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Intersectionality, first articulated by Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989, is a conceptual framework that recognizes how multiple forms of discrimination, such as race, gender, class, and sexuality, interact and reinforce one another, shaping unique experiences of marginalization and harm. Crenshaw’s work, particularly in “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color,” highlighted the necessity of accounting for multiple, intersecting identities to understand how social structures produce and perpetuate inequality fully.

Over the past decades, intersectionality has become a key concept in feminist theory, anti-racist activism, and social justice movements, and has gradually entered the discourse of human rights advocacy. Its core insight is that power relations do not operate in isolation, but rather build upon and interact with one another, producing complex and compounded forms of disadvantage (Hill Collins and Bilge, 2020). As such, intersectionality is increasingly invoked as a necessary tool for understanding and addressing the multi-layered realities of discrimination and violence, particularly in contexts of mass violence and international crimes.

In most contexts of mass violence, both perpetrators and victims are situated within multiple, intersecting systems of structural discrimination and oppression. These systems form the backdrop for the harms and criminal conduct that international human rights law (IHRL) and international criminal law (ICL) seek to address. Yet, despite the widespread recognition of intersectionality in academic and activist circles, its uptake in human rights law and international justice institutions has been relatively slow and inconsistent. While bodies such as the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) have begun to reference intersectionality as a relevant principle, the application of intersectional analysis in practice remains superficial and underdeveloped (Bond, 2021). Most ICL jurisprudence, for example, tends to homogenize protected groups and overlooks the intersecting structural factors that drive violence and shape the experiences of victims. This single-axis approach not only fails to capture the root causes of international crimes but also limits the effectiveness of legal remedies and the prevention of future violations.

The importance of intersectionality for international justice lies in its potential to illuminate the dynamics of inequality and social harm experienced by historically marginalized individuals and groups. By unpacking how interlinked systems of discrimination operate, intersectionality enables a sounder understanding of both criminal conduct and the multi-faceted harms suffered by victims. This, in turn, is essential for designing effective legal and policy responses that address the realities of those most vulnerable to compounded forms of oppression.

Despite its promise, the integration of intersectionality into international legal frameworks faces significant challenges. Intersectionality is often invoked in principle but rarely operationalized as a coherent methodology in international courts or human rights institutions. The reasons for this are manifold, including institutional inertia, political sensitivities, and the complexities of translating intersectional theory into legal practice. Nevertheless, there is a growing consensus among scholars (Davis, 2015) and advocates that a more explicit and systematic application of intersectionality is necessary for realizing the foundational aims of human rights and international justice: to protect the dignity, freedom, and equality of all individuals, especially those at the intersections of multiple forms of marginalization.