INTRODUCTION
Ahead of the 2025 midterm elections, the Philippine government has been actively warning the public of the threats from deepfakes powered by artificial intelligence (AI) (Arasa, 2025). AI-powered deepfakes are commonly known as a hyper-realistic type of synthetic media, capable of imitating a person’s likeness (Le Fevre Cervini & Carro, 2024). With the combination of images, audio, and videos of a person, deepfakes can be created into a “footage that depicts events, statements, or actions that never really happened” (Basilio, 2025).
In politics, deepfakes have been leveraged in disinformation operations, the distribution of manipulated content or false information for deceptive purposes to help one gain political interests (Le Fevre Cervini & Carro, 2024). When deployed with malicious intent, deepfakes can deceive viewers into believing what they see is real, as the content can manipulate public perceptions towards political candidates (Le Fevre Cervini & Carro, 2024). Deepfakes can jeopardise the democratic processes and undermine public trust (Maquera, 2025; Le Fevre Cervini & Carro, 2024).
As the election campaigns began, the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordination Center (CICC) anticipated a deepfake surge since around 200 to 300 incidents were reported per day in March 2025 (Arasa, 2025). In 2023, the Philippines also experienced the highest rate of malicious deepfake incidents at 4,500 percent compared to the Asia-Pacific average of 1,530 percent (Surasit, 2024). While deepfakes remain a major concern, this article will examine the case studies of politically motivated deepfakes in the Philippines’ politics in the next section. To assess how the government is prepared for the 2028 presidential election, this article will identify the Philippines’ progress in legislative and regulatory development, as well as the public-private partnerships.
THE CHALLENGE OF AI-POWERED DEEPFAKES IN THE PHILIPPINES
2.1 Politically motivated high-profile case studies
The Philippines is not unfamiliar with deepfakes from election-related disinformation campaigns, which have been around since the 2016 general election (Enriquez, 2024). The high-profile cases of politically motivated deepfakes can help assess the challenges to the Philippine political landscape. In 2024, the incumbent President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos was targeted twice (Zhang, 2024).
In July, a deepfake video depicting President Marcos as if he were consuming narcotic drugs was circulated on social media platforms among supporters of the previous president, Rodrigo Duterte (Zhang, 2024). This deepfake video was released a day before President Marcos delivered a speech for his third State of the Nation Address (PCO, 2024; Zhang, 2024).
In April, a deepfake audio of the president emerged on the internet amid the simmering territorial dispute in the West Philippine Sea. The content was manipulated to closely resemble the president’s voice, commanding the Philippines’ military to attack China (Jalli & Martinez, 2025). The Philippine authorities were swift to identify both incidents as fake, while the Presidential Communications Office (PCO) promptly warned the public (Jalli & Martinez, 2025; Zhang, 2024).
2.2 Motivations behind the deepfakes
The origin of the abovementioned deepfakes remains unknown. However, the spread of deepfakes in both cases reflected the attempts to delegitimise Marcos by undermining his character and his different approach to foreign policy from Duterte (Jalli & Martinez, 2025; Zhang, 2024).
Since Marcos assumed his presidency in 2022, Philippine politics has been characterised by the political rivalry between the Marcos and Duterte families, seeking political leadership (Head, 2025). Although both sides established an alliance to win the previous presidential election, their relationship turned bitter when the Congress targeted Rodrigo Duterte with an investigation into his drug offensive. Sara Duterte, his daughter who was the Vice President in Marcos’ office, also faced impeachment from the House of Representatives (Head, 2025; Gomez, 2024).
In the races towards the 2025 midterm elections and 2028 presidential elections, the disinformation campaign using the deepfake video with drug allegations against Marcos would likely undermine support for Marcos by tarnishing his reputation and fuelling anti-Marcos sentiment (Zhang, 2024). At the same time, the drug accusation would help the Duterte family to mobilise support from the Filipino public, who resonated with Duterte’s approach against drug trafficking. This tactic may help Duterte regain national popularity for the upcoming elections (Zhang, 2024).
Regarding foreign policy, Marcos’ administration pursued a drastically different approach from Duterte. Marcos shifted the Philippines’ direction towards the United States, while his maritime strategy over the territorial dispute has become more assertive (Jalli & Martinez, 2025). In contrast, Duterte shared a more amicable relationship with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during his time in office (Zhang, 2024). Last year, for example, Duterte disclosed his agreement with the Chinese President, allowing China to maintain the status quo in the West Philippine Sea (Hernandez & Tulad, 2024). The deepfake audio portrayed Marcos as a confrontational leader, in contrast to Duterte, potentially increasing support among pro-China constituents (Jalli & Martinez, 2025).
Following an investigation, the Department of Information and Communication Technology (DICT) revealed its suspicion that an undisclosed foreign actor may have been the creator of the deepfakes (PCO, 2024). An investigation by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute discovered that pro-Duterte social media accounts distributing deepfake content may have been linked to the CCP (Zhang, 2024). However, it remains unconfirmed whether the Chinese government has been involved, although several studies suggested a high likelihood of the CCP’s disinformation efforts in its South China Sea narrative (Jalli & Martinez, 2025; Vitug, 2025; Zhang, 2024).
Despite unidentified origins, the circulation of deepfakes demonstrates that deepfake content has become a critical tool in fabricating false narratives to undermine the authority of the incumbent political leader and mobilise support for the opponent (Jalli & Martinez, 2025; Zhang, 2024). Learning from these case studies, this article will elaborate on significant steps that addressed malicious deepfakes ahead of the 2025 midterm elections, which will demonstrate the government’s preparedness for the subsequent 2028 presidential election. In the next sections, the progress of legal development and public-private partnerships will be discussed.
PROGRESS OF LEGISLATIONS AND REGULATIONS ON AI-POWERED DEEPFAKES
3.1 Pending legislations
Given that deepfakes can be used to influence public opinions regarding political candidates, the Philippines has taken significant steps to protect its information ecosystems. The Congress has made progress in addressing regulatory gaps by proposing the following legislation.
On July 1st, 2024, House Bill 10567, also known as the Deepfake Accountability and Transparency Act, was introduced by the House of Representatives. The bill will require transparency by demanding disclosures of content created or modified by AI technologies before its distribution on the internet (Digital Policy Alert, 2024). The bill also sets out the penalty of up to five million Philippine pesos (Reyes, 2025).
Another piece of legislation includes the House Bill 7913, or the AI Regulation Act, proposed on May 2nd, 2023 (Enriquez, 2025). One of the provisions in this bill pertains to the prohibition of “the development, application, and use of AI to manipulate, exploit, or control any person” (House Bill No. 7913, 2023). Any violation or assistance to the violation will result in a punishment between six months and six years in prison and a ban from holding public office (House Bill No. 7913, 2023).
However, these bills on deepfakes and AI technologies have not yet been enacted (Enriquez, 2025). While these bills await Congress to resume its consideration in July 2025, other bills, such as the Revised Penal Code and the Cybercrime Prevention Act, can be applied to any distribution of false information harmful to the public order or the national interest (Bajo, 2024; Reyes, 2025).
3.2 Short-term and medium-term responses
With the absence of specific legislation against deepfakes, the government implemented a short-term response by imposing government guidelines. As deepfakes are one of the priority concerns for the elections, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) was prompt to issue Resolution No. 11064 as guidelines for election campaigns, which took effect on September 26th, 2024 (Opiah, 2024).
The resolution required all official accounts for election campaigns to be registered with the COMELEC and any campaign materials to be disclosed with disclaimers or watermarks if such materials involved AI technologies (COMELEC, 2024; Baker McKenzie, 2024). Technology service providers were also required to assist COMELEC with ensuring the compliance of guidelines (COMELEC, 2024; Baker McKenzie, 2024). To safeguard information integrity during elections, the COMELEC also set up a multistakeholder task force on election-specific content that was disseminated on various types of media (Enriquez, 2024).
The Philippine government has started implementing medium-term responses in early 2025 to handle deepfake issues at the national level (Enriquez, 2025). For example, the Marcos administration established the National Deepfake Task Force (NDTF), headed by the PCO, in March 2025. The NDTF will be mandated to standardise the production and distribution of AI-generated content, including the labelling requirement. The CICC is also in the process of drafting guidelines to regulate deepfake content (Gatpolintan, 2025; Jose, 2025).
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS WITH TECHNOLOGY FIRMS
Tackling AI-powered deepfakes requires a whole-of-society approach (Enrigez, 2025). Recently, the DICT and COMELEC spearheaded the building of public-private partnerships with leading technology companies in the Philippines and Southeast Asia to diversify different technological tools against deepfakes and implement awareness-raising initiatives (Magno, 2025).
In collaboration with Ensign, a Singapore-based company, the DICT, through the CICC, procured an AI-powered detection tool to verify deepfake content with speed and 95 percent accuracy (Magno, 2025; Rosales, 2025). To promote decentralisation of information verification, the CICC will share this tool with credible institutions and communities, ranging from universities to organisations observing elections (Magno, 2025).
The DICT also established a partnership with Google Philippines to monitor online circulation of harmful content, including deepfakes (DICT, 2025). The CICC will set up a coordination mechanism to liaise with Google Philippines when content that violates the Philippines’ laws and Google’s global policies is detected. At the same time, Google Philippines will develop its AI-powered detection tools for content monitoring (DICT, 2025).
Furthermore, Google Philippines will assist the DICT with promoting digital literacy campaigns under the government’s Digital Bayanihan initiative to empower Filipinos with critical thinking skills when they engage with online information (DICT, 2025). For instance, Google will support the Asia Society for Social Improvement and Sustainable Transformation (ASSIST) to implement DigiBayanihan 2.0. This campaign aims to enhance digital knowledge and essential skills for communities in Mindanao and Visayas (DICT, 2025).
Specifically for the elections, the COMELEC has been working with Microsoft Philippines, which equipped the COMELEC with cybersecurity solutions (Maquera, 2025). For example, Microsoft AccountGuard will help defend the institution from cyberattacks, while the Deepfake Reporting Tool will address deceptive AI-generated media across Microsoft platforms and services that will likely affect electoral campaigns (Khaitan, 2025). In addition, Microsoft Philippines assisted the Philippines’ policymakers in developing standards and regulations on AI while providing training sessions to political parties on deepfake identification and protection tools (Maquera, 2025).
CONCLUSION
The Philippines has been experiencing AI-powered deepfake threats to its elections that sought to influence voter perceptions through the delegitimisation of political candidates and maritime territorial disputes (Jalli & Martinez, 2025; Zhang, 2024). The government’s responses to deepfakes in disinformation operations prior to the 2025 mid-term elections demonstrated significant progress in preparing the country for the upcoming 2028 presidential election (Enriquez, 2025).
Overall, the Philippines has been prepared but still requires further actions. The Philippine government has been active in its responses to counter deepfake content, ranging from the NDTF and the COMELEC deepfake task force to public-private partnerships (Gatpolintan, 2025; Opiah, 2024). The collaboration with leading technology firms also reflected the government’s commitment to the whole-of-society approach in which stakeholders in the private sector were encouraged to engage in safeguarding the elections and information ecosystems (Enriquez, 2025).
However, the Philippine government is recommended to expedite the legislation and regulations on AI-powered deepfakes, while the regulating mechanisms, such as the existing task forces, should be systematised to avoid overlapping mandates (Enriquez, 2025). Moreover, the Philippine government should maintain its commitment to empowering the public by ensuring freedom of expression and refraining from exploiting the legislation to impose censorship against government critics (Magno, 2025; Enriquez, 2025).
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