Introduction
The conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) stems primarily from disputes over land rights and the ongoing struggle of the Indigenous Jumma peoples to have their unique identities properly recognised. The tensions in the CHT have deep historical roots, tracing back to the British colonial era and continuing through the regimes of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Over the years, political, social, and economic marginalisation has deepened divisions within the CHT. The situation is a form of “ethnocide”, the systematic erasure of cultural identity, rooted in state-driven projects of nation-building and development, alongside a heavily militarised security policy (Tauli-Corpuz & Alcantara, 2004).
Historical Conflicts and Their Roots
At the core of the CHT’s problems is the issue of land rights and the ability to access the region’s natural resources. For the people of the CHT, these lands, including forests, were essential for physical survival and for fulfilling their social, cultural, and religious practices (Cordillera Indigenous Peoples’ Legal Centre & UNDP Regional Initiative on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and Development, 2007). For generations, Indigenous communities maintained traditional practices centred around shifting cultivation. Their survival was linked to collectively owned lands and forests, governed by their customary rights that enabled them to sustain themselves by fishing, hunting and cultivating grass. These age-old practices were not just economic activities but formed the basis of their livelihood and cultural heritage (Islam, 2022).
Government-supported settlement programmes in the late 20th century significantly altered the demographic landscape of the CHT (Sarkar & Mukul, 2024). Policies involved the migration of thousands of Bengali settlers from the plains to counter the Indigenous people’s demands for rights and regional autonomy. The Indigenous population saw a decline from 81 percent in 1974 to 51 percent in 1991, and estimates suggest it may have fallen to around 35 percent in more recent times (Adnan, 2004). While the 1997 Peace Accord was intended to bring an end to decades of conflict, the region’s peace remains precarious. Recurring tensions have continued to escalate into violence, a situation worsened by the role of the military and local administrators. For the Indigenous communities, the hope for a sustained peace, lasting security, and meaningful development continues to feel like a distant goal.
Development Interventions and State Strategy
Previous governments have defined the challenges in the CHT as concerns about “underdevelopment”, completely ignoring the core issues of ethnic and political grievances at the root of the conflict (Nasrin, 2018). The establishment of the military-led Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board (CHTDB) in 1976 took control of the region. The CHTDB’s initiatives often furthered the region’s marginalisation. Earlier, the leadership was under the Divisional Commissioner of Chittagong until 1983 but later was transferred to military personnel (Chowdhury, 2022). This shift in leadership solidified military control over development matters in the region. The CHTDB was originally established to counteterrorism (Shahabuddin, 2009). However, the Board itself often presented the CHT as a “backwards tribal area” and started initiatives like road construction, electrification, etc., without consulting the local population (Adnan, 2004). Such actions resulted in misalignment of the region’s socioeconomic and cultural realities.
Over time, development efforts shifted focus from improving livelihoods to reinforcing state authority and administrative control. From the colonial era to the period following the 1997 Peace Accord, development in the CHT was an extension of political governance, rather than a process of inclusive and participatory growth. It often served as a political strategy to justify military presence and impose new social and economic structures. Many initiatives aimed to transform Indigenous communities from semi-nomadic societies into market-oriented citizens who fit the state’s vision of development (Habib & Jubb, 2015).
Following the Accord, many of the development activities were increasingly shaped by neo-liberal economic models. External interventions, designed to build a functioning post-conflict economy, often reflected wider global agendas around governance and liberal market reforms. The CHT Accord brought an end to the armed conflict and established a framework for peace and development. However, the transformation process has been continuously shaped and complicated by the partial and uneven implementation of the Accord’s provisions, particularly regarding land settler issues and demilitarisation.
The Nature and Limitations of CHT Accord (1997)
The signing of the CHT Accord in 1997 formally brought an end to more than two decades of armed conflict between the Government of Bangladesh and the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS), the principal political organisation representing the Jumma people. For many within Indigenous communities, the Accord signalled an important shift toward recognition of their distinct identity as part of the broader Indigenous movement. A significant section perceived the Accord as falling short of fundamental needs, particularly on issues such as full autonomy, demilitarisation, and constitutional recognition (Ahmed, 2017). This further led to the establishment of the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF), a group that rejected the Accord and also separated from PCJSS due to differences in political strategy and armed movement, and continued to advocate for more radical political change. While the Accord marked the initial step to ease the mistrust of the government in the CHT, it also led to more complex political developments in the region (Nasreen, 2017).
The post-Accord period was marked by new forms of violence. Divisions among Indigenous groups grew violent at times, particularly between PCJSS and its “rivals” like UPDF and JSS-R. Meanwhile, Bengali settlers, who had been encouraged to move to CHT in previous decades, organised politically to resist parts of the Accord. There were groups like Somo Adikhar Andolon (meaning Equal Rights Movement) that rejected Indigenous land claims, creating a hostile and complex conflict (Islam, 2022).
At the core of the CHT’s unrest is control and ownership over land. The Land Dispute Resolution Commission, established in 2001 after the Accord, has been largely ineffective. Law and commission exist on paper but are entangled in bureaucratic and political inertia. Indigenous families continue to lose their lands, often to settlers or development projects, deepening resentment. The lack of manpower and logistics and also claims of corruption have failed to gain the trust of the Jumma people (Roy, 2002).
Another unresolved issue is the recognition of Indigenous peoples. In 2011, constitutional amendments avoided using the term “Indigenous” (adivasi), only referring to them as “small ethnic groups” (Correspondent, 2011). Many Indigenous leaders like Jyotirindra Bodhipriya Larma (also known as Santu Larma) argued that this refusal weakened their claims to rights under international legal frameworks, including the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Roy, 2004). Avoiding this recognition makes it easier for the State to avoid accountability and control over land, governance, and development decisions.
Education policies, for example, prioritise the Bengali language and culture, often at the expense of Indigenous languages and traditions. This mirrors broader post-colonial nation-building efforts that ought to forge a homogenous identity, frequently portraying minority cultures as obstacles to national unity (Kabir, 2009).
Clash of Frameworks
The Constitution of Bangladesh, framed early in the 1970s, adopted a liberal democratic structure centred on protecting individual rights within a unitary, homogeneous national identity. The emphasis on Bengali language, culture, and nationalism sought to unify the post-independence nation, but it marginalised ethnic and cultural heterogeneity (Shahabuddin, 2013). The State’s framework, which prioritises individual claims and a singular national vision, struggles to integrate these collective identities. Additionally, nationalist ideologies, whether Bengali or Bangladeshi, have prioritised the integration of Indigenous peoples into a dominant framework, which makes it difficult to create inclusive governance models (Ahmed, 2017). Therefore, Indigenous worldviews are marginalised and their claims are met with suspicion or resistance.
In many ways, the 1997 Peace Accord brought an end to the decades of armed conflict in the CHT and also introduced a formal process for political dialogue. Yet, it failed to keep the promises made in the Accord, especially related to land rights and demilitarisation. For many Indigenous communities, the lived experience hasn’t changed much. Their demands for autonomy, respect, and inclusion have met with silence from the State.
Finding long-lasting solutions would mean moving beyond symbolic agreements. The State must confront the root causes of the conflict, which are a lack of land and resource rights, the right to self-determination and the social exclusion of Indigenous groups (Habib & Jubb, 2015). The Land Commission, as it was originally established, must be empowered to act according to the Indigenous laws and customs and not integrated into the State frameworks. Development projects that involve tourism, infrastructure, or resource use must be in partnership with the local communities, which includes free, prior, and informed consent from Indigenous groups at every stage (Tauli-Corpuz & Alcantara, 2004). At the institutional level, there is a clear need for legal and bureaucratic reform to enhance the protection of Indigenous rights and improve state responsiveness.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the limitations of the CHT Accord reflect a deeper structural issue, which is the unwillingness of the Bangladeshi state to engage with the Indigenous identity and governance on their terms. Addressing the ongoing challenges in the CHT requires more than administrative change. There is a need to reimagine the statehood, citizenship, and pluralism in Bangladesh that acknowledges Indigenous peoples are rights-bearing communities with a distinct historical, legal, and cultural claim (Sarkar & Mukul, 2024).
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