Introduction
Japan is often viewed as a country with little ethnic diversity, which is further endorsed by the government of Japan (Cidale, 2024). However, the reality is different from this perception, as individuals of ethnic origin are regarded as Japanese based on their citizenship within official records, and many individuals of ethnic origin hide their heritage due to discrimination (Cidale, 2024). Among the struggles of ethnic minorities living in Japan, the ethnic Koreans face difficulties in integrating into Japanese society. Due to complex historical issues in the treatment of ethnic Koreans and current problems with the difficulty of obtaining citizenship and lack of recognition of the ethnic minority by the Japanese government, the ethnic Koreans are living in a limbo in Japan. Despite having established their homes and families in Japan for an extended period of time, they lack access to fundamental rights and are deemed as individuals who will migrate back to South Korea. The historical treatment of the ethnic Koreans in Japan has further created diplomatic tension between South Korea and Japan, creating bilateral cooperation issues between the countries. Therefore, this article will address the background of ethnic Koreans, the human rights issues faced by them and the root causes, implications and possible solutions for the diplomatic tensions present between South Korea and Japan.
Background of the ethnic Koreans
The ethnic Koreans are also referred to as the “Zainichi Koreans”, meaning “residing in Japan Koreans” in Japanese, highlighting their temporary residency and lack of full citizenship in Japan (Cidale, 2024). Furthermore, within terminology, a distinction is drawn between South Koreans, referred to as Zainichi Kankokujin and North Koreans, referred to as Zainichi Chōsenjin, where the focus of this article is mainly on individuals with South Korean affiliation (Cidale, 2024). It is important to note that the term refers to Korean descendants who migrated to Japan before or during World War II.
In 1910, Japan occupied the Korean peninsula, following which, between 1920 and 1930, there was an increase in Korean migrants due to labour shortages in Japan (Cidale, 2024). Most of the migrants originated from southern Korea and were poor peasants, who were forcibly brought to Japan, as the farmers’ land was taken away by Japanese land surveys (Cidale, 2024). These migrants commonly ended up in mining and construction sectors, and their wages were lower than those of the ethnic Japanese workers.
As a tool to justify Japan’s colonial conquests, it adopted a mixed nation theory, according to which Japan was a mix of different people, rather than a homogenous theory consisting of people with the same origins and common culture (Cidale, 2024). In line with the utilisation of this theory, Koreans were provided with limited citizenship with universal male suffrage in 1925. In 1939, nearly one million Koreans were conscripted for the war and around 80,000 Korean women were forced into wartime prostitution, referred to as “comfort women” (Cidale, 2024).
However, when World War II ended, Korean migrants lost their citizenship and other privileges, as Japan released its colonies, and thereby turned to the utilisation of the homogenous theory. Additionally, as a result of the adoption of the Japanese Alien Registration Law, every person without a Japanese family registry was considered a foreigner and a strict naturalisation process was put in place, according to which the nationality could only be acquired by bloodline from the father’s side (Cidale, 2024). In addition, due to an Allied occupation of Japan by the US from the end of World War II to 1952, communism was seen as a threat to the governance of the nation. Koreans were commonly condemned as they were associated with communism, and some participated in actions that undermined the collaboration efforts between Japan and the US (Cidale, 2024). This led to the establishment of exclusionary measures against the ethnic Koreans, including the deprivation of the Japanese nationality that the Zainichi Koreans formerly might have held in 1952.
Human Rights Issues faced by the ethnic Koreans
The fragmentation of the Zainichi Koreans from the Japanese society and consequent struggle for their rights began in the aftermath of World War II, where the government’s attempts to exclude the ethnic Koreans led to a perception amongst Zainichi Koreans that they are temporary residents and outsiders (Cidale, 2024). However, since 1965, some progress has taken place, granting rights to the Zainichi Koreans, where the introduction of the South Korea-Japan Diplomatic Normalisation Treaty allowed Koreans who classified themselves as South Koreans to apply for special permanent residency and provided for some residency rights (Cidale, 2024). However, this excluded North Koreans who were not willing to be classified as South Koreans from obtaining permanent residence, leaving them stateless.
In lieu of activism and the ratification of international human rights treaties by Japan, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Zainichi Koreans were granted additional rights (Cidale, 2024). These rights included access to welfare programmes, such as health insurance, pension, old-age welfare pension, child-rearing allowance, and public housing. Additionally, those who identified as North Koreans were also granted the special permanent residency status in addition to South Koreans (Cidale, 2024). These changes improved Zainichi Koreans’ socioeconomic status, as they were able to enjoy more rights and access better employment.
Despite progress having been made, severe discriminatory practices and violations of Zainichi Koreans’ human rights remain. The acquisition of Japanese nationality is primarily based on naturalisation, which creates difficulties for many ethnic Koreans (Cidale, 2024). As dual nationality is prohibited in Japan, Zainichi Koreans are required to abandon their Korean nationality in order to obtain Japanese nationality (Minority Rights Group, 2018). Despite having been born and raised in Japan and having Japanese as their mother tongue, the fact that neither parent holds Japanese nationality remains a persistent barrier. The naturalisation process becomes very costly, due to attorney fees required to obtain all the needed documents to prove their family histories, and the lack of privacy present creates humiliation and stress for individuals (Cidale, 2024). Furthermore, the naturalisation process does not erase the underlying feelings of being an outsider within Japanese society due to holding ethnic Korean roots, which further deters Zainichi Koreans from applying for naturalisation.
Due to the lack of naturalisation and the resulting citizenship, ethnic Koreans are prohibited from holding government positions and voting, preventing them from being able to influence the politics of the country they live in (Cidale, 2024). Despite employment as a public employee being possible in theory, local authorities have the right to limit the number of foreigners hired (Cidale, 2024). Furthermore, positions such as a civil rights commissioner, a firefighter, and a judicial commissioner are not available to foreign nationals, such as Zainichi Koreans.
A study conducted by the Korean Scholarship Foundation found that widespread discrimination is present towards Zainichi Koreans (Goto, 2021). For instance, the study found that Zainichi Koreans were subjected to verbal harassment in schools by their classmates, other students, and teachers (Goto, 2021). Similar experiences were felt by those in part-time jobs, who were verbally harassed by customers (Goto, 2021). A few examples of this verbal harassment included a teacher asking a student whether they were a North Korean spy and classmates telling them to get out of Japan (Goto, 2021). Moreover, ethnic discrimination surfaces in online spaces, where many refrain from using the internet to avoid seeing such discriminatory content (Goto, 2021). A high percentage of respondents had heard hate demonstrations or speeches, while some experienced offensive encounters in public, including stores, public transportation or government offices. Some had been treated in a discriminatory manner when trying to rent accommodation or apply for employment (Goto, 2021). The presence of xenophobia has even evolved into physical violence targeted towards Zainichi Koreans. Commonly, the ethnic Koreans have two names, their ethnic name, which reveals their ethnic roots, as well as a Japanese alias, where the alias is used in order to avoid being discriminated against (Cidale, 2024).
The educational development of Zainichi Koreans is also limited. Many ethnic Koreans attend privately run Korean schools, where they can learn the language and culture, which is lacking in schools run by the state. However, most of the Korean schools are not eligible for university entrance examinations (Minority Rights Group, 2018). While other foreign schools benefit from governmental financial support, school tuition-waver programmes, and tax-exemptions, the Korean schools are exempt (Minority Rights Group, 2018). Due to many Korean schools not being recognised as regular schools, graduates commonly face discrimination on the employment market.
Causes of diplomatic tension between South Korea and Japan
The relations between South Korea and Japan have been rather cold during the post-war period and historical grievances remain prevalent between the nations. Contentious issues include the comfort women, where women were forced into wartime prostitution, compensation for wartime forced labour by Japanese companies, historical revisionism by Japan, and the social exclusion of Zainichi Koreans in Japan. Due to the Japanese government’s unwillingness to address and continually minimise these issues and the contrasts created by nationalism, a solution for cooperative diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan seems difficult.
The issue of the use of comfort women during the war era stayed silent for decades and only after 1991 started to cause diplomatic tensions between South Korea and Japan when Kim Hak-sun, a former comfort woman, spoke up on the matter (Ushiyama, 2021). Issues lie in the fact that the Japanese far-right wing of the government, known as ‘historical revisionists’, deny the forced prostitution of comfort women, while survivors are demanding financial reparations from Japan (Ushiyama, 2021).
The comfort women system started in the 1930s as an institutionalised military prostitution and grew into an integral part of the military operations until it was dissolved in 1945 (Ushiyama, 2021). The comfort stations or recreational centres where legal prostitution took place were set up in order to reduce rape occurring on the battlefield. However, many of the comfort women were forcibly recruited into prostitution, such as through false pretences, being sold to traffickers, through abductions in their hometowns or on the battlefield (Ushiyama, 2021). The conditions the comfort women faced would be regarded as sexual slavery nowadays, where they were burdened by debt, leading to having no freedom to choose their work or move freely and faced systematic rape as well as physical violence (Ushiyama, 2021).
In 1992, Japan officially issued its first public apology, succeeded by a few additional apologies in the coming years, and admitted to the military’s involvement within the comfort women system (Ushiyama, 2021). However, according to Japan’s position, its liability for any reparations had ended within the 1956 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea. As a resolution to the issue, Japan established a third-sector fund, the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF), which gave out private donations as relief payments to the survivors, however many Korean survivors rejected this as being insincere (Uashiyama, 2021). The AWF plan caused historical revisionism among the Japanese right-wing activists, with calls to reform historical textbooks on the matter.
Not only do the conservative supporters continue to deny the Japanese imperial wrongdoings towards the ethnic Koreans who were forced into prostitution, but they also deny the forced labour practices conducted during the war by Japanese companies. Around 150,000 Koreans were forced to work in factories and mines in Japan during the war as part of Japan’s colonisation of the Korean peninsula between 1910-1945 (Mackenzie & Yong, 2023). The victims of Japan’s forced labour have neither received recognition nor compensation (Prakash, 2024). In 2018, the South Korean Supreme Court issued a ruling ordering Japan’s Nippon Steel and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries to pay mental compensation to 15 victims of forced labour, however the companies refused (Mackenzie & Yong, 2023). Previous South Korean administrations had attempted to achieve reparations payments from Japan, however South Korea’s former president Yoon’s government controversially exempted Japanese companies from paying reparations to the victims and their families (Yang, 2023). Thereby, a third-party debt repayment system was put in place in 2023, where the reparations came through a foundation established under a government ministry with voluntary contributions from Japanese and South Korean businesses (Yang, 2023).
According to victims and opposition, this was a blatant disregard of the Supreme Court ruling and provided immunity for Japanese businesses that took part in forced labour practices and failed to provide any voluntary contributions to the established fund (Yang, 2023). While former president Yoon’s actions improved the South Korea-Japan relations, it has been viewed as degrading diplomacy by the opposition, and Japan’s stance on its involvement in forced labour has not changed. One barrier to resolution is the fact that the wartime violations were committed by the ancestors of current generations, leading some to argue that the current generation is not responsible for the deeds of their ancestors. This creates a stalemate, where South Korea is requesting an apology from Japan and the current generation of Japan is not willing to take responsibility for the actions done in the past.
While these issues remain at the forefront of the diplomatic tensions between South Korea and Japan, the anti-Korean views and discrimination targeted against ethnic Koreans enhance the tensions in the background (Grimaldi, 2022). The colonial era views which painted Zainichi Koreans as dangerous and sabotaging US-Japan relations have not been erased. Disinformation about ethnic Koreans committing vicious acts remains prevalent and often resurfaces after misfortunate events, such as the assassination of the former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo or the arson attack on the Shuri Castle in Tokyo (Grimaldi, 2022). This is increasing the already existing social exclusion of the ethnic Koreans living in Japan, which in turn is not viewed well by the South Korean counterpart.
Implications and solutions for diplomatic tension between South Korea and Japan
The persistent diplomatic tensions between the two nations continue to negatively impact the daily lives of ethnic Koreans and exacerbate issues relating to the tourism, trade, and security sectors. Especially after the South Korean Supreme Court ruling on the wartime forced labour compensations and other successive rulings, these negative consequences have intensified.
The day-to-day life effects can be seen in the downfall of sales for ethnic Korean business owners, with one Korean cosmetics shop owner reporting having lost half their customers in 2019 (McCurry, 2019). However, shop owners who sell products to a younger target audience expressed no decrease in sales. Furthermore, discrimination and hate speech in the form of threats towards ethnic Koreans appear to have increased as a result of poor relations between Japan and South Korea, creating insecurity within daily lives (McCurry, 2019).
Economic issues have also created barriers for trade between the nations. In 2019, in retaliation for the Supreme Court ruling, Japan placed restrictions on the exports of semiconductor materials, vital for South Korea’s technology industry, and removed South Korea’s fast-track export status. At the same time, South Korea removed Japan from its list of trading partners that receive preferential treatment (McCurry, 2019). Furthermore, in 2019, tourism from South Korea to Japan had dropped 48 percent compared to the previous year due to boycotts (McCurry, 2019). The impacts of these trade restrictions encompass Japan and South Korea’s value chains, but potentially had a larger impact on neighbouring countries as well (Shin & Balister, 2022). While Korea is a major supplier of parts used within the technology industry, the economies of the countries that rely on those parts will also be negatively impacted by the trade restrictions, as the production of electronic devices also suffered a significant hit from this. Furthermore, the boycotts from Korea against Japanese services and products have negative implications for the Japanese economy (Shin & Balisteri, 2022). Additionally, indirect effects can flow to other nations’ economies, such as the Chinese economy, as goods sold within some Japanese brands are produced in China. Moreover, the investment and exchange between South Korean and Japanese businesses decreased, resulting from the trade dispute. However, due to restoring the removed trade regulations in 2023, the negative economic implications have started to turn for the better.
Security cooperation has also suffered, creating a dangerous space for instability within the Korean peninsula from North Korea’s ballistic missile and nuclear threat as well as the possibility for adversaries, such as China and Russia, to disrupt regional cooperation in order to further their own goals (Matsuda & Park, 2019). In 2019, South Korea invalidated the intelligence sharing pact with Japan, which had the possibility to impede the countries’ ability to counter North Korea’s threats, however by 2023 the pact was reinstated (McCurry, 2019). In addition to North Korea’s nuclear threat, China’s views of absorbing Taiwan are a major factor in bringing regional instability, where trilateral security cooperation is pivotal as well (Taylor, 2022).
In order to move forward and create functioning diplomatic relations amongst the nations, the past must be acknowledged. Even though the former president Yoon’s administration released Japanese businesses from their legal obligations to pay reparations to wartime forced labourers, the administration in South Korea has changed following the impeachment of former president Yoon. With the new administration in power, the bandage put on the contentious issues of wartime forced labourers’ relief efforts by Yoon might not hold. Therefore, as the historical grievances are the focal point of the diplomatic tension between Japan-South Korea relations, a compromise which is suitable for both countries in the long-run should be sought between the countries to foster lasting bilateral cooperation between Japan and South Korea (Ahn, 2023). Furthermore, as the Yoon administration already made the move to compromise on the forced labour issue, some degree of compromise might be expected from the Japanese administration in the form of an official apology as well as requiring the defendant companies to provide contributions to the already established third-party payment system (Ahn, 2023). It remains to be seen whether the Japanese administration will take this step to reconcile the tense relations revolving around the forced labour issue.
Conclusion
World War II has left many scars on the ethnic Koreans residing in Japan. From forced labour to prostitution and discrimination coupled with human rights abuses, the Zainichi Koreans have and are faced with grave struggles as an ethnic minority in Japan. Their ethnic roots, despite the current generations having been born and raised in Japan, create a big divide in Japanese society, where many hide their true heritage in order to blend in and avoid discrimination. Moreover, due to the grave difficulties of obtaining citizenship in Japan, the Zainichi Koreans, recognised as foreigners by the Japanese government, face limitations on their human rights, such as not being able to influence the politics of the country they are living in, creating a vicious cycle where they are not able to stand up for their rights. Further limitations stem from the lack of educational development placed on the Zainichi Koreans, as the private Korean schools are not recognised as regular schools, evading the possibility for further academic development and job discrimination based on their educational background from a Korean school. These issues compounded by the anti-Korean sentiment in Japan create major barriers to living a peaceful life for the ethnic Koreans in Japan.
The historical grievances between Japan and South Korea have created vast tension in the diplomatic ties between the countries, where bilateral cooperation is lacking. The nationalist views in both South Korea and Japan, creating opposing views as well as the lack of recognition of wartime atrocities from Japan have pushed the countries’ relations to stagnation. This has had wide effects on the daily life of ethnic Koreans, tourism and issues on trade and security. The way forward with the diplomatic relations of South Korea and Japan rests on the ability of the nations to reconcile the historical grievances and focus on the pressing need to uphold the trilateral security cooperation of Japan, US, and South Korea in order to maintain peace and avoid negative implications on the economies of affected nations. As can be seen the implications of diplomatic tensions are far-reaching, calling for active compromise and dialogue between the nations.
Bibliography
Ahn, H. (2023, April 17). South Korea-Japan Relations: Surviving the forced Labour Dilemma. The National Bureau of Asian Research. Retrieved on 25 August 2025 from https://www.nbr.org/publication/south-korea-japan-relations-surviving-the-forced-labor-dilemma/.
Cidale, F. (2024, February 26). Zainich Koreans in Japan: Exploring the Ethnic Minority’s Challenges. CEIAS. Retrieved on 19 August 2025 from https://ceias.eu/zainichi-koreans-in-japan-exploring-the-ethnic-minoritys-challenges/.
Goto, Y. (2021, February 21). ‘There is no discrimination in Japan’: Survey results show statement is far from true. The Mainichi. Retrieved on 20 August 2025 from https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20210220/p2a/00m/0na/015000c.
Grimaldi, C. M. (2022, September 29). Anti-Korean Sentiment Simmers in Japan. The Diplomat. Retrieved on 25 August 2025 from https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/anti-korean-sentiment-simmers-in-japan/.
Mackenzie, J. & Yong, N. (2023, March 6). South Korea to compensate victims of Japan’s wartime forced labour. BBC. Retrieved on 25 August 2025 from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-64858944.
Matsuda, T. & Park, J. (2019, November 7). Geopolitics Redux: Explaining the Japan-Korea Dispute and Its Implications for Greater Power Competition. War on the Rocks. Retreieved on 25 August 2025 from https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/geopolitics-redux-explaining-the-japan-korea-dispute-and-its-implications-for-great-power-competition/.
McCurry, J. (2019). ‘We have to get along’: Japan’s Korean residents at sharp end of diplomatic row. The Guardian. Retrieved on 25 August 2025 from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/29/we-have-to-get-along-japan-korean-residents-at-sharp-end-of-diplomatic-row.
Minority Rights Group. (2018, April). Koreans in Japan. Retrieved on 19 August 2025 from https://minorityrights.org/communities/koreans/.
Prakash, M. (2024, July 18). Zainichi Koreans In Japan And Their Rights As Foreign Nationals. IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science, 29(7), 39-45.
Shin, S. & Balisteri, E. J. (2022, April). The other trade war: quantifying the Korea-Japan trade dispute. Journal of Asian Economics, 79. Retrieved on 26 August 2025 from https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asieco.2022.101442.
Taylor, M. J. R. (2022, October 31). Obstacles to US-South Korea Alliance Regional Contingency Planning and Considerations for US Policy. Air University. Retrieved on 26 August 2025 from https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3212706/obstacles-to-ussouth-korea-alliance-regional-contingency-planning-and-considera .
Ushiyama, R. (2021, December 9). ‘Comfort women must fall’? Japanese governmental responses to ‘comfort women’ statutes around the world. Memory Studies, 14(6), 1255-1271. Retrieved on 21 August 2025 from https://doi.org/10.1177/17506980211054308.
Yang, K. (2023, June 29). Rethinking South Korea-Japan Relations. East Asia Foundation. Retrieved on 21 August 2025 from https://www.keaf.org/en/book/EAF_Policy_Debates/Rethinking_South_Korea_Japan_Relations?ckattempt=2.
