The Election and Aftermath
On September 11th 2022, Sweden had its general election, which saw the victory for the right-wing conservative bloc (consisting in part of the far-right) over the current Social Democratic government-led centre-left bloc. The election was a tight-fought race, dividing the parliament between 176 and 174 seats for each respective bloc. It saw substantial gains for the far-right Sweden Democrats, which became the second-biggest party in parliament, a position previously held by the Conservative Party (Moderaterna), who had traditionally held the position as the leader of the right-wing bloc. Since their first electoral gains in 2010, the Sweden Democrats have been shut out and ostracised by the other parties until this election period. The Conservatives and Christian Democrats realised that any potential future government would, at minimum, require support from the Sweden Democrats if not offered a ministerial role in that government.
For these three parties to take power, it would also need the support of a fourth party, either one of two liberal parties in Sweden, the Center Party (whose election campaign was staunchly opposed to working with the far-right) or the Liberal Party. Whilst previously having an anti-far-right position, the Liberal Party in 2021 opened up for cooperating with the far-right (Sveriges Radio, 2021).
Before election day, both the far-right Sweden Democrats and Liberal Party said that they would disapprove of a government composed of the other party and would block one another from having a position in a future government (Nordenskiöld, 2022; Dawod, 2022). Alongside the risk of unhappy Liberal MPs defecting against their own party line due to the cooperation with the far-right, the Conservative party inherited the task of forming a government suitable to all four political parties, including the unstable Liberal Party.
The Tidö Agreement (Tidöavtalet)
The Tidö Agreement (Tidöavtalet) is the agreement signed on 14th October 2023 after negotiations between the Conservative Party, the Christian Democrats, the Liberal Party and the Sweden Democrats determining the composition of the future government and the policies that will be focused on in the next mandate period. The new government is composed of three of the four mentioned parties who will be given ministerial positions, whilst the Sweden Democrats will not formally be part of the government. To compensate for the lack of a government role and to gain the confidence and supply votes, the Sweden Democrats will have a large say in decisions made and be given high positions in important committees for their support.
While the parties came to an agreement on many issues, including nuclear power, education and healthcare, the areas important to look at are the proposals that pertain to immigration and crime and the risks that they pose in violating human rights afforded to people and the rule of law if successfully implemented by the new government. In terms of immigration, the Tidö Agreement proposes more restrictive immigration policies such as revoking residence permits, reducing the number of asylum seekers entering Sweden, strengthening borders and increasing border control and collecting biometric data on foreigners. In combating crime, the agreement looks at the deportation of foreigners for certain criminal activities, increased punishment for crimes (including increased prison sentences and removing discounts on sentencing, especially for younger offenders), and the introduction of visitation zones.
Despite all these negative proposals, the agreement also highlights some positives in terms of human rights. First, the potential addition of abortion to be added into basic law, and second is to focus more on preventing discrimination based on gender, sexual orientation and race in schools.
Immigration
The Tidö Agreement proposes strengthening Swedish external borders to combat “irregular immigration” and “transnational crime”. This proposal seen on page 31 of the agreement includes re-introducing ID checks for those entering the country by bus, train, plane and ship (Tidöavtalet, 2022). By introducing these measures, there is a risk of discrimination based on race or ethnicity through disproportionate checks. These fears also arise from the fact that it is meant to curb irregular immigration, which includes refugees and asylum seekers. It may also violate the Schengen Treaty for free movement between signatories.
Found on pages 31 to 32 of Tidöavtalet, the agreement also wants to collect information such as fingerprints, physical features, pictures and DNA of non-EU citizens seeking residence permits in Sweden and put this into a registry (Tidöavtalet, 2022). They argue that it will prevent identity fraud and welfare fraud and make it easier to process information about those who have entered the country. Not only would this potentially lead to discrimination based on physical features as people are catalogued or can be separated into categories, but it is also a violation of personal privacy through the collection and storage of this data.
On page 34 of the agreement, the government and far-right announced that it wants to change the law regarding those seeking asylum by limiting its obligation to them to the minimum allowed under EU law. This aims to reduce their rights by limiting their opportunities to seek help from the state, with a line on page 42 proposing to reduce benefits for non-citizens (Tidöavtalet, 2022). By granting asylum seekers and non-citizens less support, it would only deepen the divide between an already economically and socially segregated society that exists in Sweden and reduce integration (one of the main goals of this new government). Along these lines of reducing the intake of asylum seekers, Sweden currently takes in around 5000 ‘quota refugees’ annually from the UNHCR (Migrationsverket, 2022). On page 35, the new government proposes to reduce this to around 900 a year while also setting up a criteria list of those most likely to be “integrated well” into Swedish society (Tidöavtalet, 2022). By limiting the number of asylum seekers and refugees, Sweden would not be doing its utmost to help those in need and potentially send them to places where they may not get the assistance they need.
In order to reduce asylum seekers, the governing coalition wants to review which countries it considers “safe” and which countries people can seek asylum from on page 36 (Tidöavtalet, 2022). This may lead to misclassifications of what is safe/not safe and may generalise the country’s situation and thus miss individual cases of abuse that have led to someone seeking asylum.
Crime
Another proposal regarding deportation made between the governing parties and the far-right is the wish to introduce the possibility of deporting foreign citizens based on “lacking morals”. This is specified on page 37 as those who do not “respect Swedish values”, engaging in criminal activities, criminal and extremist organisations or activities that pose a threat to “basic Swedish values” (Tidöavtalet, 2022). What comes to mind is the concept of “Swedish values” they use; what exactly do they mean by this? The proposal to deport foreigners from Sweden based on arbitrary normative ideas (outside the specific crimes committed) is not in line with the rule of law and how any justice system should be based upon. In addition, some of the things mentioned in the document, such as prostitution (the act of selling, not buying), are not illegal in Sweden and therefore deporting someone that they consider immoral but not illegal (so without trial) would be against the rule of law and the rights afforded to people.
To combat crime, the government and far-right on page 20 propose increasing the punishment for offenders for many crimes, including for repeat offenders (Tidöavtalet, 2022). There is a focus on punitive forms of correction rather than rehabilitative ones. This would make it harder for people to reintegrate into society rather than focusing on rehabilitative forms of justice. Incarcerating criminals leads to the risk of only further enticing them to continue rather than giving them alternatives. Currently, Sweden also has discounts for offenders under 18, and for those older, the Tidö Agreement on page 22 wants to lower these discounts under 18 offenders and remove them completely for those over 18 (Tidöavtalet, 2022). This effectively performs the same tasks as it increases the punishment instead of helping those from re-entering criminality. This punishment aimed at youth is even more harmful as they need support and not punitive justice.
To combat the increased gun violence in Sweden over the last years (Brottsförebyggande rådet, 2021), the agreement on page 20 highlights the introduction of “visitation zones”, which would allow police in certain areas to conduct searches on property or people without them being suspected of a crime (Tidöavtalet, 2022). There is a high risk that this will lead to discrimination and abuse by police as these zones will be put in areas in which these gun crimes have been committed and vulnerable areas (utsatta områden), many of them with high migrant populations. Another issue when it comes to searching people and property for weapons or other illicit goods without probable cause is the violation of the presumption of innocence. This also runs the risk of abuse and discrimination based on ethnicity when conducting searches, as people may be presumed and treated as guilty despite not being proven guilty. The right to privacy is also violated through these measures and potential actions taken by police.
Some Positives
Aside from the proposals that would only cause harm and violate human rights and the rule of law, the Tidö Agreement has some positives in regard to abortion and preventing discrimination in schools. While abortion is already legal in Sweden, in all cases, up to the 18th week, the Tidö Agreement on page 61 seeks to investigate whether it can be encoded within Swedish basic law to further cement women’s rights. Regarding schools, the document on page 54 calls for increased efforts to create a more comfortable environment by preventing discrimination based on gender identity, race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation (Tidöavtalet, 2022).
Conclusion
The centre-right and right-wing conservative parties opening up negotiations with the far-right have normalised their inhumane anti-refugee and asylum politics and their anti-crime stances that fail to uphold the principles of the rule of law and human rights. It seeks to punish those in need of support and fails to protect the vulnerable, only furthering the divisions existing in Swedish society. In their attempts to combat integration and crime issues, the Tidö Agreement’s proposals only risk exacerbating these problems.
References
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