomacy, and goodwill” to de-escalate tensions and prevent regional conflicts (About ASEAN 2025, n.d.; Vietnam Plus, 2025). In this regard, Malaysia cannot turn away from the persisting civil war in Myanmar, which has put ASEAN and Malaysia in a difficult position. Malaysia felt an obligation to address this issue not only as an ASEAN Chair to improve regional security but also as a neighbouring country impacted by the conflict. Nearly 90 percent of refugees residing in Malaysia fled the atrocities in Myanmar (Saravanamuttu, 2025; UNHCR, 2025).
In February 2021, Gen. Min Aung Hlaing ousted Aung San Su Kyi’s civilian government and established the State Administrative Council (SAC) (Saravanamuttu, 2025). As the power struggle between the military junta and ethnic armed groups has continued for over four years, more than 6,000 casualties have been reported, while millions of others are displaced or in need of assistance (Mishra, 2025). The catastrophic earthquake in March 2025 further worsened the humanitarian situation, while the junta violated the ceasefire and continued deploying over 600 airstrikes instead of providing disaster relief (Mishra, 2025).
To assess the feasibility of achieving Malaysia’s peace priority, this article will analyse ASEAN’s engagement with Myanmar and examine Malaysia’s pragmatism in its diplomatic approach as the ASEAN Chair.
ASEAN’S ENGAGEMENT
Ultimately, ASEAN’s objective in Myanmar is to restore peace and return power to the democratically elected government (Saravanamuttu, 2025). Through the formal diplomatic channel, ASEAN pressured Myanmar’s military leaders with the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), demanding that the SAC immediately cease violence and seek a peaceful resolution while allowing the ASEAN Special Envoy to mediate and meet with all conflicting parties. Myanmar should also permit ASEAN to provide humanitarian aid through the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (ASEAN, 2021).
However, the SAC repeatedly rejected the 5PC, leaving ASEAN member states no other choice but to bar the junta and its political representatives from ASEAN’s full membership privileges, such as attending ASEAN Summits (Saravanamuttu, 2025). Although ASEAN sent a collective signal that the SAC’s legitimacy is not recognised, Myanmar’s rejection of the 5PC and the continuation of violence led to a diplomatic deadlock for ASEAN (Saravanamuttu, 2025).
If Malaysia seeks to promote ASEAN as a conflict resolution platform, it is crucial to understand the geopolitical challenges and normative limitations. First, expelling Myanmar from ASEAN is not a viable option; otherwise, Myanmar could be driven closer to China, undermining ASEAN’s regional security (Lam, 2025; Saravanamuttu, 2025). As China seeks to engage bilaterally with ASEAN member states instead of multilaterally with the regional bloc, ASEAN’s collective actions against Chinese influence would be weakened further (Lam, 2025; Yaacob, 2024).
Second, terminating Myanmar’s membership would contradict ASEAN’s longstanding norm, the non-interference principle with mutual respect for national sovereignty (Saravanamuttu, 2025). These principles are enshrined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976), which prevents ASEAN member states from intervening in each other’s internal affairs. However, the non-interference principle limits ASEAN from proactively and effectively resolving regional conflicts (Saravanamuttu, 2025).
MALAYSIA’S PRAGMATISM
Understanding the complexity of Myanmar, Malaysia, as the ASEAN Chair, recognised the need to adapt its approach to promote ASEAN’s proactivity in conflict resolution while respecting ASEAN’s norms. Therefore, Malaysia “shifted away from ASEAN’s rigid frameworks towards more flexible, outcome-driven initiatives” (Lopez, 2025).
While Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim of Malaysia reaffirmed his commitment to the 5PC, he has been a strong supporter of constructive engagement, an informal peacebuilding strategy (Saravanamuttu, 2025). With a background as a human rights advocate, Ibrahim recognised the ineffectiveness of the non-interference principle, which kept ASEAN reactive (Radzi & Jaafar, 2025; Saravanamuttu, 2025). To overcome such limitations, ASEAN needs to pursue constructive engagement as a “moral and humanitarian obligation to avoid loss of life and restore peace and security” (Saravanamuttu, 2025).
Malaysia’s chairpersonship recognised the highly complex and challenging landscape in Myanmar. Therefore, Malaysia has implemented the following actions (Lopez, 2025).
1) Inclusive engagement: In April 2025, Prime Minister Ibrahim met with Gen Min Aung Hlaing for an informal discussion in Bangkok, facilitated by the Thai government. He also held a virtual meeting with the opposition leader, U Mahn Win Khaing Than from the National Unity Government (NUG) (Zahiid, 2025). As the junta continues military attacks, the meetings reflected Malaysia’s push for the de-escalation of conflict while maintaining Malaysia’s ASEAN theme of inclusivity. Ibrahim sought the opportunity for ASEAN to gain access to Myanmar to provide post-earthquake humanitarian assistance and discuss the possibility of a ceasefire extension, including future dialogues for a peaceful resolution (Zahiid, 2025).
2) Sustainable engagement: Malaysia realised that the one-year ASEAN chairpersonship can be impractical to achieve conflict resolution (Lopez, 2025). In this regard, Malaysia proposed the institutionalisation of the ASEAN Special Envoy to Myanmar by extending the term from one year to three years, along with the improvement of resources and personnel (Azhar, 2025; Lopez, 2025). As the political crisis in Myanmar persists, this proposal was intended to facilitate the ASEAN Chair’s successors with a more effective mechanism for conflict resolution. To put this in progress, two special meetings on Myanmar were held in May, where Southeast Asian senior diplomats discussed the ways forward (Lopez, 2025).
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Considering Malaysia’s proactivity, Malaysia’s informal meetings with Myanmar’s leaders and the reconsideration of the ASEAN Special Envoy reflect its pragmatism in overcoming the normative limitations of the non-interference principle. Although the meeting with the junta raised scepticism regarding the risk of legitimising the SAC, the informal setting did not endorse a full recognition of the military junta, while the video conference with the NUG indicated an inclusive diplomatic approach (Strangio, 2025; Azhar, 2025).
Due to a lack of trust between the conflicting parties in Myanmar, the Malaysian premier understood the sensitivity of the issue as dialogues between them were unlikely to succeed (Al Jazeera, 2025). Therefore, informal meetings remained the most feasible way to maintain Myanmar’s engagement with ASEAN amid the ongoing sensitive conflict (Lopez, 2025).
However, it remains unclear whether Malaysia’s proposal to extend the Special Envoy’s serving term will enhance ASEAN engagement in Myanmar. Since 2021, previous Special Envoys faced setbacks due to the limited access and authority as the military government prevented them from interacting with the opposition (Azman, 2025). Moreover, the SAC has observed ASEAN’s struggle to unite its efforts to resolve the conflict in Myanmar (Yaacob, 2024). The absence of cohesive coordination allows the SAC to exploit this by “selectively engaging with states willing to offer a platform for legitimacy while dismissing criticism from others” (Lam, 2025).
Malaysia’s peace priority during its ASEAN chairmanship paves the way for a more inclusive engagement with all conflicting parties. To achieve a more sustainable outcome, Malaysia needs to encourage ASEAN member states to join forces and consider a more assertive approach to Myanmar. While it is important for the member states to maintain engagement at the government level with Myanmar, ASEAN needs to collectively hold the SAC accountable since the junta has yet to face the consequences of its violent atrocities inflicted upon its citizens (Saravanamuttu, 2025). For Malaysia’s efforts to achieve lasting impact, ASEAN must ultimately adopt a unified stance to balance informal engagement with collective pressure on the junta, including coordinated diplomatic and economic measures.
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